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Abstract 
 
The primary motivation behind this thesis was to examine how illicit drugs represent 
a multidimensional threat to the security of Pacific island states and the region as a 
whole. However, this research was presented with significant challenges before it 
began, which included the illegality of the subject matter, the confidentiality of law 
enforcement intelligence and the fact that there was a near total absence of 
academic research and statistics concerning drugs within the region. In order to 
overcome these challenges, this thesis blends a synthesis of conflict and security 
literature, reports from international and non-governmental organisations and the 
concepts of securitisation developed by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever & Jaap de Wilde 
in Security: A Framework for Analysis (1998). The domestic environment of the 
states that form the case studies are examined, the negative influences of drugs are 
presented and the perceptions and responses of the governments are discussed. 
Furthermore, the comparative aspect of this thesis, where two case studies are 
drawn from the Caribbean, Jamaica and Haiti, and two from the Pacific, Papua New 
Guinea and Fiji, ensures a thorough understanding of the complex challenges 
posed to state security, and provides a window for examining how states with 
similar characteristic and weaknesses are threatened by drugs. For example, 
throughout Papua New Guinea, marijuana has facilitated the acquisition of small 
arms and light weapons by both criminal groups and villages involved in conflict. In 
Fiji, there is the potential for the trafficking of drugs to destabilise the state by 
providing support to criminal groups and those currently involved with transnational 
criminal activities. This thesis concludes that the cultivation, production and 
trafficking of illicit drugs present an immediate and long-term threat to the Pacific, 
and that the security architecture for the region must be enhance to combat this 
formidable threat. 
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Thesis Introduction 
 
Thesis Question 
 
Does the cultivation, production and trafficking of illicit drugs throughout the Pacific 
region represent a threat to the security and stability of Pacific island states, and 
regional security as a whole? How does the experience of Caribbean states assist 
with illustrating the potential security threats? 
 
Thesis Rationale 
 
1. There is a tremendous lack of academic investigation and research into drugs 
and drug-related issues within the Pacific. 
 
2. The information and research that is available does not examine or discuss the 
associated security issues for PIS or for the region as a whole.  
 
3. Drugs may present a fundamental threat to the region now and in the future, and 
as such research is therefore required to highlight the potentially negative 
consequences associated with their cultivation, production, trafficking, and to inform 
policy initiatives and anti-drug measures.  
 
Methodology 
 
The structure of this thesis and the theoretical framework that is employed is 
designed to overcome the lack of information and research regarding drugs and 
drug-related security issues throughout the Pacific. It utilises the concepts 
developed through the cooperation of Barry Buzan, Ole Waever & Jaap de Wilde in 
Security: A Framework for Analysis (1998) to organise each of the four case studies. 
Each of the  case studies are comprised of one state, and both the historical and 
contemporary presence of drugs are discussed, as is how they have merged with 
the particular political, military, societal and economic characteristics of the state. 
The actions of neighbouring states, powerful regional actors and intergovernmental 
organisations are also discussed as they often exert a strong influence upon the 
presence of drugs and the formation of domestic and regional drug-related policies. 
Furthermore, the anti-drug measures of each government and its perceptions of the 
drug-related problems present throughout the country are discussed at length in 
order to overcome this absence of detailed drug-related information.  
 
The Caribbean was chosen as an ideal region in which to compare the 
Pacific to, as those states share similar features such as their size and capabilities, 
the ability of foreign actors to exert a strong level of influence upon them and the 
continuing complexity of their sovereignty arrangements. The Caribbean has 
experience drug-related insecurity for a considerable period of time, and it was 
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hoped that they would provide an opportunity to examine potential security threats 
that could occur in the Pacific in the future. Lastly, the decision was made to 
examine two states for both regions in order to illustrate the complexity of drug-
related security issues, and the range of strategies and governmental commitment 
to dealing with the threats that they pose. The framework for this thesis is discussed 
in detail within Chapter Two.  
 
While it is beyond the scope and capabilities of this thesis to measure or 
estimate the availability of drugs throughout the Pacific, the primary objective of it to 
investigate how drugs merge with, and exacerbate, contemporary issues and assist 
with the creation of new sources of insecurity and instability is achievable. 
 
Drug Definitions1 
 
Amphetamine/Methamphetamine/Ice 
 
Amphetamines are produced from an oil base but may be found in a number of forms. The most common is for the oil to be converted into a 
powder. The powder may be made into capsules or tablets. Methamphetamine may appear as rock-like crystals or as a liquid. 
Methamphetamine, although structurally similar to amphetamine, is more pure and longer lasting. Occasionally a very high purity gel or 
putty like substance can be produced. Amphetamine is often "cut" with adulterants such as sugar, glucose or ephedrine. 
 
Cocaine  
 
Cocaine is extracted from the leaves of the coca bush. Cocaine is most commonly available as cocaine hydrochloride, a white powder, 
although it can found as an alkaloid form for smoking or in the form of small crystals known as "crack". In its powdered form, cocaine is 
often "cut" with other substances such as lactose, sucrose and talcum powder to increase volume and reduce purity. 
 
Ecstasy 
 
Ecstasy is the street name for a range of drugs including, or similar in chemical structure to MDMA (methylenedioxymethamphetamine). 
Some of these include MDA, MDEA and PMA. Ecstasy belongs to the family of synthetic drugs known as phenethylamines. Ecstasy tablets 
may contain varying mixtures of MDMA and related drugs (including amphetamine) as well other substances. Many ecstasy pills are fake 
and contain little or no MDMA. 
In its original form, ecstasy is a white, bitter-tasting oil. It is usually available in tablet form and sometimes as capsules. Tablets vary in 
colour, size and design. Tablets may be crushed to give the appearance of a powde 
 
Heroin  
 
Heroin is an opioid or narcotic analgesic made from a sticky resin secreted by the opium poppy, Papaver somniferum. Produced by a 
chemical process, it results in a white, brown or pink powder or granules. Street heroin is often "cut" with additives making it difficult to 
establish the actual contents or purity of a street deal. A crude form of heroin made from codeine is known as "homebake". 
 
Marijuana/Cannabis 
 
Cannabis is a drug obtained from the leaves, stems, flowers and seeds of the Cannabis sativa plant. The active psychotropic ingredient in 
cannabis is THC (delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol). Cannabis is generally found in three forms. Marijuana, a mix of dried leaves and flowers 
of the cannabis plant, is the most common but least potent form of cannabis. Hashish, dried cannabis resin, has a higher concentration of 
THC and produces stronger effects. Hashish oil, a thick oily liquid, is the most powerful form of cannabis. 
 
 
 
                                                
1
 http://www.aic.gov.au/research/drugs/types/  
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Chapter One 
 
Literature Review 
 
 
The Pacific Region and the Paucity of Illicit Drug Research 
 
The increasing seizure of drugs and the disruption of elaborate clandestine 
operations by both regional police and customs agencies combined with the 
estimated volume of drug cultivation, production and trafficking occurring 
throughout the Pacific indicates that there is significant cause for concern. Three 
pertinent examples demonstrate the extent to which the region has become 
intimately involved with drugs, these are: the seizure of 502kgs of cocaine trafficked 
in the yacht Bora Bora II that were off-loaded into a rendezvous yacht, the Ngaire 
Wha, after multiple PIS had been visited during 2000; operation Logrunner (2000) 
that intercepted 357kgs of heroin inside a shipping container in Fiji; and finally, 
operation Outrigger (2004) where a clandestine laboratory with the capacity for the 
commercial production of methamphetamine was dismantled in Fiji. 
 
However, in spite of the extensive investment of governmental, institutional 
and private resources into research devoted specifically to contemporary security 
concerns, very little has been published regarding drug related insecurity in the 
Pacific. Similarly, academic investigations into the consequences of drugs have 
frequently cited some of the potential threats, though they have failed to adequately 
explore them or situate them within an appropriate security discourse. Moreover, 
while both police and customs agencies throughout the region are explicitly aware 
of the contemporary drug situation and have published reports outlining their 
concerns, these have equally failed to generate significant academic investigation. 
A diminutive amount of literature therefore exists for the region (with the obvious 
exception of New Zealand and Australia) while many of the important investigation 
undertaken have been overlooked or have failed to attract an appropriate level of 
attention. Unfortunately, the negligible amount of literature that is available often 
focuses upon the associated health aspects and the potential for social harm, 
though what is available has universally highlighted the need for further research 
and statistical analysis into the presence of drugs. Lastly, the potential threats 
posed by drugs in the region are often included under the rubric of transnational 
crime (TNC), though deplorably, they are frequently discussed without the 
employment of illustrative case studies or discussion of the specific modus operandi 
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of those criminals involved, and as a consequence, little can be extrapolated for 
comparison elsewhere.  
 
The recent overview article by Devaney et al highlights this sincere dearth of 
information, they assert that: “Currently, there is no overall regional or country-
based illicit drug policy for the Pacific and few treatment programs; limited data exist 
to aid in understanding illicit drug use and the harms associated with its use in the 
Pacific.” 2 Increasing apprehension is also auditable over the escalating drug 
problems present throughout American Pacific territories, and information 
concerning their presence there is more fully developed than for other PIS. The 
presence of this situation necessitates an adequate and overarching investigation 
of drugs, their potential influence upon PIS and an examination of the threats they 
pose to regional security.  
 
The recent conference paper by Schloenhardt demonstrates the deprived 
state of academic literature, as disturbingly, this paper represents one of the few 
publications that devote more than parsimonious attention to regional drug issues.3 
More importantly, Schloenhardt highlights a significant point of contention that 
exists; that there is neither the demand nor the financial capacity for the 
establishment of domestic or regional drug markets throughout the Pacific. 
According to Shaun Evans, former Law Enforcement Advisor for the Pacific Islands 
Forum, the very low cost of production for amphetamine-type substances (ATS) 
ensures that local communities would be able to afford drugs that are considered 
more dangerous than marijuana.4 Similarly, the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) has asserted that the primary concern in the region was now 
increasing incidents of trafficking, and that the demand for methamphetamine was 
growing, which as a consequence would lead to the establishment of local 
                                                
2
 Madonna L. Devaney et al, “Illicit drug use and responses in six Pacific Island countries”, Drug and Alcohol 
Review Vol.25 (2006) p.387 
3
 Andreas Schloenhardt, “Drugs, Sex and Guns: Organised Crime in the South Pacific” (Paper presented at 
the conference Regionalising International Criminal Law, University of Canterbury, Christchurch (NZ), 18-20 
August, 2006); Other recent articles include John Mcfarlane, “Regional and International Cooperation in 
Tackling Transnational Crime, Terrorism and the Problem of Disrupted States”, in Engaging Oceania with 
Pacific Asia, ed. Peter Cozens (Wellington, Centre for Strategic Studies: Victoria University, 2004); 
Lieutenant Colonel James Laki, “Transnational Issues Linking Oceania with Southeast Asia”, in Engaging 
Oceania with Pacific Asia, ed. Peter Cozens (Wellington, Centre for Strategic Studies: Victoria University, 
2004) 
4
 Shaun Evans, “Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat”, in Report of the Senate Ad-Hoc Select Committee 
Established to look into the Escalating use of Drugs and Related Crimes Including Sexual Crimes and 
Prostitution, The Senate, Vol.2, Parliamentary Paper No.22 (Suva: Fiji, Department of Legislature, 2006) 
submission.29 p.3 
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production facilities.5 In contrast, both Schloenhardt and Devaney et al have 
proposed that the exorbitant costs associated with drugs, with the exception of 
locally cultivated marijuana, in comparison to local incomes forms a prohibitive 
barrier to their widespread consumption.6 The very existence of this debate 
demonstrates that more research must be undertaken and publicised on the 
presence of drugs in order to further influence and assist with the development of 
anti-drug strategies and security policies within PIS and throughout the region. 
 
This thesis challenges the assertion that domestic drug markets are not 
viable within the Pacific. It will demonstrate that while marijuana may appear to be 
an innocuous drug, with only individualised health risks, the use of the profits from 
both the cultivation and sale of it can be employed in a range of activities that 
include the acquisition of small arms and light weapons (SALW), the provision of 
financial support for local gangs or even for reinvestment in acquiring harder, more 
profitable, drugs for supplying local markets. There is significant concern throughout 
the region that the profits derived from marijuana will be invested in acquiring and 
producing drugs such as methamphetamine, which could result in potentially 
devastating social consequences and increased levels of violence and crime.7 This 
scenario has, in all likelihood, already occurred in New Zealand and Australia, and 
it could equally occur within PIS. The development of such a scenario would result 
in significant insecurity and instability.  
 
At this point, it is important to remember that drugs conform to local market 
environments and represent a rational, though illegal business opportunity. Within 
Western states, the price for drugs is determined by the combination of a high level 
of disposable income and the principles of supply and demand.8 Such a situation is 
equally true for developing states, as consumers do not necessarily need to have a 
high level of disposable income in order to purchase drugs; local market forces 
determine the price accordingly. Examples of this are readily available, and include 
the substantial surge in ATS consumption in Thailand and throughout South East 
                                                
5
 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Regional Centre for East Asia and the Pacific,  “Pacific Profile: 
Pacific Islands”, Section II (2003) p.6-7 
6
 Schloenhardt, 2006, p.6; Devaney et al, 2006, p.388 
7
 Evans, 2006, p.2-3 no.24-29 
8
 See for example: The Independent, “Government in Crisis (I): Victory to the traffickers: Heroin and cocaine 
prices on the street are at record lows as seizures plummet”, November 25, 2007”; Ivelaw L. Griffith (A), 
“Introduction: Drugs and Political Economy”, in The Political Economy of Drugs in the Caribbean, ed. Ivelaw 
L. Griffith (London, MacMillian Press, 2000) p.3 
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Asia, and the high levels of heroin addiction along traditional Middle Eastern and 
Asian trafficking routes.  
 
The adoption of new security theories and the subsequent recognition of 
drugs as a pertinent security issue by New Zealand, Australia, the Pacific Islands 
Forum (Forum) and regional agencies such as the Oceania Customs Organisation 
(OCO) has resulted in the creation of a large body of official documents, briefing 
papers and communiqués that give credence to the potential threats. These 
documents are integral for constructing an assessment of the regional response 
towards drugs. As an example, in 2000 the New Zealand External Assessment 
Bureau noted that the Pacific region was acquiring an international reputation that 
was commensurate to that held by the Caribbean.9 However, the overriding need 
for some domestic security agencies and organisations to protect their interagency 
relationships and the required confidentiality of their intelligence—hence 
unattainable—does not prevent an insightful investigation. This official observation 
assists with justifying the undertaking of a comparison between the two regions by 
this thesis. Coincidentally, the OCO has begun to establish closer working relations 
with customs organisations throughout the Caribbean due to their concerns that 
pleasure craft are using the Panama Canal to bring drugs into the Pacific, though 
the development of this relationship is in its infancy.10 
 
The Changing Security Discourse: New and Traditional Paradigms in 
Security 
 
Fundamental geo-political changes that include both the ending of the Cold 
War and the current post-September 11th security discourse have assisted with the 
re-conceptualisation of traditional security paradigms, commonly referred to as 
realist or neo-realist. As a consequence, new interpretations and conceptions of 
what constitutes a threat, and indeed, what should be characterised as a threat 
towards state security and survival, have developed. The New Security Discourse 
(NSD) recognises the fact that insecurity derives as much from non-military and 
non-state actors as from interstate rivalry and armed conflict.  
 
The realist discourse emphasises the primacy of the state in international 
relations, and as such, threats to state security are identified according to a 
                                                
9
 The New Zealand External Assessments Bureau, Strategic Assessment 2000, 24 March 2000, p.15 
10
 Interview with Robert Taylor in Fiji, head of the Oceania Customs Organisation, 26 March 2008 
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restrictive criteria.11 Overriding emphasis is placed upon external military threats 
that derive from an identifiable sovereign source. Conflicts and wars between states 
are considered normal and as a by-product of the competitive and anarchic 
environment within the international system. Accordingly, Kerr succinctly 
summarises the discourse: “For traditionalists the referent object is the state, the 
main threat is other states that have the capability and intention to use force to 
achieve their goals. The means for countering such threats is military deterrence, 
and if necessary the use of force if attack seems imminent or actually takes place.” 12 
The pre-eminence of such an approach towards state security is logical and 
legitimate given the endemic nature of interstate conflict as demonstrated by both 
World Wars and the Cold War. However, as Jung and Schlichte observe, the 
theoretical underpinnings of realism have distorted its ability as a paradigm to 
account for the way that conflict and warfare have evolved, and therefore, the way in 
which state security is now challenged.13 The inability to recognise this 
transformation prevents the state from responding as it required to, and as a 
consequence, these new issues can ultimately become unmanageable and 
significantly destabilising.   
 
Security scholarship during the 1980s recognised that definitions of security 
required a more generalised meaning, as issues that were not necessarily thought 
of as a threat to the state increasingly transformed to a critical level where the state 
itself was endangered.14 According to Ullman: “…defining national security merely 
(or even primarily) in military terms conveys a profoundly false image of reality.” 15 
Furthermore: “…it causes states to concentrate on military threats and to ignore 
other and perhaps even more harmful dangers.” 16 The overriding critique of the 
realist discourse by the NSD is that issues of defence and security are both 
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subjective and relational, and that theories and frameworks cannot ignore changing 
real world circumstances in favour of long held assumptions and previously 
implemented policies. The NSD does not replace the traditional discourse, and it 
adds an additional dimension for understanding interstate relations and the causes 
of conflict where non-state actors and processes are involved, which can then be 
translated into realist policy equations.  
 
The NSD complements the traditional discourse, and in many instances 
these new issues are intimately connected with more traditional concerns, such as 
the precipitation of interstate warfare or competitive and combative foreign relations. 
Moreover, because of their transnational attributes and the fact that they often 
involve multiple states, new security issues are likely to strongly influence both 
bilateral and multilateral relations among states, and as a consequence this could 
also involved more traditional security concerns. For example, Thailand and 
Myanmar have clashed over the presence of drug production facilities along their 
mutual border, as those involved are beyond the reach of Thai authorities. The 
drugs produced directly impact upon both the Thai state and its citizens, and it is 
likely that a sizable proportion of the profits are used to support armed separatist 
groups that are present throughout the region.17 As another example, the incursion 
of Colombian armed forces into Ecuador during March 2008 in order to attack the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) serves as an example where 
drugs may not be directly linked to the initial confrontation, though they require 
recognition as it is widely known that FARC supports itself and its conflict with the 
Colombia government by its significant involvement with the production and 
trafficking of cocaine.18 The position of Colombia as the primary area for cocaine 
production in South America generates significant regional discussion, difficult 
bilateral relations and the involvement of external actors such as the United States 
(US). These two examples clearly demonstrate how the two security discourses are 
complementary when the subject of drugs is involved. 
    
The NSD has received considerable criticism, and has not enjoyed 
indifferent or apathetic acceptance despite its widespread employment and 
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adoption. Significant criticism is devoted by academics to the appropriateness of 
opening the security discourse to include new issues, as in their opinion this would 
make the field incoherent and the discourse devoid of any substantive meaning.19 
Moreover, internal criticism from the NSD itself has focused upon how the 
application of security frameworks upon new issues may militarise the response of 
the state, resulting in human rights abuses and the achievement of unstated 
political objectives.  
 
Within a Pacific context, both academics and security practitioners have 
traditionally regarded the region as devoid of traditional concerns because of the 
lack, and incomprehensibility, of armed interstate conflict occurring. As a 
consequence, it has been widely asserted that new security issues have always 
characterised the most pressing concerns throughout the region. However, armed 
intrastate conflict has frequently occurred, and enduring issues related to political 
competition, economic development and resource extraction ensures that there are 
a considerable number of issues for conflict to occur over. The presence of drug 
cultivation, production and trafficking will add an additional layer of complexity to 
these issues. It must be noted here, that while it is extremely unlikely that armed 
interstate conflict would ever occur over drugs between PIS, the possibility of 
strained and difficult bilateral relations and the development of domestic conflict 
where drugs are involved is possible. For example, this could occur between the 
Solomon Islands, Bougainville and PNG, or along the PNG-West Papua boarder, 
which could potentially involve the violation of PNG sovereignty as Indonesian 
authorities attempt to secure the border.   
 
Transnational Crime, Weak States and Sovereignty: The Maintenance 
of an Enabling Environment 
 
A broad consensus exists within the transnational criminal literature 
regarding the manner in which enhanced communications technology and 
increased economic interdependence have further facilitated an environment that is 
conducive for the cultivation, production and trafficking of drugs. 20 This 
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contemporary environment has resulted in a situation where drug issues can be re-
conceptualised as a significant transsoverign security concern, a threat to state 
security and an issue where the affects are not limited, or confined, to regions that 
are geographically proximate. Particular attention is dedicated by the TNC literature 
to the way in which globalisation has transformed and redefined the principles and 
practice of sovereignty, and therefore, the amount of control that can be exercised 
by state governments. 
 
According to Lock, globalisation has also assisted with the development and 
expansion of illicit parallel economies, resulting in a situation where informal 
markets and illicit commodities have merged with regular financial markets to cater 
to the drug demands of Western consumers.21 The extent of these contemporary 
developments and the concern surrounding them is demonstrated by the increasing 
attention given to Illicit International Political Economy. Furthermore, the vast 
economic dimensions associated with drug activities, TNC, and criminal networks 
combined with the linkages between these issues and both intrastate and interstate 
conflict ensure that these will continue to be significant contemporary security 
threats on their own.  
 
Chalk concisely illustrates the manner in which these new opportunities have 
created a favourable environment for non-state actors via the concept of Grey Area 
Phenomena (GAP).22 According to Chalk, drug activities have moved into those 
states that are unable to confront, control or monitor those involved. Moreover, the 
combination of globalisation, the power confirmed upon non-state actors by the 
profits generated, and the increased access to advanced technology and the revival 
of ethnic, atavistic and communal identity conflicts have created a more complex 
conflict and security environment.23 In Chalk’s opinion, states are no longer 
primarily consumed by traditional military threats emanating from neighbouring 
states, they are now caught in a situation where they cannot control their borders, 
nor can they rely on traditional means of defence or deterrence as an impediment to 
the challenges posed by non-state actors and transnational threats.24 Unfortunately, 
as Holden-Rhodes and Lupsha observe: “this characteristically gives rise to an 
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‘ooze-factor’ situation whereby the effects of GAP are often ignored or, when 
recognised, only factored into a viable political policy equation once they have 
reached a major crisis destabilising stage within the state(s) concerned.” 25 The 
continued political and economic integration of states and the relaxing of internal 
regional border controls will continue to provide an ideal facilitating environment for 
drug activities.  
 
According to Flynn, weak states are both the primary producers of drugs and 
the flaw in the approach to combating the international drug trade, as the global 
enforcement regime is constructed outside of those states where the majority of 
drug activities occur, while government agencies and political leaders are often 
corrupt, involved with drug activities.26 This situation prevents the effective 
suppression of the problem and allows the unabated production and trafficking of 
drugs. Goehsing summarises the situation, and asserts that: “Regardless as to 
whether transnational criminal networks came first to weaken nation-states or 
whether weak-nation states create a breeding ground for transnational criminal 
networks, we can conclude that transnational criminal networks and weak nation-
states are two factors that mutually reinforce one another.” 27 Additionally, the 
existence of small or microstates must be added to these concerns, as their power 
and capacity to act is equally constrained, and is often circumscribed by the 
availability of resources and the degree of sovereignty that they command. 
 
The complex transformational characteristics, re-organisational aspects and 
often disordered processes associated with globalisation have, in many respects, 
modified the degree to which states can effectively exercise sovereignty and claim 
to be autonomous.28 Globalisation has blurred the traditional distinctions and 
divides between domestic and international affairs, opening the state to challenges 
from political, military, social and economic forces that now transcend their borders. 
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According to Hughes: “…it is clear that the security order is now pitted against the 
phenomenon of globalisation, which generates security issues diametrically 
opposed to and often beyond the limits of sovereign-state authority.” 29 The 
involvement of outside actors, non-governmental organizations, international 
private companies, sources of investment capital and intergovernmental 
organisations have all reduced and transformed the totality of state sovereignty. As 
a consequence, the decision-making capabilities and the range of policy options 
available to national governments is open to external influence, while at the same 
time, domestic disputes, conflicts and crises have been exacerbated by the 
involvement of these actors.30 A focus upon regional relations is therefore required 
in order to understand and account for the strong influences that are often exerted 
upon governmental anti-drug policies and strategies by external actors. 
 
In the opinion of Ayoob, developing states face inherent internal 
contradictions that influence and precipitate the development of internal conflict and 
instability.31 Accordingly, these states are primarily concerned with the connections 
between internal security and the facilitation of economic development. In 
attempting to achieve this security, the state is forced to grapple with the challenges 
and the contradictions posed by the convergence of both pre and post-colonial 
actors such as competing authority structures where traditional authorities 
command both loyalty and legitimacy versus imposed state structures that have 
weaker legitimacy but stronger coercive powers.32 This situation has arisen as a 
consequence of colonial administration and the inclusion of developing states 
within a globalised political and economic system. Moreover, Ayoob suggests that 
the fallout and negative consequences associated with international economic 
processes and the demands of Western states upon developing states have been 
allowed to continue as it was unlikely that these issues could impinge upon the 
security of their states.33 The failed state discourse and the current War on Terror 
have fundamentally reappraised this situation, and developing states now feature 
prominently within Western security concerns.  
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Within a Pacific context, Hegarty has emphasised the reengagement of 
security actors with the internal security of PIS.34  This development is evident with 
the return of Australian interventionist paradigms as a consequence of events such 
as the Bali Bombing, state collapse in the Solomon Islands, the occurrence of 
multiple coups in Fiji and the presence of armed conflict throughout PNG.  
 
The Contemporary Face of Conflict: Accounting for New Conflict 
Environments and Conflict Dynamics—Or—Relearning Forgotten 
Lessons? 
 
The occurrence of conflict between states and the multitude of non-state 
actors and influences ensure that the characteristics of conflict are not static, and 
are open to rapid transformation. Contemporary assessments by scholars and 
security practitioners have only recently begun to recognise the fact that the 
capabilities of non-state actors—gangs, criminal organisations and armed political 
groups—have increased significantly in relation to the state, and that the beliefs and 
organisational structures of other non-state actors—such as ethnic clans or 
militias—do not necessarily adhere to Westernised conventions for warfare.35 
According to the research of Eriksson, Wallensteen and Sollenburg, armed 
intrastate conflict has increasingly characterised warfare around the world since 
1946, with 91 out of a total of 116 recorded conflicts between 1989 and 2002 being 
defined as intrastate.36  In many respects, the state represents just one of many 
actors involved in conflict and warfare, and understanding the potential influence of 
drugs and their profits are essential for gaining an insight into the precipitation, 
escalation, continuation or conclusion of armed conflict.  
 
Conflict within many states also derives from ethnic and communal divisions 
that are present throughout the state, and these are further exacerbated by the 
political, economic and social policies employed by their governments. This has 
situation has been commented upon by Ballentine and Nitzschke, and they observe 
that a pro-state bias has previously dominated conflict analysis with research 
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favouring rebel or insurgent groups as the primary source of conflict.37 Furthermore, 
Cha succinctly summaries the nature of contemporary conflicts, and asserts that:  
Globalisation has ignited identity as a source of conflict. The elevation of regional and 
ethnic conflict as a top-tier security issue has generally been treated as a function of the 
end of the Cold War. However, it is also a function of globalisation.38  
 
While the vocabulary of conflict in international security traditionally centered on interstate 
war (e.g. between large set-piece battalions and national armed forces), with globalisation, 
terms such as global violence and human security become common parlance, where the 
fight is between irregular substate units such as ethnic militias, paramilitary guerrillas, cults 
and religious organizations, organized crime, and terrorists. Increasingly, targets are not 
exclusively opposing force structures or even cities, but local groups and individuals 39  
 
Cha’s observation captures not only the complexity of influences involved, but also 
vividly demonstrates the challenges posed for states when dealing with non-state 
actors. Governments must manage both internal and external influences that assist 
in precipitating conflict and assist in undermining their sovereignty. Furthermore, 
they must also institute measures to manage these non-state actors that are, by 
their very nature, non-sovereign, though some may be seeking legitimacy and 
powers associated with sovereignty, while others may intentionally seek to create 
an environment of instability. Moreover, the increasing mixture of criminal and 
financial motives into objectives previously based upon grievance adds additional 
complexity and prevents an accurate understanding of the motivations of these 
combatants.40 This motivational transformation results in a situation in which it is 
increasingly difficult to dissociate ideological or political motivations, and as a 
consequence, the potential for the creation of an intractable and detrimental cycle of 
illicit business and conflict is possible.   
 
Understanding the economic dimensions of conflict is extremely important, 
as the relationship between drugs and armed conflict adds an additional level of 
complexity that must be negotiated by the state during its attempts at either 
combating non-state actors or during negotiations. According to Ballentine and 
Nitzschke modern domestic conflicts have become self-financing, resulting in a 
situation where shadow economies and black markets contribute to both the 
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collapse of the state and the provision of financial and material assistance to rebel 
groups.41 Furthermore, as Fearon observes, domestic conflicts that involve ethnic or 
political groups who utilise the profits from drugs to fund themselves are very long 
lasting, with a mean duration of up to 2.6 times longer than conflicts involving other 
sources of finance.42 Moreover, while Cornell finds that based upon the available 
evidence, there is no link between the initiation of conflict and the production of 
drugs, though production escalates once conflict has begun.43 As an example, 
Sislin has examined the relationship between SALW acquisition and the escalation 
or de-escalation of conflict within Sri Lanka, and concludes that the acquisition of 
SALW generally precedes the escalation of conflicts. 44 This observation is 
important, as it is widely noted that the Tamil Tigers have utilised drugs as a 
financial resource.45 The existence of such a relationship poses significant 
challenges for the state, as governments are likely to respond by devoting 
additional resources to providing security and to protecting economic development, 
while this diversion of resources may itself become a focus for internal conflict.  
 
The establishment of a parallel internal state is also highly possible, 
especially if drugs are used to fund social services, while drugs may become further 
entrenched if they represent one of the few economic opportunities available.46 It is 
highly likely that drugs assist in prolonging conflict, and while Cornell believes that 
drugs are not linked to conflict initiation this may be a function of his definition of 
what constitutes conflict, which may ignore the overwhelming presence of 
urbanised gang warfare and powerful non-state actors who frequently initiate 
conflict over the issue of drugs. Given the preceding discussion, drugs clearly 
represent a threat to state security and exert a strong influence upon bilateral and 
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multilateral relations, and as such, PIS and the region must be examined in order to 
gain an insight into a potentially significant source of insecurity in the future.  
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Chapter Two 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
 
Introduction   
 
This chapter will begin by broadly discussing the publications that will be 
consulted throughout this thesis and will then outline the benefits associated with 
utilising the work of these authors, before providing a detailed overview of the 
concepts that will be employed. The case studies within chapters three and four 
shall be structured according to a confluence of the ideas developed by both the 
individual expertise and mutual collaboration of the authors Buzan, Waever and de 
Wilde within three of their publications: 1. People, States & Fear: An Agenda for 
International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (1991) herein (PS&F); 2. 
Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998) herein (NFA); 3.Regions and 
Powers: The Structure of International Security (2003) herein (R&P).47 All three 
publications share important ideas and theories related to security that include 
scrutinising the discourse and speech that derives from security actors, opening up 
the security discourse to include new threats and the importance of examining both 
domestic and regional relations between states as they are highly interdependent. 
The consultation of these three publications allows for an integrated understanding 
of their content and the ideas shared between them, and more importantly, the 
creation of a superior framework for application that can account for the 
complexities associated with the examination of drugs as a security issue.  
 
An Enhanced Approach for Examining Drugs as a Security Threat 
 
 Consulting PS&F allows this thesis to penetrate the security discourse of 
actors and to examine the specific state-society relations that characterise the 
domestic environment of the state that is being studied. Buzan identifies these 
particular domestic characteristics as being important for understanding the specific 
security needs of a state, as issues linked to their historical creation or the presence 
of competition between internal ethnic groups or non-state actors defines the 
source of insecurity and the responses of the government.48 Furthermore, Buzan 
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was motivated to illustrate the paradoxes related to security by demonstrating how it 
is relational, and therefore dependant upon where the actor is located within a 
ontological hierarchy organised from individual citizen to global actor. Additionally, 
examining the institutional and historical characteristics of a state is equally 
important as these domestic characteristics influence the development of drug 
cultivation, production, trafficking, and the transformation of these activities into 
potential threats to the state.  
 
The NFA is concerned with both providing a coherent framework for 
widening the security discourse and facilitating a greater investigation into why 
certain issues become objects of security. It also seeks to challenge the primacy of 
the state as an object of security. New security threats within the NFA are normally 
divided into the categories of military, environmental, societal, economic and 
political, and then examined according to both their implications for the state and 
the type of actors that become involved, such the government of a state or 
oppositional political parties, nongovernmental or intergovernmental actors and 
organisations. This thesis utilises this category approach—categories can be 
overlapping and interrelated—though importantly, instead of examining a single 
issue such as infectious disease within a single category (societal) or armed conflict 
over natural resources (military and economic), it examines the subject of drugs as 
a threat to the state according to all of these categories (except for environmental). 
The categories become ‘drugs as a political threat’ and ‘drugs as a military threat’, 
and so forth. 
 
With regard to the political category, the case studies focus upon the 
influence of drugs as a source of corruption and how drug profits can influence 
national elections or fundamentally undermine state institutions. As a consequence 
of this situation, military threats can develop as non-state actors are provided with 
the opportunity to challenge the weakened state, while the financial capacity to do 
so could be provided by the profits associated with drugs. This example clearly 
demonstrates how a single security issue can bridge multiple categories at once, all 
of which require an accurate understanding if the state is to organise an appropriate 
response to combating the threat that they increasingly present. This illustration 
becomes more complex when an additional dimension is added, such as when the 
state is either tacitly or explicitly involved with drug activities, though conversely, it 
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publicises its strong opposition to them and undertakes extensive and oppressive 
measures to enforce the law that it is itself breaking.  
 
R&P is specifically concerned with examining both the regional security 
relations between states and identifying the shared issues that become objects for 
security. According to Buzan and Waever: “Studies of ‘regional security’ usually 
take place without any coherent theoretical framework because, other than a few 
basic notions about balance of power and interdependence borrowed from the 
system level, none has been available.” 49 By utilising their discussion of Regional 
Security Complexes (RSC) and the interdependence that exist between states, a 
bridge is created between the polar extremes of the state and the system levels and 
this facilitates a greater understanding of the motivations and behaviour of states in 
response to their regional environment. This also provides an ideal platform for 
comparing and contrasting the negative impact of drugs upon different states and 
regions, and the subsequent influence upon bilateral and multilateral relations. This 
is ideally suited for examining the small and microstates of the Caribbean and 
Pacific regions, which are challenged in a similar manner by drugs and the external 
influences of more powerful actors.  
 
Justification for Employing the Concepts and Framework Developed by 
Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 
 
1. The NFA provides an organised approach and framework for examining the 
complexity of drugs as a multidimensional security issue. 
 
2. The employment of the NFA and four of its categories results in a deeper and 
more holistic understanding of one particular issue and its interrelation with 
other potential threats. 
 
3. The NFA allows this thesis to examine how drugs become an issue for 
security and the deployment of state resources.  
 
4. The consultation of PS&F and the NFA demonstrates the importance of the 
domestic environment and historical events associated with statehood, and 
links these characteristics to its regional behaviour as outlined in R&P. 
 
5. The NFA allows this thesis to evaluate the actions and perceptions of a state 
towards drugs and to consider the implementation of policies that are 
designed to combat them. It also facilitates a discussion of the unintended or 
unstated political objectives, if they exist.  
 
6. In R&P, Buzan and Waever contend that the Pacific region is an unstructured 
RSC because of the weakness of security independence between them. This 
thesis will challenge such an assertion.  
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7. In both the NFA and R&P, the authors are keen to examine wether new 
security issues will form into RSC, and this thesis will provide conclusions 
regarding how the subject of drugs fits within their geographic illustrations of 
RSC. 
 
Lastly, consulting all three publications assists in overcoming the poor 
predicative capabilities inherent with a qualitative social science investigation into a 
subject such as drugs, and it also facilitates a structured comparison of the 
differences and parallels between the four case studies so that contemporary 
issues, potential threats or future trends can be identified. This thesis is also 
confronted by both the lack of and imprecise nature of the available statistics, and 
the fact that law enforcement agencies are inherently secretive about their 
operations. The use of the concepts developed by Buzan et al and the NFA allow 
this thesis to examine the potential threats posed by drugs without having to 
precisely account for the amount of drugs available. While it is important to illustrate 
the presence of drugs in each state, such as the estimated quantities involved and 
identification of important activities, such as wether they are being cultivated, 
produced or trafficked, establishing the precise volume of drugs is not the primary 
focus of this thesis. Highlighting specific drug activities is considered more 
important as these define the responses of the state and the possible intervention of 
external actors. All subsequent issues that relate to the employment of the concepts 
developed by Buzan et al will be addressed within chapter five during the 
conclusions. 
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Case Study Layout 
 
 
Introduction   Brief overview of the state and the issues that define it as a suitable case study. 
 
Illicit Drug Overview What is the current drug situation? Is drug cultivation, production or trafficking present? What 
types or quantities of drugs are available and what kinds of prices are being paid? Are any 
statistics available? What is the state aware of? What kinds of transformations have occurred 
within the domestic drug market? 
 
Political The political category is focused upon the governance of the state and issues affecting its 
security and stability, such as competition over the state itself by national leaders, the 
presence of corruption or the effectiveness of the police or judicial system. 
 
Military                                     This category is concerned with examining whether there is armed conflict in the state, and the 
availability of small arms and light weapons (SALW), as well as how drugs may be 
associated with these issues. 
 
Societal                                    This category is concerned with the prevailing social attitudes of the government towards its 
citizens, and especially its identification of those associated with drugs and the threats they 
are perceived to present to the state. The presence of crime or violence related to drugs and 
the possible involvement of gangs is also important, as is the deployment of specific counter 
measures to combat drugs. For example, if the government associates drugs with poor or 
ghetto areas, then significant issues arise according to the type of counter-measures or 
strategies that can be legitimately employed there, which could not be implemented 
elsewhere. 
 
Economic This category discusses the economic environment in the state, and highlights issues       
such as poverty that may encourage and sustain the participation of both ordinary citizens and 
gangs with drugs as a source of income. It also highlights the impact of drug violence and 
crime upon the economy. 
 
Regional Actions What actors exert an influence upon the state, drug-related policy or counter-measures such 
as regional forums, international actors or powerful neighbouring states. 
 
State Actions How does each state view the presence of drugs? Are they perceived as a security issue? Is 
the state involved with drugs as a source of funding for itself? Has it enacted measures to 
combat their presence? According to the terms used by Buzan et al, has the state securitised 
or politicised drugs as an issue? Is the state attempting to use drug counter-measures to 
achieve other domestic objectives? How successful has the state been in suppressing drug 
activities? 
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Glossary of Terms  
 
Securitisation—is defined as: “the discursive process through which an 
intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat 
something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call 
for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat.” 50 Buzan et al view 
securitisation as a negative situation and a failure to deal with issues through 
normal political processes. Furthermore, they believe that there are socially defined 
limits regarding what can be securitised and who can use security language.   
 
Politicisation—according to Buzan et al, this refers to the opening (or the 
appearance of opening) an issue up to discussion, which places it within the realm 
of public debate. Furthermore, they assert that while politicisation is very similar to 
securitisation, securitisation is opposed to facilitating debate and analysis of an 
issue, and this is how the two differ according to their definition.51  
 
Referent Object—refers to an object defined as requiring the provision of 
security, or an actor or process that is defined as a threat. 
 
Weak or strong states—refers to the levels of socio-political cohesion and 
internal political violence. Weak states will have low cohesion and high internal 
violence, while strong states will have high cohesion and low internal violence.52 An 
important caveat must be added, the concept of small states, which are 
characterised by their limited resources, poor economic development and territorial 
size. Not all small states suffer from the issues associated with weak socio-political 
cohesion or violence that are present within the definition presented by Buzan et al, 
though they can be considered as weak. 
 
 Regional Security Complex—refers to: “a set of units whose major 
processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their 
security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from another.” 
53
 
 
Regional power—refers to an actor that influences the structure of a regional 
security complex.54  
 
Security constellation—refers to the discourse and actions that are 
generated through the interaction of security actors upon a specific issue across the 
levels of domestic, regional, interregional and global.55 
 
Unstructured security regions—refers to states that cannot project their 
power beyond their own boundaries, and as a result, the formation of a regional 
complex does not result because of a lack of security interdependence.56 
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Security According to Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 
 
The NFA presents a re-conceptualisation of security, and challenges the 
prevailing traditionalist threat orthodoxy by revising and reconsidering the theory 
and literature concerning the contemporary character of conflict and threats. 
According to Buzan, security was at one stage an underdeveloped concept and 
ideas concerning national security were wedged between the dichotomous 
tensions associated with the realist and idealist paradigms, and as such he rejects 
the extremes inherent in either formulation of security and instead broaches a 
centrist platform.57 As previously asserted, the traditional discourse defined security 
in strict state-centric and military-political dimensions, and as such, the designation 
of referent object—an object defined as requiring the provision of security or 
defence against an actor or process—is, in the majority of cases, limited to the state 
itself. As a consequence, Buzan et al assert that: “It also requires us to provide a 
classification of what is and what is not a security issue, to explain how issues 
become securitized, and to locate the relevant security dynamics of the different 
types of security on levels ranging from local through regional to global.” 58 New 
security issues do not, and cannot, replace traditional concerns as the strong 
possibility of armed intrastate conflict still exists within the international system, and 
with the exception of a few regional actors, the ability to determine whether a 
particular object or issue should be designated as requiring security is still limited to 
sovereign actors. 59 Furthermore, new issues are themselves likely to engender both 
inter and intrastate conflict as resources are increasingly mobilised and deployed 
against these new threats to the state, resulting in new conflict arenas and 
dynamics. Understanding how a state perceives both its security and insecurity is 
therefore important, as this definition defines its response and the development of 
specific measures.   
 
                                                
57
 Buzan, 1991, p.1-13.The paradox of following a Realist paradigm for national security is that the search for 
security by individual states through power maximisation results in the creation and exacerbation of security 
dilemmas and the possibility of arms races. Such a paradox is the result of the structure of the self-help 
anarchic international system, neighbouring states will view such power maximising actions as inherent 
threats to their national security. Idealist visions of security are equally extreme, where the provision of 
peace within the system and among states will result in security, though such a belief ignores the reality of 
sovereign states locked into both political and economic competition, and fundamentally ignores human 
nature and desire. 
58
 Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.1 
59
 The North American Treat Organisation (NATO) provides a good example of a regional organisation that 
can define an object or issue as requiring security, though the consent of its members is still required. The 
UN provides another example, though in this case, the ability of the UN to act is circumscribed by its 
members, their competing agendas and the United Nations Security Council. The decision of the UN to 
become involved in peacekeeping operations in some states, and not others, is characterised by this 
bargaining process.  
 33
According to Buzan, threats to security are heterogeneous in character. For 
example, many ethnic groups define the state as representing the primary threat to 
their security as a consequence of its attempts to assert and consolidate sovereign 
authority over its territory.60 This represents an inherent contradiction associated 
with the concept of national security. The state is a multidimensional actor that is 
simultaneously involved in the provision of security, the definition and assessment 
of threats and has benefited from its historical position as the primary referent object 
requiring security. As a consequence, a paradoxical relationship exists between the 
state and its citizens, as its power increases so does its ability to threaten their 
security.  
 
For Buzan et al, artificially restricting the security discourse fails to account for 
the evolutionary character of conflict, the lack of symmetry among states and the 
changing organisational dynamics of the international system. Importantly, Buzan et 
al also recognise the dangers and possible consequences associated with the 
application of the security label to a wider array of issues, and as such they observe 
that:  
The new framework results from the expansion of the security agenda to include a 
wider range of sectors than the traditional military and political. Expanding the security 
agenda is not a simple or a trivial act, nor is it without political consequences. It is not just 
about tacking the word security onto economic, environmental, and societal. Pursuing the 
wider security agenda requires giving very careful thought to what is meant by security 
and applying that understanding to a range of dynamics, some of which are 
fundamentally different from military-political ones. 61 
 
These potentially negative consequences are qualified with reference to Waever’s 
recommendation that issues be moved out of a state of emergency and ameliorated 
through normal political processes. This would subject the security issue to both 
scrutiny and oversight, therefore preventing the obscurity and indeterminateness of 
the security label from achieving any un-stated political objectives.62 Weaver’s 
assertion also raises the important issue of public versus private securitisation, 
where a government deliberately places an issue within the public arena for 
discussion or attempts to prevent an issue from gaining publicity to ensure that it 
avoids scrutiny. This potential situation is addressed within their definitions and the 
distinction they make between securitisation and politicisation, though real-world 
events do not necessarily correspond to their classifications.  
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As an example of public verses private securitisation, the US provides 
significant amounts of military aid to Colombia based upon the premise that this is 
directly allocated towards fighting the cultivation and production of cocaine, as 
cocaine is directly related to the insecurity present throughout the Caribbean and to 
domestic US anti-drug objectives. However, in reality this policy could also be 
related to preventing FARC, a left-wing guerrilla movement, from taking over the 
state. Furthermore, such assistance could also help justify future US military 
budgets and influential domestic actors, such as industries that are intimately 
related to military and political interests. Aspects of such a policy will be publicised 
or concealed according to US government objectives and the need for the 
legitimisation of such policies by its citizens. The aspect of combating drugs would 
be promoted as it fits within an already established domestic security discourse, 
however, other policy goals such as US strategic objectives for the Caribbean and 
the need to satisfy political and economic sectional interests would obviously be 
played down. All governments have multiple objectives associated with their 
policies, and the successful implementation of them involves creating a balance 
between providing the public and oppositional political parties (if they exist) with 
enough information to garner consent, while at the same time obscuring potentially 
negative consequences. 
 
For Buzan et al, securitisation—the process of identifying an issue as 
requiring security and the bargaining process that follows—represents an extreme 
form of politicisation. According to their definition, actors seek to move issues that 
are defined as threats into emergency mode in order to claim both extraordinary 
powers and to mobilise state resources to combat the perceived threats.63 In their 
opinion, threats must be dramatised and presented to an audience: “They have to 
be staged as existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who 
thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would 
otherwise bind.” 64 According to Buzan et al, threat designation is a ‘self-referential 
practice’ where an issue does not need to be an actual threat, only defined or 
presented as such.65 Of further importance is the observation that security 
assessments entail predictions about future events, the possible dire consequences 
that will occur if no remedial action is undertaken and the positive situation that will 
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result after the issue has been resolved.66 This implies that the definition of threats 
are open to manipulation, where an appropriate actor can present, manage or 
stage an issue as presenting an existential threat to a valued object, and this action 
legitimises counter-measures. 
 
Buzan contends that threats and security issues are both subjective and 
constructed, and that powerful reasons exist for maintaining their ambiguity and 
elusiveness as an undefined concept. 67 This provides an insight into why Buzan et 
al seek to expand the security discourse through categories, as this approach 
allows for the separation of security issues into manageable segments for 
conducting analysis and their reunification so that a holistic picture of security 
relations can be constructed and the interests of specific actors opened up to 
scrutiny. Buzan et al assert that:   
…the sectoral approach reflects what people are actually doing with the language 
by adding “security” onto sector designators (economic, environmental, and the like). This 
behaviour is a vital part of the securitisation process despite the fact that in the discourse 
it often reflects impulsive or superficially tactical moves designed to raise the priority of a 
given issue in the general political melee. These moves can, if successful, nevertheless 
generate deeper political consequences. Sectors are distinctive arenas of discourse in 
which a variety of different values (sovereignty, wealth, identity, sustainability, and so on) 
can be the focus of power struggles. The rhetoric of sectors generates a need for 
analytical follow-up to get some handles on how these consequences might unfold. 68 
 
Buzan et al therefore believe that the securitisation of an issue contains an 
identifiable inner logic that can be explored and extrapolated. In order to examine 
an example of securitisation, Buzan et al employ discourse analysis to assess the 
statements, rhetoric and threat presentation of actors involved in the assessment 
and definition of a threat, which they denote as the speech act. They continue by 
observing the involvement of all actors with a particular issue, defined by them as a 
security constellation, and the chain reactions that occur as a result of both the 
actors involved and those that arise through the invocation of security.69 As an 
example, within the United Kingdom (UK) recent debate has focused upon the 
issue of reclassifying marijuana from a class C drug to a class B drug—which would 
involve harsher penalties and the suspension of a confiscate and warning system 
instituted by the police—in response to burgeoning concerns over drug availability 
and the increasing involvement of organised crime. The situation is complex, as 
demonstrated by Prime Minister, Gordon Brown’s, indicated preference for 
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upgrading the classification of marijuana, and there are strong contentions that he 
has ignored the advice of the government’s own drug experts. Furthermore, in spite 
of the previous support of police authorities for downgrading the classification of 
marijuana, due to the overwhelming waste of resources dealing with minor 
possession activities, they now support its reclassification but with the inclusion of 
provisions for police discretion.70 This situation could be viewed as an attempt to 
prevent securitisation, as the Prime Minister clearly views marijuana as a threat to 
both the state and society, though other actors and organisations with the authority 
to discuss drug issues contest the opinion expressed by the Prime Minister.  
 
Securitisation: A Three-Step Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Justification for Focusing upon Regions 
 
Originally, Buzan explored Classical Security Complex Theory (CSCT) within PS&F 
and was concerned with analysing the security dynamics that existed among states, 
which result in the formation of regional groupings. These regional groupings 
developed as a consequence of the intense security relations among neighbouring 
states that are conditioned by an overarching environment of interdependence, 
patterns of amity or enmity, and the interplay of power imbalances, security 
dilemmas and arms races.71 Buzan and Waever observe that: “Anarchy plus the 
distance effect plus geographical diversity yields a pattern of regionally based 
clusters, where security interdependence is markedly more intense between the 
states inside such complexes than between states inside the complex and those 
outside it.” 72 Expanding beyond the artificial preclusion of threats to state security 
as entailed within the traditional discourse required the development of a 
framework that was inclusive of new threats and actors. As a consequence, Buzan 
et al reformulated Buzan’s original presentation of CSCT into Regional Security 
Complex Theory (RSC), and as such, they observe that:  
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Security interdependence is markedly more intense among the units inside such 
complexes than with units outside them. Security complexes are about the relative 
intensities of security relations that lead to distinctive regional patterns shaped by both the 
distribution of power and relations of amity and enmity. A security complex is defined as a 
set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so 
interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart 
from one another. The formative dynamics and structure of a security complex are 
normally generated by the units within it—by their security perceptions of, and interactions 
with, each other. But they may also arise from collective securitizations of outside 
pressures arising from the operation of complex metasystems, such as the planetary 
environment or the global economy. 73 
 
This quote reveals the divergence between CSCT and RSC, where the focus is now 
upon units and not exclusively with states as the primary actor requiring security. 
However, this thesis will maintain the focus upon the state as the primary security 
actor as it alone maintains sovereignty and the ability to make domestic policies 
related to drugs. An important caveat to this is of course the ability of more powerful 
actors and states to impose their authority, and to coerce weak or small states into 
conforming to their objectives. Furthermore, retaining the focus upon the state 
reduces the overall complexity of the case studies and still allows for the tension 
between the state and the presence of multiple ethnic groups and non-state actors 
to be examined. This thesis shall explore the presence of the Caribbean within the 
US RSC in chapter 3. 
 
The Importance of the Pacific to Regional Security Complex Theory 
 
Of significant importance to this thesis is the fact that Buzan et al highlight 
examples where it is unlikely that a RSC would form, defined by them as an 
unstructured security region, where security interdependence among neighbouring 
states is non-existent or weak.74 This situation could include states with domestically 
directed security concerns and among states that are unable to project their power 
beyond their borders.75 The Pacific is ostensively cited by Buzan et al as a region 
that best approximates their definition of an unstructured region, though they 
acknowledge that the Forum binds the region into a lose security community. The 
prominence of new security issues that are characterised by  transnational 
attributes, combined with the current concern for weak and failed states as 
incubators for such threats, has at a minimal level challenged this observation, and 
may have even invalidated it. For example, the trafficking of SALW between Papua 
New Guinea and the Solomon Islands or drugs throughout the Pacific region all 
entail significant consequence for state and regional security. According to 
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contemporary security assessments conducted by New Zealand and Australia, PIS 
feature prominently because physical isolation by water is no longer considered as 
a sufficient barrier to the development and expansion of threats. The positioning of 
the Pacific within the RSC of both Australia and New Zealand shall be addressed 
within chapter 4. 
 
Levels of Analysis Scheme 
 
In order to locate the source of threat(s), the referent object(s) requiring 
security, the reactions to instances of securitisation or counter-securitisation and the 
influencing actors and processes, Buzan et al employ the levels of analysis 
schema. Critical to the employment of this analytical tool is the caution, as observed 
by the authors, that this schema only represents an ontological tool that allows the 
analyst to locate where events or processes take place and their interconnections 
or interdependence; their location on the scheme are not explanations for their 
occurrence.76 Buzan et al also acknowledge that the levels of analysis scheme 
privileges and reinforces state-centric observations. While such a concern is valid, 
the author’s inclusion of a diversity of actors and processes as threats or referent 
objects within the NFA and their objective of widening the security discourse 
counter-act such a privileged position.  
 
Categories within the New Framework for Analysis 
 
Political Security 
 
According to Buzan et al, the political security category is difficult to present 
as in many respects all security is defined and conceptualised by political actors 
who attribute objectives, motives and decision-making capabilities to actors or 
processes perceived by them as adversarial.77 Importantly, Buzan et al emphasise 
the changing nature of political units, noting both the recent appearance of states as 
the primary form of political organisation and the presence of formalised equality 
among all states within international relations.78 Accordingly, states are only one 
manifestation of political organisation, and as Buzan et al suggest, they have been 
privileged as the dominant political unit within international relations since 1945.79 
In spite of this, Buzan et al recognise the authority and power commanded by many 
non-state actors and organisations, and additionally observe that many non-state 
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actors are motivated by a desire for independence and statehood.80 As a 
consequence, Buzan et al characterise political threats to state sovereignty as those 
that derive from non-military sources; however, they also recognise the difficulty in 
circumscribing political security as it forms an essential part of all the other 
categories they present within the NFA. 
 
Locating the state as the primary referent object within the political security 
category requires clarification as to what is threatened and what elements constitute 
the state. Buzan observes that: 
Political threats are aimed at the organisational stability of the state. Their purpose may 
range from pressuring the government on a particular policy, through overthrowing the 
government, to fomenting secessionism, and disrupting the political fabric of the state so 
as to weaken it prior to military attack. The idea of the state, particularly its national identity 
and organisational ideology, and the institutions which express it are the normal targets of 
political threats. Since the state is an essentially political entity, political threats may be as 
much feared as military ones. This is particularly so if the target is a weak state.81 
 
Threats that derive from domestic and international actors and processes that 
question the sovereignty and/or legitimacy of the state therefore define political 
security. These two concepts are fundamentally important for the state in 
maintaining its position as the primary organisational unit within its territory and as 
an equal within the international system. 
 
At this point, it is important to recall the distinction between weak and strong 
states. Strong states are not internally contested and those who can act on its behalf 
are regulated by formalised rules. In contrast, weak states are open to threats of a 
political nature as they are internally contested by actors who deliberately attempt to 
undermine the legitimacy of the government, the state or both.82 Ultimately, both 
weak and strong states, will identify threats as those that challenge their 
sovereignty, Buzan et al therefore assert that: “Existential threats to a state are those 
that ultimately involve sovereignty, because sovereignty is what defines the state as 
a state.” 83 With regard to the threat presented by drugs, they can assist in 
undermining the sovereignty of the state by corrupting security agencies such as 
the police or the functioning of the bureaucracy. Moreover, they can provide non-
state actors with the ability to create and maintain an internal parallel state through 
the provision of social services, therefore challenging the legitimacy of the state by 
questioning its reason for existing. It is important to remember that all states exist 
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with varying levels of political insecurity, and that the ability to securitise an issue is 
restricted in some states by this very weakness. Furthermore, drugs often reinforce 
and exacerbate the presence of these political weaknesses. A combined focus 
upon the domestic political environment and the negative influence of drugs shall 
be examined within each case study.   
 
Military Security 
According to Buzan et al, the military security category is not exclusively 
concerned with security issues, though their conception of the category employs 
both traditional military concerns of inter and intrastate conflict and blends this with 
new security concerns.84 They observe that the rules governing the securitisation of 
threats and the employment of military force have become increasingly 
institutionalised and regulated, especially when the state is the referent object, 
though again, the distinction between weak or strong states should be recalled.85 
The state remains as the primary referent object within the military category and the 
government claims the legitimate right to monopolise the employment of force in 
both domestic and international situations.86 Buzan et al observe that: “In practice, 
the military security agenda revolves largely around the ability of governments to 
maintain themselves against internal and external military threats, but it can also 
involve the use of military power to defend states or governments against non-
military threats to their existence, such as migrants or rival ideologies.” 87 Moreover, 
Buzan et al highlight other non-state actors that regularly serve as military referent 
objects—objects that security measures should be deployed against—these can 
include ethnic groups, private armies or criminal groups that challenge the 
governance arrangements of the state, mimicking its functions or services and 
suborning its regulations, which therefore challenge its sovereignty and 
legitimacy.88 The ability of many non-state actors to act autonomously of the state 
have been circumscribed through the gradual disarming of their citizens, though 
such a situation is present within a minority of states and this is inherently difficult to 
enforce when extensive land or sea boarders are the only barrier to acquiring 
weapons, with the exception of the financial means.  
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Given this observation, activities such as the trafficking of SALW and the 
cultivation, production and trafficking of drugs can become the object of military 
security because of their direct relationship with domestic and regional conflict, 
violence and insecurity. Buzan et al observe that:  
…the general rule of military relations is that states are worried more about their 
neighbours than about distant powers. With non-traditional military relations, the distance rule 
applies more unevenly. It remains largely true for local criminal and inner-city scenarios and failed-
state anarchies, but terrorists and mafias may deliver threats with little concern for distance…89  
 
Drugs and SALW are intimately linked with non-state actors that challenge the 
sovereignty and legitimacy of the state, and therefore represent a significant threat 
to the security of the state. The security of a state, as previously acknowledged, can 
be further undermined when neighbouring states define drug activities that are 
occurring along their borders as a threat to their security, and act accordingly. The 
relationship between drugs, non-state actors and SALW acquisition will be focused 
upon within each case study where appropriate.  
 
Societal Security 
 
Buzan et al define cultural identity issues as the main focus of the societal 
category, and as such, they observe that members of a community perceive security 
in terms of threats to their identity and survival.90 In order to emphasise this 
assessment, Buzan et al employ Bennedict Anderson’s definition of an ethnic group 
as identity-based communities that are imagined and self-constructed, with shared 
cultural practices, history and religion.91 The historical and often ad-hoc creation of 
states, where state and ethic group boundaries are often incongruent, has resulted 
in the presence of internal and irredentist societal conflict as a natural characteristic 
of domestic relations within many states.92 As Buzan observes within PS&F, 
domestic relations in the majority of states are also defined by the tension that exists 
between the creation of the state by the nation, and the creation of the nation by 
actions of the state.93 Furthermore, because of the asymmetry among state 
structures, the societal category is therefore composed of a variety of issues that 
include migration, vertical or horizontal competition between different ethnic groups, 
and the attempts by the state at cultural homogenisation or ethnic favouritism, all of 
                                                
89
 Buzan. Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.59 
90
 Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.119 
91
 Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.120; See for example Bennedict Anderson, Imagined communities: 
reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism (London, Verso, 1983) 
92
 See for example: Ted Gurr, Peoples versus states: minorities at risk in the new century (Washington, D.C., 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000); Ted Gurr, Minorities at risk: a global view of ethnopolitical 
conflicts (Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993) 
93
 Buzan, 1991, p.70-77 
 42
which can have a significant impact and destabilising influence upon both domestic 
and regional security.94 Understanding this domestic environment and specific 
history is essential as it defines the manner in which national security is conceived, 
how threats are defined and the measures that can be deployed. Furthermore, as 
only a few states throughout the world are ethnically homogenous, there is 
considerable scope for internal security issues to directly influence bi-cultural 
relations, and this situation could itself result in the creation or exacerbation of 
domestic conflict.  
 
The referent objects within this category are any significant societal groups 
and can include a combination of clans, tribes, ethnic groups or non-state actors 
such as gangs or criminal organisations. Furthermore, because of the possible 
inclusion of multiple societal groupings within a state, a government or state that is 
dominated by a particular group can also serve as a referent object for minority 
groups.95 The securitising actors include anyone that is authorised to speak on 
behalf of the ethnic group or state, and political groups or individuals seeking power 
frequently use references to their ethnic identity to assist with the mobilisation of 
political support. While Bazan et al employ a specific focus upon intra-societal 
competition and conflict, this thesis recognises that other significant social 
consequences which are associated with drugs, such as the development of drug-
related crime and violence, and the spread of diseases such as AIDS/HIV through 
the sharing of needles or prostitution to pay for drugs, are important societal security 
concerns.  Moreover, societal conflict could arise if a specific ethnic group 
dominates drug activity or is perceived to be associated with such activities, or if the 
profits from drugs are used to support ethnic groups during conflict, attempts at 
separatism or rebellion. A combination of these issues will be discussed according 
to their relevance to each case study. 
 
Economic Security 
 
In the economic category Buzan et al discuss the tension that exists between 
competing visions within the international political economy discourse. As such, 
they provide a brief overview of the central conflict between the subordination of the 
state to the market versus state intervention and regulation of the economy to 
                                                
94
 Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.121-122 
95
 Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.123-124. For further discussion of the particular domestic 
arrangements and the societal threats that can develop as a consequence of identity please review p.126-
137 
 43
provide for the needs of society.96 Buzan et al observe that: “Concern about the 
global economy might be securitized in its own terms, but it might also be 
securitized in terms of a national economy or of groups of individuals within a 
national economy (such as displaced worker).” 97  While Buzan et al focus upon 
these aspects and the presence of domestic competition between political parties 
based upon these differences, this thesis is concerned with what is commonly 
characterised as the dark side of capitalism, as economic freedom has increasingly 
facilitated drug and SALW trafficking, the penetration of the state by criminals and 
the empowerment of non-state actors.  
 
The multidimensional character of drugs requires that the economic 
dimensions receive particular attention as they can be used as a financial resource 
during armed conflict, as a source of income for individuals and groups within 
economic depressed areas and as a source of income for criminal groups. The 
presence of poor financial controls and the presence of money laundering 
operations can provide significant assistance to those involved with drug activities. 
Furthermore, the development of societal conflict and violence related to drugs can 
have a fundamentally detrimental influence upon economic development by 
intimidating both potential investors and tourists. This can result in the creation of a 
cycle of economic decline that is defined by the resort to drug profits by many 
sections of society for income and the subsequent generation of drug-related 
conflict that hinders economic development that forces the reallocation of limited 
financial resources by the state to ensure additional security arrangements. This 
prevents the state for focusing upon important economic priorities. These aspects 
shall be discussed throughout each case study. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Caribbean Regional Overview 
 
 
Introduction  
 
 The small and microstates that collectively define the Caribbean region are 
geographically comprised of hundreds of islands that are spread out as a thin 
archipelago between North and South America. As such, the relatively compact 
distances between these states and the primary production and consumption areas 
for cocaine ensure that they are ideally suited for trafficking activities. As this 
chapter shall demonstrate, drugs have had an extremely detrimental influence upon 
political, military, social and economic affairs within these states, and they have 
merged with them to further undermine state agencies and bureaucratic structures, 
which were already compromised and open to corruption. Of further consequence, 
is the historical creation of these states through colonialism and their enduring 
foreign relations with these external powers, which has resulted in a contemporary 
collage of sovereign entities and complex jurisdictional arrangements. The intimate 
relationship between these states and trafficking activities ensures that they are 
required to balance a variety of challenges to their sovereignty. For example, 
attempts by the US to prevent drug activities combined with the existence of 
relationships between internal and external criminal groups and gangs all 
undermine the domestic security and sovereignty of Caribbean Island States (CIS). 
The Caribbean therefore represents an ideal case study for examining the impact of 
drugs upon the state, and perfectly illustrates how external actors influence anti-
drug policies and strategies. Furthermore, it also demonstrates how the weakness 
of one state, or collectively shared weaknesses, can influence regional security. 
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News Coverage in Caribbean Regional 
 
Source Date Headline 
New York Times April 12, 1988 “Caribbean Nations Say Drugs Imperial Stability” 
New York Times May 10, 1998  “Dominicans Allow Drugs Easy Sailing” 
New York Times August 19, 1996 “Storm in St. Kitts as a Cocaine Case Churns Politics” 
New York Times January 22, 1999 “Agents Seize Nearly 5 Tons of Cocaine Aboard Freighter” 
Barbadian Nation 
News 
June 29, 2005 “Call to cut drugs demand” 
Caribbean Net News August 15, 
2005 
“Regional crime wave fuelled by gangs and deportees” 
Caribbean Net News  January 3, 2006 “Absence of regional action justifies DEA office in Guyana” 
The Nassau 
Guardian 
April 3, 2006 “Waging the war against cocaine” 
Caribbean Net News May 29, 2006 “Is the Guyana government in bed with indicted drug dealers and criminals” 
The Monserrat 
Reporter 
January 26, 2007 “RMPF holds zero tolerance for illegal drug activities” 
Associated Press August 28, 2007 “Dominican police find wreckage of plane they say was carrying drugs, pilot 
missing” 
Antigua Sun February 28, 
2008 
“Joint operation nets over $70,000 in cocaine” 
Caymanian  
Compass News 
April 6, 2008 “Drug mules found in Cayman” 
Trinidad Express April 29, 2008 “Man in Court over $1.4m in cocaine” 
Tobago News May 9, 2008 “Fined $5,000 for cocaine” 
 
Overview of Drugs and their Impact Throughout the Caribbean 
 
 CIS have traditionally been affected by the significant cultivation and 
trafficking of both marijuana and cocaine, however, within this considerable history, 
new developments have frequently occurred. These changes have included the 
appearance of crack-cocaine, which is relatively cheap in comparison to other 
drugs, and more recently there has been increasing demand for ATS. The 
increasing seizure of precursor chemicals related to ATS production indicates that 
demand has begun to stimulate regional manufacture.98 Furthermore, according to 
Douglas and Hillerbrand, drug abuse among CIS is increasing as a local service 
market for traffickers has been established and those employed by them have been 
paid for their services with drugs.99 Abrahams emphasises additional changes, and 
observes that increasing amounts of heroin were available throughout the 
Caribbean in 1996, compared to previous periods, as a direct result of their 
increasing leakage from consignments.100 Unfortunately, a consensus does not 
exist regarding the presence or magnitude of domestic addiction. For example, 
during 2006 the INCB asserted that in spite of the primary use of the Caribbean for 
trafficking activities, there were low levels of abuse and consumption.101 However, it 
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had previously stated during 2000 that there was noticeable domestic consumption 
due to their trafficking.102 This situation is important, as domestic, regional and 
international actors require an accurate assessment and overview of the drug 
environment in order to establish effective counter measures such as rehabilitation 
and demand reduction services.  
 
Unfortunately, in spite of the magnitude of drugs and their ubiquitous 
availability, statistics and information concerning the influence of their presence are 
underdeveloped or non-existent, despite seizures figures that demonstrate 
trafficking patterns and highlight those states that are primarily affected. According 
to the INCB: “few of the island states in the Caribbean have undertaken studies to 
assess the drug situation, even when conducting such studies is included as a 
priority in their national drug control master plans.” 103 Furthermore, as Douglas and 
Hillerband observe, few states collect statistics or employ a standardised 
methodology, and the lack of technical and financial resources has resulted in the 
termination of initiatives and regional monitoring systems.104 CIS are in a 
disadvantageous position because of their reliance upon both foreign assistance 
for maintaining anti-drug activities, and the complexities involved in coordinating 
national and regional initiatives. This situation is evident by the frequency of 
regional drug conferences where there is a poor record of the agreed upon 
measures being implemented, in spite of their ratification.105 However, this situation 
may not be as bad as is frequently portrayed, as some research concerning drug 
abuse in the region is available, though is not widely publicised.106 As a 
consequence of inadequate or unpublicised research, governments, their law 
enforcement agencies and regional organisations cannot constructively intervene 
into cultivation, production or trafficking activities unless they can identify which 
activities are of primary concern and those structures that provide support to them, 
such as segments of the population that are addicted or domestic criminal groups 
that are intimately involved. More importantly, the effectiveness of the strategies that 
are employed cannot be assessed because of this lack of information.  
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The share volume of drugs and the wide variety of criminal groups that are 
involved are fundamentally overwhelming for CIS. For example, one regional 
multilateral operation during 2005 resulted in the seizure of 26.5 tons of cocaine, 
USD$86 million and 354 arrests.107 Additionally, operations organised by the DEA, 
such as Busted Manatee and Double Talk have collectively resulted in the seizure 
of 6,589kgs of cocaine, 1,208.8kgs of marijuana, USD$45,929,155 million in 
currency and assets and 130 arrests.108 Disturbingly, in spite of this clear 
demonstration of significant and frequent success, these operations have done little 
to disrupt trafficking activities for any sustained period, and have they not changed 
the domestic and regional environment that facilitates drugs activities. These 
examples further illustrate the extent of the regional trade and the enormous 
financial incentives that encourage participation. They also assist with accounting 
for the continued weakness of these transit states, and in spite of their continued 
investment in law enforcement resources and counter measures, they are unable to 
adequately secure their borders or prevent the use of their territory for drug-related 
activities.  
 
The geographic sandwiching of CIS between the US and South America 
ensures that all available means of personal, maritime and air transportation have 
been, and are, utilised to traffic drugs. Furthermore, new strategies have developed 
and previous methods have been alternated between in order to avoid detection as 
well as in response to successful law enforcement operations and improved 
security arrangements. For example, tightened airport security within some states 
has encouraged human couriers to use alternative airports or neighbouring states, 
and the absence of any credible air defences has effectively facilitated the use of air 
shipments to clandestine airfields.109 Issues such as state failure in Haiti have 
resulted in increasing shipments transiting through it, and the absence of a credible 
law enforcement presence elsewhere combined with the availability of sparsely 
populated islands has encouraged activities such as drug stock-pilling.110 The 
presence of large immigrant communities throughout multiple states has also 
                                                
107
 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), “Analysis of the World Situation”, in Annual Report of the 
International Narcotics Control for 2005, p.51; Caribbean Drug Information Network (CARIDIN) “The Caribbean 
United Against the Demand for Drugs”, in Quarterly Newsletter Vol.1 No.1 (June, 2002) 
108
 Drug Enforcement Administration, “Statement of Thomas M. Harrigan, Chief of Enforcement Operations 
Drug Enforcement Agency” (Presentation at the House Government Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice DrugPolicy and Human Resources, Interrupting Narco-Terrorist Threats on the High Seas: Do We 
Have Enough Wind in Our Sails, June 19, 2005) 
109
 Eric Weiner, “Airborne Drug War is at a Stalemate”, The New York Times, July 30, 1989; INCB, 2004, 
p.45; INCB, 2000, p.35 
110
 INCB, 2000, p.35; INCB, 2004, p.43; Larry Rohter, “Haiti Paralysis Brings a Boom In Drug Trade”, The 
New York Times, October 27, 1998  
 48
assisted with the establishment of illicit business relations and alternative trafficking 
routes based upon these social relations.111 Additionally, the intimate involvement of 
both commercial and private vessels ensures that traffickers enjoy a considerable 
comparative advantage over coastguard and customs interdiction operations. For 
example, the DEA estimates that several hundred go-fast-boats with the capacity for 
one to two tonne shipments of cocaine operate from Colombia throughout the 
region.112 The volume of maritime traffic and the diversity of vessels ensure that law 
enforcement agencies and operations face a rapidly changing environment that is 
further complicated by the challenges posed by multiple territorial boundaries, 
complex jurisdictional arrangements and interagency cooperation.  
 
The introduction and spread of new technologies such as internet-banking, 
satellite and cell phones, global positioning systems and computers all directly 
enhancing the ability of criminals to organise their activities across the region, and 
further assists with their ability to avoid detection. The establishment of free trade 
areas for commercial manufacturing and increasing regional economic integration 
has also allowed traffickers to disguise their shipments and to take advantage of 
attempts by CIS to develop their economies. The use of new technology places 
significant financial and resource burdens upon the state and law enforcement 
agencies, as they are required to introduce new legislation, acquire advanced 
computer skills and employ highly skilled personnel that can assist with the 
introduction of modern investigative techniques for examining financial 
transactions, instances of money laundering and drug activities.  
 
The large number of states and the existence of asymmetries between them 
regarding the exercise of sovereignty, differing law enforcement capabilities and 
institutional structures all influence their ability to adequately provide domestic 
security and to intervene in drug activities. Furthermore, reoccurring issues such as 
limited financial, technical and human resources prevent these states from 
allocating the required resources to ensure the continued functioning of counter 
measures. As Bernal et al observe, CIS are trapped within a vicious cycle where 
they are forced by structural adjustment programmes to service their foreign debts, 
and therefore reduce social spending, and must concomitantly divert essential 
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funds to combat drug cultivation and trafficking.113 The negative by-products 
associated with drugs, such as the direct costs placed upon both the health service 
and judicial system further undermines their stability and ability to respond. As a 
consequence, drugs have fundamentally penetrated CIS, and have corrupted not 
only members of law enforcement agencies, but also political leaders, local 
businesses and bureaucratic administrators.114 Criminal groups and gangs are able 
to exploit these visible differences to their advantage, while these governments are 
unable to appropriately respond due to either their inability to direct and command 
their agencies, provide them with adequate resources or because there is 
insufficient political willpower to do so. Furthermore, a paradoxical situation often 
occurs, where the repositioning of state resources away from social programmes 
encourages the participation of ordinary citizens in drug activities in order to 
generate an income, which assists with entrenching drugs throughout the state.  
 
The overwhelming presence of drugs throughout the Caribbean has also 
resulted in increasing levels of violence and crime associated with criminal rivalry 
and competition, and the financial support that drugs provide for non-state actors. 
Furthermore, increasing levels of crime are also related to drug addicts attempting 
to support their habits, though with regard to this aspect, the type of drugs 
involved—such as crack-cocaine—may also assist in determining the appearance 
of violence. According to US Admiral Robert E. Kramek: “the connection between 
drugs and violent crime is irrefutable.” 115 This link between drugs and violence is 
further explored by Griffith, who observes that: “There is an obvious relationship 
between drugs and crime: drug operations are illegal, and they lead to or require 
other criminal conduct.” 116 Griffith also acknowledges that while there is little 
empirical evidence that can validate regional casual linkages between drug 
activities and crime, the areas with progressive increases in homicide, serious 
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assault and theft have occurred in those states that have also served as centres of 
drug activity within the Caribbean.117 This situation requires the state to devote 
increasing resources to law enforcement agencies in order to establish a safe 
environment for its citizens and for economic development to continue.  
 
The presence of internal armed conflicts between criminal organisations and 
gangs over drugs, between these groups and the state, or even the presence of 
competition among national leaders over the control of the state itself, can also 
contribute to the presence of drug-related violence, as symbiotic relationships 
between drugs and SALW frequently develop. For example, criminal groups, gangs 
and non-state actors can utilise the profits from drugs to acquire SALW, or 
alternatively, SALW can be trafficked alongside drugs as another illicit business 
opportunity or the two can be exchanged in a direct trade.118 During 2001 the INCB 
observed that: “There has been a noticeable increase in firearms trafficking along 
drug trafficking routes, together with an increase in other criminal activities 
associated with the illicit trade, such as trafficking in persons and motor vehicle 
theft.” 119 Furthermore, as Shridath Ramphal, former Foreign minister for Guyana, 
asserted: “It only takes twelve men in a boat to put some of these governments out 
of business.” 120 An additional influence upon the development of violence is the 
presence of gangs based upon ethnicity with illicit transnational interests and the 
problems associated with the deportation and reintroduction of hardened criminals 
back into these small states.121  
 
The presence of a symbiotic relationship between drugs and SALW is 
extremely concerning for two primary reasons: it undermines the coercive capacity 
of the state, which could already be insignificant, and it provides criminals and non-
state actors with the ability to self-finance, removing them from reliance upon the 
domestic economy and directly enhances their power. This ensures that if CIS 
attempted to directly confront those involved there could be considerable violence 
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and the potential for human rights abuses committed by both sides, while it also 
causes significant instability that could overwhelm the government and result in the 
failure of the state. Another primary concern is the undermining of the legitimacy of 
CIS as a consequence of these criminal groups utilising a portion of their drug-
related profits to provide social services for their local communities. 
 
 
 
Estimated Cocaine Flow in Metric Tons From July 1998 through June 1999 
 
Country 3Rd Quarter/98 4Q/98 1Q/99 2Q/99 Total 
Jamaica 4.9 2.55 5.75 3 16.2 
Haiti 7.728 17.97 16.25 11.941 53.889 
The Dominican 
Republic 
2.411 1.513 3.96 1.95 5.91 
The Bahamas 16.33 5.7 9.047 0.925 32.002 
Cuba 1.35 0.5 0 0 1.85 
Table adapted from DEA Congressional Testimony January 4, 2000 (Statement of William E. Ledwith, Chief of International 
Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration, United States Department of Justice Before the House Government Reform 
Committee.) Figures presented in metric tons. 
 
 
 
 
Selected Marijuana Seizure Figures in the Caribbean 1994-2001  
 
 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 
Bahamas 4,091 4,134 3,610 2,598 3,763 2,606 3,536 1,420 
Barbados n/a 2,948 1,116 96 1,092 3,083 856 377 
Cayman 
Islands 
11,818 6,621 5,100 4,063 3,423 3,188 2,673 1, 728 
Cuba 6,121 8,802 5,559 4,610 6,023 5,369 4,482 1,195 
Dominican 
Republic 
3,816 2,934 184 650 788 246 1,056 6,810 
Guadaloupe 516 1,017 515 8,860 20,179 52,377 0 1,935 
St Vincent & 
Grenadines 
1,962 1,709 7,180 1,321 527 1,227 3,630 1,710 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
1,039 1,546 1,558 1,850 3,120 11,408 1,634 7,249 
Table copied from the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime Caribbean Regional Office, Caribbean Drug 
Trends 2001-2002 (2003) p.28. Figures presented in Kilograms. 
 
 
Selected Cocaine Seizures in the Caribbean 1994-2001 
 
 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 
Bahamas 1,468 2,774 1,857 3,347 2,565 115 392 492 
Cayman 
Islands 
1,001 1,813 1,402 1,213 1,054 2,219 143 5 
Cuba 1,278 3,145 2,444 956 1,444 7,905 372 238 
Dominican 
Republic 
1,908 1,307 1,071 2,337 1,225 1,341 4,391 2,888 
Netherlands 
Antilles 
1,043 n/a 18 639 1,302 710 111 906 
Table copied from the UNODC Caribbean Regional Office, Caribbean Drug Trends 2001-2002 (2003) p.27. Figures presented in 
kilograms.  
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Estimated Volumes of Trafficked Marijuana, Eastern Caribbean during 1999 
 
State Volume (Kgs) 
Antigua-Barbuda 75 
Barbados 333 
Dominica 105 
Grenada 217 
St Kitts-Nevis 16 
St Lucia 267 
St Vincent 7,188 
Source: Axel Klein, “The Ganga Industry and Alternative Development in St Vincent and the Grenadines”, in Caribbean Drugs: From 
Criminalization to Harm Reduction (London, Zed Books, 2004) p.225, Original source: UNODCCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2001. 
Figures presented in Kilograms. 
 
 
Caribbean Regional Actors  
 
The United States 
 
 The Caribbean represents a fundamentally important region for US national 
security. As such, it has been the focus of significant foreign policy and incorporated 
into domestic security considerations such as the Monroe Doctrine or characterised 
as a third territorial border. The importance of the region is unmistakable, though its 
centrality within security considerations has fluctuated, and the frequency with 
which large-scale interventions have occurred, both before and after the Cold War, 
such as in Cuba (1904), Grenada (1983) and Haiti (1994 & 2004), demonstrates its 
continuing strategic value. US concerns surrounding the threat posed by drugs are 
therefore a mixture of domestic anxieties over drug addiction, which have been 
expressed via its War on Drugs, and regional security concerns about failed states, 
the potential for terrorist scenarios and, more importantly, US desires to control the 
region for its own political, economic and strategic benefit. The threat posed by the 
use of CIS for the cultivation and trafficking of drugs has merged comfortably with 
the already established US security discourse for the region, and as a 
consequence, drugs have undeniably been securitised.122  This situation is clearly 
evident throughout US policies and actions. For example, an enormous amount of 
financial, technical and human resources are provided though with the precondition 
that CIS adequately addressed the presence of drugs, and there are a variety of 
governmental agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) who 
have offices established throughout the region. 
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However, the securitisation of drugs by the US has not significantly reduced 
the magnitude of their cultivation or trafficking, and its aggressive approach to 
negotiations with the small and microstates of the region has at times been counter-
productive. Furthermore, according to testimony from J Milford, DEA administrator, 
drug organisations throughout the Caribbean: “are almost immune to conventional 
law enforcement strategies”, and in his assessment, anti-drug polices and 
operations must be conducted through a holistic hemispheric approach in order to 
be effective.123 Though, Payne highlights the complexity of US objectives and 
observes that: “…one has quickly to move on and away from the easy notion of 
there ever being a single US state strategy towards anywhere or anything and 
grapple instead with the many contradictions and variables—the many messy 
policies—that actually exist.” 124 The tensions surrounding the negotiations of 
bilateral agreements such as Cooperative Maritime Counter-Narcotics Agreements 
serve as just one example where poor consideration of the concerns expressed by 
CIS undermines the ability of the US to achieve mutual security objectives. The 
traditional distain of the US for multilateral cooperation also encumbers 
negotiations, as CIS have strengthened their connection to regional organisations 
in order to overcome their shared weaknesses and to maximise their collective 
political and economic power. Moreover, because the US is such a powerful 
political and economic actor, and as a consequence of the size of its bureaucracy 
and the presence of internally competing interests, anti-drug measures and policies 
from different agencies can, paradoxically, undermine each other. The 
implementation of alternative strategies or reductions in financial assistance for 
counter measures in South American states also directly influences the amount of 
cocaine transiting CIS, and this situation directly influences their level of security. 
The Caribbean is therefore clearly apart of the US RSC. 
  
Within the US there is strong bi-partisan consensus between both the 
Republican and Democrat parties regarding the focus of anti-drug strategies, and 
reducing the supply of drugs rather than suppressing the domestic demand for them 
is viewed as the best policy approach for achieving success.125 However, this 
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consensus is itself problematic, as drugs and national security are themselves 
highly emotive and politicised issues, and the failure of either party to adequately 
address them would invite criticism and potentially involve significant domestic 
repercussions. This situation should be partially viewed as a primary driving force 
behind US investment in regional anti-drug policies. Lastly, the securitisation of 
drugs also justifies and legitimises the considerable expenses involved in 
maintaining its strong presence throughout the region, and the maintenance of 
security measures designed to enhance both its own security and that of CIS. The 
provision of significant amounts of financial, technical and human resources to CIS 
should be viewed as overwhelmingly related to self-interest with additional 
elements of altruism.  
 
Caribbean and United States Relations 
 
Regional relations between CIS and the US are difficult to characterise, as 
they are in constant fluctuation between cooperation and open opposition, and 
contrary to popular observations, they are not unidirectional with the US simply 
imposing policies upon them.126 According to Payne, CIS have failed to take 
advantage of the US as they have inadequately inserted themselves into its policy 
communities, and as a consequence, they have not enhanced their position within 
this fundamentally important bilateral and multilateral relationship.127 This situation 
may have characterised previous relations. However, documents such as the 
National Security Policy for Jamaica: Towards a Secure and Prosperous Nation 
(2007) released by the Jamaican Government clearly outline its intention to utilise 
bilateral relationships to meet internal security objectives.128 Additionally, according 
to Knight and Persaud, attempts by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) to 
involve the UN within the region’s anti-drug strategies represents an attempt to 
counter-balance the overwhelming influence and dominance of the US.129 As 
another example of the incorporation of foreign actors, the Organization of 
American States (OAS) has a strong relationship with the European Union for 
coordinating anti-drug measures, with a focus upon both demand reduction and 
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alternative development strategies.130 This clearly demonstrates that the CIS are not 
simply stuck within the dichotomy of weak versus powerful states, and that they are 
able to overcome the challenges posed by their limited resources and sovereignty 
to seek alternative sources of assistance. It is also likely that national leaders 
throughout the Caribbean have at times found it politically expedient to project their 
appearance of weakness, even though this exists and is visible, in order to attain 
further US assistance for their own domestic purposes.   
 
CIS do not have a compartmentalised view of drugs within their societies and 
they view their presence as a function of economic underdevelopment. This 
relationship between economic development and anti-drug measures has become 
a source of conflict between CIS and US relations, and during important 
negotiations.131 For example, agencies such the DEA cannot discuss economic 
development priorities that would reduce the reliance of Caribbean citizens upon 
drug related income, while US trade negotiations, such as those which challenged 
the preferential treatment of Caribbean export commodities to Europe, such as 
bananas, do not take account of the manner in which such activities directly 
undermines CIS economic security and employment opportunities. As such, the 
weaknesses that create ideal conditions for drug activities remain, and a symbiotic 
relationship between state weakness, insecurity and drugs frequently develop.  
 
Furthermore, CIS view themselves as sandwiched between the US 
objectives of reducing their vulnerability to drugs and the ability of them to reach its 
territory, and the need to balance this challenge to their sovereignty with those 
posed by armed criminal groups and gangs associated with drugs, who also 
directly threaten their internal sovereignty and security.132 The issue of maintaining 
sovereignty in the presence of this dual challenge has significantly influenced 
regional relations. For example, as Munroe has observed: “Cooperation with the 
United States in advancing this self-interest did not develop, however, without 
serious concern in the Caribbean that mutually beneficial collaboration with the 
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United States should not be at the expense of the sovereignty of the Caribbean 
states.”  133 Furthermore, as Lt Commander Bethel suggests, past US unilateral 
approaches to drug interdiction ignored the sovereignty and legal systems of CIS, 
and as a consequence, collective security measures have been view with 
suspicion.134 The level of CIS concern regarding drugs is clearly evident within 
CARICOM reports, statements and regional summits.135 However, despite CIS 
anxieties over US infringements upon their sovereignty, many have cooperated 
extensively, and they have also continued to devote significant attention and 
resources toward combating drugs. Though, it is possible that this cooperation and 
continued investment is a product of necessity, as without combating the presence 
of drugs, criminal groups and gangs would destabilise their states, while the US 
commands extensive political and economic coercive capacity to ensure 
compliance with anti-drug strategies. This situation ensures the continued 
maintenance of the sovereignty dilemma for CIS.  
 
North American Regional Security Complex According to Buzan and Waever 
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This map by Buzan and Waever accurately depicts the RSC that is in 
operation between the US, the Caribbean and the wider region. However, with 
regard to drugs, the concerns of the US and the boundary of the RSC are extended 
throughout those states in South America that are involved with the cultivation, 
production and trafficking of cocaine, such as Colombia, Bolivia and Peru.136    
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Case Study One 
 
Jamaica 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 Jamaica has endured the ubiquitous presence of both drug cultivation and 
trafficking, and as such, information concerning the impact of drugs upon state 
security, as well as upon all aspects of society, are well recognised and  
documented. Jamaica represents an important case study, as the large body of 
official documents facilitates an insight into the long history of drug securitisation and 
the multitude of actors and influences involved. This information also provides an 
extensive overview of the attempts by the Government of Jamaica (GOJ) at 
combating drugs. However, this case study is complicated by the fact that this 
understanding has not resulted in a tangible reduction in their presence. At the heart 
of this failure are the existence of strong relationships between national leaders and 
gangs, and the fact that some sections of the bureaucracy, law enforcement agencies 
and ordinary citizens financially benefited from drugs and the presence of insecurity. 
This situation has undermined the ability of the government to both eradicate 
cultivation and prevent the use of the country for trafficking activities, and in spite of 
frequent large-scale instances of operational success, counter measures have had 
little overall impact.  Furthermore, strong external influences and changing US anti-
drug strategies have imposed constraints upon the GOJ, while also restricting the 
range of policies and measures that have been implemented.  
 
News Coverage of Drugs in Jamaica 
 
Newspaper Date Headline 
BBC News January 3, 2002 “Jamaican drug mules ‘flooding’ UK” 
Jamaican Gleaner January 31, 2002 “Jamaican ain transhipment port for Colombian drugs- 
Narcotics Chief” 
Jamaican Gleaner February 6, 2003 “’Drug link could corrupt politics’—Phillips says narcotics 
trade ‘clear and present danger’” 
Jamaican Gleaner  March 28, 2003 “The illicit drug trade and Jamaica” 
Jamaican Gleaner September 25, 2003 “Drugs in the mail” 
Jamaican Information Service November 17, 2003 “Phillips Wants More Help From U.S. to Fight Drug 
Trafficking” 
Jamaican Gleaner February 9, 2004 “Big drug bust-Narco agents seize US$15m cocaine in 
Gimme-Me-Bit” 
Jamaican Gleaner March 17, 2006 “Narcotics police make huge dent in illegal drug trade” 
Jamaican Gleaner April 9, 2006 “Guns and drugs….the Montego Bay link” 
The Jamaican Observer: Internet 
Edition 
August 16, 2006 “Big ganja bust: Police, soldiers seize compressed 
marijuana in Cockpit, Old Harbour Bay” 
Jamaican Gleaner December 24, 2006 “Police officer comes clean” 
Jamaican Observer March 4, 2007 “Public health risk! Officials theories link between drug-for-
gun trade in Haiti and malaria outbreak” 
Council on Hemispheric Affairs July 20, 2007 “Jamaica: In the Drug Trade—Big and Getting Bigger” 
Jamaican Information Service September 24, 2007 “Gov’t to Intensify Fight Against Illicit Drug Trade” 
Jamaican Information Service January 20, 2008 “2007 Active Year for Narcotics Division” 
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Overview of Illicit Drugs in Jamaica 
 
Jamaica is both the largest producer and trafficker of marijuana, and one of 
the primary transhipment points for cocaine destined for the US in the Caribbean. 
According to Carlton Wilson, Assistance Commissioner of Police and head of the 
Narcotics Division, during 2007, 32,800kgs of marijuana were seized, a figure that 
was down from 37,100kgs seized during 2006, while only 98kgs of cocaine were 
seized in 2007, which was another decrease, on 109kgs being seized during 
2006.137 In his opinion, these decreasing seizure figures were the result of 
increasing border security initiatives, successful operations and regional 
cooperation. Though, it is also possible that changing tactics for trafficking or the 
use of alternative routes has contributed to the presence of fewer drugs in transit or 
has assisted in preventing their detection. Concerns have also been expressed by 
the INCB over the reliability of law enforcement statistics, and conducting an 
examination of UNODC statistics demonstrates increasing seizure figures during 
the 2000s, any decrease in these figures is worthy of concern and investigation.138 
In spite of the potential issues associated with the reliability of statistics, the 
presence of drugs in Jamaica can be confidently characterised as a phenomenon 
of pandemic proportions. 
 
The demand for drugs is firmly established throughout all levels of society. 
For example, the results of one survey involving students of four high schools 
revealed that 60 percent of students had tried one or more drugs, including 
marijuana, while 1.3 percent had used cocaine.139  Additionally, the consumption of 
cocaine was cited as the fastest growing drug of choice and problem for the GOJ 
during the 1990s, and concerns have begun to focus upon the increasing seizure 
of, and demand for, ATS such as ecstasy.140 As an example of the volume of drugs 
present throughout Jamaica, during 2003, 1,586kgs of cocaine, 36,600kgs of 
marijuana, 1,897kgs of hashish oil and 444.6 hectares of marijuana were seized or 
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destroyed, and 6,042 people were arrested on drug charges.141 During 2005, 
142.38kgs of cocaine, 17,654kgs of marijuana, 13,070 ecstasy tablets and 391 
hectares of marijuana were seized or destroyed, and 6215 people were arrested on 
drug charges.142 These figures attest to the magnitude of the problem. These 
changing drug preferences challenge the ability of the GOJ to provide adequate 
financial resources for its law enforcement agencies to respond. For example, new 
legislation is required to control these substances and forensic facilities are 
required to test them for presentation as evidence during criminal proceedings. 
Other challenges could include the establishment of domestic production facilities 
for ATS, and the large costs associated with both the dismantling of these 
laboratories and the provision of specialised addiction treatment facilities.  
 
Trafficking occurs through all available means of maritime and air 
transportation, including deliveries by go-fast boats and light planes to covert 
landing strips. Issues that include limited or varying levels of financial, technical and 
human resources have directly impacted upon the volume of marijuana cultivated 
and the amount of cocaine seized. This situation has been frequently illustrated 
through the differing levels of manpower employed for the manual eradication of 
marijuana crops, and the subsequent amount of marijuana destroyed. Additional 
costs derive from the need to institute specialised programmes for monitoring 
Jamaican airspace and the provision of sea vessels for preventing the uninhibited 
use of the coastline for drug transhipment or stockpiling activities. Unfortunately, as 
successful cooperation between Jamaica and the US have demonstrated, 
traffickers have frequently changed their modus operandi; successful maritime 
interdiction has encouraged the use of passengers on commercial flights or the use 
of covert flights for consignments.  
Other significant transformations have occurred within the domestic drug 
market, and these changes have increased the challenges posed to seizure and 
interdiction operations. For example, demand for marijuana in the US during the 
1960s and 1970s encouraged the expansion of its cultivation on an industrial scale, 
while the effectiveness of bilateral operations between the US and Jamaica has 
encouraged the shift towards the involvement of criminal groups with the trafficking 
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of cocaine and crack-cocaine.143 This situation has facilitated increasing domestic 
consumption. Furthermore, Colombian groups associated with the trafficking of 
cocaine have also established cooperative relationships with Jamaica criminal 
groups and gangs in order to utilise their established business structures that were 
originally employed for the trafficking of marijuana. The large profits associated with 
cocaine, in comparison to marijuana, is also likely to have encouraged increased 
participation and diversification. The GOJ therefore has to deal with the 
complexities of both domestic production and foreign transhipment, each of which 
require the investment of extensive resources and different operational strategies 
that are, at times, not amenable to overlapping application. 
 
The GOJ has repeatedly expressed it concerns over the domestic drug 
situation, for example the National Security Policy for Jamaica: Towards a Secure & 
Prosperous Nation 2007 (NSP) voiced particular concern over the fact that those 
involved with drug activities were being paid with cocaine for their services.144 This 
situation further helps to stimulate and entrench demand by creating a domestic 
consumer market. The low price of drugs also helps to stimulate and maintain 
demand, according to the UNODC the price of a gram of cocaine in Jamaica during 
2001 was USD $6, compared with USD $80 in the US and USD $90 in Canada.145 
Additional concerns have been noted by the INCB; these include the specific 
targeting of disposable tourist income, the use of light planes for scouting shipping 
lanes to avoid maritime interdiction efforts and the fact that successful law 
enforcement operations have encouraged the covert cultivation of marijuana.146 
This demonstrates the profitability of the trade and assists in explaining why 
individuals become involved, even if only a small segment of criminals are able to 
benefit from this potential income. Moreover, it illustrates the fact that a high level of 
disposable income is not required for drug consumption in developing states, and 
that criminals employ business strategies in order to maximise their profits and 
reduce the potential risks. 
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Drug Seizures and Arrests in Jamaica 1994-2003 
 
Drug  2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 
Marijuana 
cultivation 
eradicated (Ha) 
444.6 80 332 517 894 705 743 473 695 692 
Cocaine seizures 
(Metric tonnes)  
1.586 3.39 2.947 1.625 4.601 1.160 0.414 0.236 0.571 0.179 
Marijuana seizures 
(Metric Tonnes) 
36.6 26.63 68.46 55.87 56.22 35.91 24.00 52.99 37.20 46.00 
Hashish oil (Kg) 1.897 497.00 211.00 578.00 371.49 144.05 383.00 263.41 278.00 47.00 
Arrests of 
Jamaican nationals 
5,739 7,657 6,023 8,238 6,385 7,093 3,143 2,996 3,325 788 
Arrests of foreign 
nationals 
303 447 420 421 - - 221 267 380 98 
Total arrests 6,042 8,104 6,443 8,659 6,385 7,093 3,364 3,263 3,705 886 
Table copied from United States Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International 
Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2003, (March, 2004). Data was obtained from the Narcotics Division of the Jamaican 
Constabulary Force (JCF), with the exception of the estimated hectares of marijuana cultivation, which was based upon joint figures 
from the JCF, Jamaican Defence Force and US Drug Enforcement Administration.  
 
 
 
Drugs Seizures in Jamaica 1994-2001 
 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Cocaine 
(Kgs) 
179 570 254 414 1,143 2,455 1,656 2,948 
Marijuana 
(Kgs)  
46,000 90,737 31,587 24,729 35,911 22,740 55,870 74,044 
Table adapted from United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime Caribbean Regional Office, Caribbean Drug Trends 
2001-2002 (2003). Figures presented in kilograms.  
 
 
Estimated Area of Marijuana Cultivation 
 
Cultivation 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Estimated (ha) 1,790 2,250 1,783 1,200 1,200 1,000 
Eradication (ha) 1,510 1,030 833 811 456 692 
Estimated 
Production 
(metric ton) 
189 825 641 263 502 208 
Table copied from National Council on Drug Abuse, Ministry of Health and Ministry of National Security & Justice, National/Master 
Drug Abuse and Control Plan 1997-2002, (1997) p.21. Original source United States Department of State, Bureau for International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1994 
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Examples of Major Drug Seizures in Jamaica 
 
Date Location Operation name/ 
Details 
Agencies 
Involved 
Illicit Drug Estimated Value 
2003 Jamaica Seizure made in secret 
concrete bunker 
JCF 1620kgs of 
hashish oil 
 
2003 Kingston Seized inside mail at 
Central Sorting Office 
Narcotics Division 68.18kgs of 
marijuana and 
1.6kgs of 
cocaine 
JD $1.6 million for 
marijuana 
2004 Gimme-Me-Bit, 
Clarendon 
Drugs seized near to 
local airstrip 
JCF and Narcotic 
Division 
484kgs of 
cocaine 
USD $15.9 million 
2006 Port Antonio, 
Portland 
American family 
arrested with drugs in 
their possession 
JCF 454.55kgs of 
marijuana 
 
2006 Cockpit, Salt River, 
Clarendon 
Joint operation on 
August 13 
JCF and JDF 482.73kgs of 
marijuana 
 
2006 Old Harbour Bay, 
St Catherine 
Joint operation on 
August 14-15 
JCF and JDF 849.09kgs of 
marijuana 
 
2007 Jamaica Highway 
2000 
Woman caught in her 
car by police 
JCF 380.91Kgs of 
marijuana 
 
 
 
Political Security Concerns 
 
The state is trapped within a damaging and detrimental cycle. The GOJ is 
unable impose or secure its internal and external sovereignty and cannot effectively 
marshal all of its available resources to combat drugs, while the presence of drugs 
assists in undermining the ability of it to do so. It can be confidently asserted that the 
state has been thoroughly penetrated by drugs. This scenario is vividly 
demonstrated by the damaging actions of some national leaders, who have 
themselves undermined the stability of the state. Strong historical connections 
between political parties, community leaders and gangs have been extensively 
documented, as has the presence of permissive attitudes towards corruption. 147 As 
Clarke suggests: “During the 1970s, politicians, using their influence with the police, 
provided cover for the gun-handling of the gangs, and protection for their non-
political activities, notably, the ganja [marijuana] trading of the drug dons.” 148 Brana-
shute offers a similar opinion, and asserts that: “Politics and cocaine have conflated 
in Kingston.” 149 As a consequence of this environment, the GOJ is fundamentally 
unable to organise itself to combat drugs, as it is likely that some of those who are 
responsible for both the political and economic governance of the state benefit from 
their presence and the instability that they cause. Furthermore, it is likely that the 
profits derived from association are employed to assist with the costs involved with 
their political positions, patronage arrangements or during election periods. 
Additionally, any social or political stigma that may have been attached to the use of 
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drug profits may have been eroded, especially if multiple leaders are known to have 
benefited financially, and this situation would allow lower socio-economic groups to 
rationally justify their own participation. It is extremely unlikely that this symbiotic 
relationship between Jamaican leaders and criminals would discontinue of its own 
accord, as both would benefit from it significantly.  
 
Transparency International (TI) has also broached concerns over the 
weaknesses present throughout the state; these include the concentration of power 
within the executive, poor or inadequate governmental oversight mechanisms and 
the culture of patron-client relationships.150 Domestic politics have also been 
characterised as tribalistic, with the frequent appearance of politically motivated 
violence, election violence, and the use of coercion and intimidation to force bloc 
candidate voting. Furthermore, as the Council of Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) 
observes, the government under Prime Minister Patterson failed to mitigate this 
environment of violence. During his administration, concerted anti-drug action was 
stifled through the establishment of national enquiries and committees, though the 
final conclusions and recommendations presented by these bodies were instituted 
in a restricted fashion.151 These examples are important, as they illustrate that there 
are few controls within the state to monitor the behaviour of officials and the 
bureaucracy, and this effectively facilitates corruption. Moreover, the inability and 
indifference of some GOJ administrations to properly address drugs, combined with 
their willingness to manipulate domestic politics through the use of violence 
provides a conducive environment for drug related activities, all of which ensures 
domestic insecurity and instability.   
 
The Jamaican Constabulary 
 The actions of Jamaican Constabulary Force (JCF) have also assisted in 
facilitating and maintaining an ideal environment for drug activities, and have 
prevented the achievement of greater levels of operational success. For example, 
the JCF have frequently employed a militarised and violent approach towards 
creating a safer domestic environment, this strategy is best demonstrated by the 
frequency in which extra-judicial killings have occurred.152 According to Amnesty 
International (AI), in spite of overwhelming evidence: “…the Jamaican authorities 
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have failed to hold the security forces to account; law enforcement officers are able 
to kill with impunity.” 153 With reference to another case, AI asserts that: “…the DDP 
[Director of Public Prosecutions] refused to prosecute despite the verdict of a 
Corner’s Court jury that the police officers concerned should be held criminally 
responsible.” 154 The Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) has also been implicated in the 
unlawful killing of civilians.155 The regularity with which citizens have been abused 
by state security agencies is vividly demonstrated by the fact that an estimated 
JD$280 million in compensation was paid to victims between 2000 and 2005.156 
The presence of impunity fundamentally undermines the confidence and trust of 
some segments of Jamaican society, and assists in alienating other segments, 
when a community-focused strategy would enhance police intelligence, 
effectiveness and state-society relations. The approach of the JCF further adds to 
the pervasive environment of drug-related violence, and may encourage the 
militarisation of criminal groups and drug gangs in order to protect their business 
interests. Their actions also undoubtedly ensure that those involved with drugs 
receive a modicum of community protection.  
 
The presence of corruption throughout the JCF and other law enforcement 
agencies has also prevented successful drug operations, as some of those charged 
with up holding the law and implementing anti-drug measures have financially 
benefited from their presence.157 Anecdotally, according to one anonymous police 
officer with experience in both the Criminal Investigations Bureau and Narcotics 
Division, from the beginning of their career, they were paid to ignore or escort drug 
shipments, tamper with evidence related to drug cases and worked in concert with 
both local drug dealers and senior officers involved with drug shipments.158 
Considerable evidence is available to illustrate that corruption in the JCF is not 
limited to a few isolated cases, but is widespread and culturally embedded 
throughout the force.159 The confidence of citizens in the JCF has therefore been 
constantly undermined, while the capacity of the JCF to undertake anti-drug 
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operations is directly called into question because of these relationships with 
criminals. This also calls into question the ability of the GOJ to tackle drugs 
throughout the country, even if it possessed the resources to act. However, this 
characterisation of the JCF is also problematic, and may not accurately depict the 
whole force, as the 2003 INCS Report described the narcotics division of the JCF as 
both “competent and well respected.” 160 Given the pervasive environment of 
corruption, instances of judicial impunity and poor oversight capacity, it is 
questionable whether any braches of the JCF, or other agencies such as customs 
or the coastguard, could withstand the prospect of significant financial inducements 
for providing either tacit or explicit assistance to traffickers.  
 
Military Security Concerns 
 
The Availability of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Drugs and Insecurity 
 
The GOJ has adopted national, regional and international legislative 
measures in order to counter the trafficking of SALW, and has recognised the 
symbiotic linkages between their availability and the use of drugs as a financial 
resource for their acquisition. 161 As an example, in 1988 Heckler and Koch 
weapons from West Germany were seized while on route to FARC. A sample of the 
weapons discovered included 1,000 G3A3 automatic assault rifles and 250 HK21 
machine guns; all were paid for by cocaine shipments made to Europe.162 To further 
reinforce the magnitude of gun availability, in July 2004, 10,132 confiscated guns 
were destroyed.163 Moreover, a significant trade in both guns and drugs is believed 
to regularly occur between Jamaica and neighbouring Haiti. The availability of 
SALW directly threatens the security of the state, as it allows criminals and gangs to 
achieve a level of coercive capacity equal to that enjoyed by the JCF and JDF. 
Furthermore, it forces the government to continually invest its limited resources in 
providing additional domestic security arrangements. The government has 
introduced legislation and has utilised regional mechanisms to control the 
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availability of SALW in an effort to shift part of the responsibility for its security onto 
neighbouring states; this can be characterised as a move towards greater 
multilateral measures to promote collective security. Jamaica has also begun 
exploring closer bilateral security ties with Haiti. 
 
The relationship between SALW, drugs and the maintenance of an 
environment of insecurity is clearly recognised by the GOJ. The Honourable K.D. 
Knight, former Minister of National Security and Justice, has asserted that: “The 
linkage between arms and drugs has resulted in a frightening escalation of violence 
and violent crimes. This has seriously undermined the peace and security of many 
countries and will increasingly threaten the stability of these States as well as 
international security.” 164 As a consequence, the GOJ has consistently invested in 
counter measures for more effective border management. For example, security at 
port facilities has been upgraded, technical capabilities have been enhanced with 
the acquisition of eight Vehicle and Cargo Inspection Systems for examining cargo 
containers, new legislation requires all forms of weapons shipments to gain prior 
permission and this has been assisted by computer software designed to monitor 
SALW shipments throughout the Caribbean.165 The institution of these measures 
represents an attempt to undermine the SALW-drugs relationship by reducing the 
ability of gangs and criminals to attain a coercive capacity. Moreover, interrupting 
drug trafficking removes the financial capacity for such acquisition activities. 
Unfortunately, the presence of state weakness and failure among neighbouring 
states, such as Haiti, forces the burden of enhanced security measures upon those 
that are in a better position to act, and the opportunity presented for criminal 
activities by this failure are likely to strain these enhanced security measures. 
 
Societal Security Concerns 
 
Societal security is significantly affected by the presence of drugs, as political 
and drug-related violence have increasingly merged, and communities have 
fortified themselves in response. This environment of violence is vividly 
demonstrated by the extremely high rate of murder that occurs annually. For 
example, during 2000, there were a total of 887 murders recorded, of which, 536 (or 
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60 percent) were attributed directly to the use of guns.166 However, statistics 
concerning the annual rate of murders in Jamaica do not appear to be accurate. 
Unfortunately, political leaders have transported issues such as discrimination and 
class-conflict directly into these poor communities to assist with the achievement of 
their own objectives. These areas have therefore been politicised, and the 
presence of patron-client relationships that are expressed in the form of 
government-sponsored social development have also encouraged the 
development of conflict.167  
 
Moreover, measures employed by the GOJ and the JCF to combat the 
presence of drugs have been inserted into this social conflict, and as such, the 
aggressive strategies that have been instituted are representative of this 
discrimination. This is evident within even GOJ policy, as poor areas are presented 
as being both a threat to society and the primary location where drug activities 
occur. As a consequence, measures which could not be employed elsewhere have 
been legitimised within these neighbourhoods, and large segments of Jamaican 
society actively support the use of aggressive and violent tactics that are frequently 
employed to intervene into drug activities and to reassert the authority of the GOJ. 
 
Recorded Murders and their Motives during 2000 
 
Motive Number  Percentage of Total (%) 
Robbery 133 15 
Domestic 294 33 
Reprisal  287 32 
Gang 126 14 
Other 47 6 
Source Honourable K.D. Knight et al, Report of the National Committee on Crime and Violence, June 11, 2002. 887 people were 
murdered throughout 2000, of which 55 percent were located in the Capital Kingston and near St. Andrew.  
 
 
Gangs and Insecurity 
 
Individuals who have become wealthy through their drug activities, 
colloquially referred to as Drug Dons, have increasingly become parallel sources of 
authority throughout society, and further complicate anti-drug measures. Portions of 
their drug-related income are often utilised for the benefit of the surrounding 
community, and this situation partially accounts for the level of community support 
for them. According to Peter Phillips, Jamaica’s former Minister for National 
Security, crack-cocaine is an illicit industry worth between USD$3—3.6 billion.168 
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This equates to 40-50 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the country.  
This ensures that there is a significant amount of money available to individuals, 
gangs and criminal organisations to utilise to ensure compliant communities, to 
corrupt officials and to enhance their level of autonomy in relation to the state. In 
contrast, the level of social service spending by the government fluctuates 
according to its available revenue and the performance of the domestic economy, a 
situation that those associated with drugs are not necessarily tied to, and this 
assists in de-legitimising the state. The GOJ has recognised that drug related 
income has assisted with the development of these alternative forms of leadership, 
and that undermining this connection is essential for re-establishing the authority of 
the state and reinstituting domestic security.  
 
The continued existence of close relationships between political leaders and 
gangs cannot be accurately accounted for, though it is evident that the formation of 
them has been extremely detrimental for domestic security. According to Clarke, 
gangs were originally tied to the political system through patron-client relationships, 
where political leaders from both the People’s National Party (PNP) and the 
Jamaican Labour Party (JLP) utilised gangs to coerce, intimidate and violently 
confront oppositional supporters and allied gangs to ensure favourable election 
outcomes during the late 1960s through to the 1980s.169 The politicisation of 
elections and the close political association between gangs and national political 
parties has ensured that a pervasive environment of “orchestrated political 
violence” has developed.170 Without this original umbrella of protection, gangs 
would not have been able to increase their autonomy in relation to the state, and 
they would not have been shielded from law enforcement prosecution. Furthermore, 
the availability of SALW and the use of drugs as a financial resource for their 
acquisition has directly enhanced their coercive capacity, all of which has resulted 
in a situation where gangs present a significant threat to the state. 
 
The power of these gangs originally derived from their involvement in 
marijuana and SALW trading, though their patron-client relationships with Jamaican 
leaders ensured that a modicum of control exist over their activities.171 However, 
these patron-client relationships were transformed by the shift away from the 
cultivation and control of marijuana towards involvement with cocaine and crack-
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cocaine during the 1980s. As a consequence, the amount of control that political 
parties and patrons could exert over gangs decreased, as their autonomy and 
power was increased through the large profits associated with these alternative 
drugs. 172 Furthermore, as Brana-shute observes, additional changes have occurred 
within these patron-client relationships, and Drug Dons now actively participate with 
local political parties during elections. In his opinion, these areas have become: 
“…mini-states with their own armies which frequently invade each other to capture 
political and drug-dealing turf.”  173 Successive GOJ administrations and the JCF 
have been unable to effectively combat gangs, and the presence of corruption 
further facilitates the weakening of the state while simultaneously opening it up to 
foreign actors, such as South American criminals that are involved with the 
trafficking of cocaine. Moreover, the function of politicians and Drug Dons has 
increasingly merged within the view of the community, and these gangs have 
transformed beyond a domestic concern, to become both a regional and inter-
regional security issue in their own right. There is extremely likely that these 
relationships will continue, and this ensures that attempts by the JCF to control and 
undermine them are ultimately unsuccessful, as the environment that facilitates their 
creation is maintained.  
 
Economic Security Concerns 
The adoption of Neoliberal economic restructuring plans advocated by the 
International Monetary Fund during the 1980s and 1990s significantly impacted 
upon both the economy and the amount of revenue available to the GOJ. As a 
consequence of the redistribution of economic resources, it has been estimated that 
social expenditure by the GOJ declined by 44 percent between 1981 and 1985.174 
The Institute of Jamaica calculated that the poverty level was around 28 percent 
during 1997, and suggested that nearly one in three Jamaicans were living on 
JD$37 or just around USD$1 a day.175 Furthermore, experimental US policies 
during the late 1990s decreased the provision of bilateral funding for drug 
eradication operations in an effort to encourage a greater level of responsibility with 
the GOJ.176 This situation has, paradoxically, encouraged the development of 
another detrimental cycle, where economic decline has increased the participation 
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of citizens with drugs in order to supplement their declining income and the lack of 
available employment.  
 
The GOJ has therefore been forced to devote diminishing resources towards 
drug enforcement operations in order to meet US eradication targets, instead of 
focusing upon economic development priorities. This situation has been 
recognised, and according to Knight: “Given a choice, many of the farmers involved 
in drug crop cultivation would cease. Theirs is an involvement exacerbated by a 
combination of poverty and the negative impact of the international trading system 
on the traditional agricultural sectors in their countries.” 177 The continuing presence 
of violence, crime and corruption associated with drugs requires the prioritisation of 
domestic security and anti-drug measures and the continued investment of limited 
resources. The pervasive environment of violence also inhibits economic 
development, by creating anxiety among potential investors and intimidating 
tourists, who currently provide the largest source of foreign income for Jamaica. 
 
United States Anti-Drug Assistance to Jamaica 
 
 The US is overwhelmingly concerned by the central involvement of Jamaica 
in the cultivation of marijuana and the use of the country for the trafficking of 
cocaine. As such, concerns are fundamentally focused upon protecting US national 
security interests by enhancing the capacity of Jamaican law enforcement agencies 
and the ability of the GOJ to intervene into drug activities. As a consequence of 
these security priorities combined with domestic anti-drug policies, Jamaica is firmly 
with the US RSC. The US is able to employ significant political and economic power 
to influence the formation and institution of anti-drug policies, and as a 
consequence, bilateral relations between the two states have been strained, and 
cooperation has fluctuated. The intensity, and at times brusque nature, of these 
bilateral relations is vividly demonstrated by the political disputes that evolved 
during negotiations over clauses contained within the Maritime Drug Trafficking 
(Suppression) Act (1998), commonly referred to as the Shiprider Agreement, such 
as the ability of US security personnel to board vessels in foreign waters and their 
immunity from prosecution.178 The US was accused of employing aggressive tactics 
during negotiations, which included the threat of de-certification for inadequate anti-
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drug achievements; this action frequently results in the suspension of economic 
assistance. Jamaican officials also accused the US of failing to recognise the 
interdependence between economic development, employment opportunities and 
the involvement of citizens in supporting drug activities throughout the region.  
 
The GOJ was especially concerned with preserving aspects of its 
sovereignty, and expressed the desire to cooperate with US objectives to prevent 
the manipulation of its territorial and sea borders by traffickers. However, the GOJ 
clearly wished to maintain a degree of control and authority over US actions within 
its borders, and desired to institute a modicum of reciprocity within the relationship 
by ensuring that JDF or Jamaican Coast Guard (JCG) vessels could undertake 
similar actions in US territorial waters. The Act has resulted in significant success in 
intercepting maritime drug shipments, though as a consequence of these original 
disagreements, additional clauses relating to the boarding of ships and the sharing 
of personnel were not included until 2004. Importantly, a framework for managing 
jurisdictional issues that arise from working within each other’s territorial waters has 
been established, and this can be characterised as an example of success for the 
GOJ, as it has maintained a degree of sovereignty over anti-drug measures in the 
face of strong external pressures.   
 
Operation Buccaneer provides another illustrative example where bilateral 
relations have affected cooperative anti-drug efforts.  Buccaneer commenced in 
1974, and involved the US providing extensive technical and financial resources for 
joint JCF-JDF operation. However, unrelated political disputes resulted in its 
suspension for 11 years, and cooperation recommenced in 1985, though US 
budget constraints undermined the programme in 1993.179 These two examples 
illustrate how anti-drug issues can become incorporated and subsumed within 
other competing bilateral policies and issues. Furthermore, the negotiation over the 
Shiprider clause illustrates the continued importance of sovereignty, and the 
delicate nature of negotiations when there is a defined power asymmetry between 
two states. In this instance, the US was unlikely to overcome preconceived 
perceptions and anxieties over its dominance within bilateral relations, and its 
actions reinforced these established concerns. This example is applicable 
throughout the wider Caribbean and beyond, and is especially important when 
security issues that are certain to engender emotive accusations (such as drug-
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related corruption among national leaders) arise.  Careful consideration for the 
position of less powerful states must be taken into account in such circumstances, 
especially when the primary objective is to obtain mutually beneficial security 
objective, and not the achievement of one-side goals.  
 
The US has provided significant assistance to the GOJ to combat both drug 
cultivation and trafficking. Close operational cooperation and support occurs 
between law enforcement agencies from both states, and both the JDF and JCG are 
closely involved with US maritime interdiction efforts. Funding has been provided 
for the provision of specialists to directly assist with the development and training of 
security personnel, and financial assistance has also been provided for the 
establishment of the Caribbean Regional Drug Law Enforcement Centre. As a 
recent example, in 2003 the JDF were given three fast patrol boats at a total 
estimated cost of USD $1.5 million to assist in enhancing maritime operational 
success and border security. In 2007, an additional USD$35 million was allocated 
to assist with enhancing maritime interdiction, port security and law enforcement 
capacity. Close cooperation has occurred with the US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco 
and Firearms in tracing weapons that have been recovered in Jamaica, resulting in 
the implementation of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).180 The US has also 
tightened regulations concerning export licences for SALW to Jamaica, in spite of 
historical opposition, and a shortage in the availability of firearms for sale has 
resulted; this is in spite of the growing demand for personal protection as a 
consequence of increasing levels of drug-related violence.181  
 
In spite of the asymmetrical power relationship that exists between the two 
states, and the acquiescence of the GOJ to US-imposed drug eradication targets, 
this relationship has not been one-sided. This is best demonstrated by the 
determination of the GOJ to ensure that marijuana crops are manually eradicated, 
rather than through the use of aerial spraying that has the potential to contaminate 
other financially important export crops. As this important bilateral relationship 
demonstrates, an aggressive approach towards drugs may in fact be detrimental to 
the success of interdiction and seizure strategies, as it promotes conflict between 
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states that must enhance their cooperation in order to achieve mutual and 
sustained success.   
 
External Influences upon Policy Decisions: The Impossibility of 
Legalising Marijuana in Jamaica 
 
 There are mixed domestic political attitudes towards the decriminalisation of 
marijuana, even though it is widely recognised as being culturally and religiously 
embedded throughout Jamaican society. This scenario represents an important 
area for assessing the influence of both domestic and foreign actors upon the 
formation of internal policies. The GOJ has established multiple inquires to assess 
the potential harms associated with marijuana and to review its criminality, these 
have included the Joint Select Committee “to consider the criminality, legislation, 
uses and abuses and possible medicinal properties of ganja and to make 
appropriate recommendations” (1977), and more recently, the National 
Commission on Ganja (2000) (COG). Both of these bodies have recommended that 
marijuana be decriminalised. The COG asserted that: “The Commission is 
persuaded that that the criminalisation of thousands of people for simple 
possession [and] for consumption does more harm to the society than could be 
done by the use of ganja itself. The prosecution of simple possession for personal 
use and the use itself diverts the justice system from what ought to be a primary 
goal, namely the suppression of the criminal trafficking in substances, such as 
crack/cocaine…” 182 This illustrates the two primary characteristics of the debate. 
The concern over the potentially harmful effects upon individual users and the 
social and financial impact upon the state from its criminal status, versus the more 
important concern regarding the involvement of criminal groups and their 
profiteering from drugs, which is considered more detrimental. The COG also 
expressed its concern that the conviction of individual marijuana uses did more to 
damage the state through the alienation and abuse of citizens, than secure it 
through criminal convictions and the exposing of individuals to the judicial system. 
 
However, in spite of these recommendations, domestic support for the 
decriminalisation of marijuana is mixed. For example, Peter Phillips strongly 
opposed both the decriminalisation of any drugs and the findings of the COG, and 
cited the increased level of violence throughout areas with increasing drug activity 
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as proof of why drugs should remain illegal.183 Strong pressures from external 
actors such as the INCB and the US have undoubtedly influenced internal 
decisions relating to marijuana legislation. The COG itself recognised the internal 
and external obligations of the GOJ as a consequence of its ratification of UN anti-
drug Conventions, and also noted the complex legality associated with 
decriminalisation, as commitment to other international Conventions and principles 
need to be considered. The INCB strongly asserted its position on the debate, and 
stated that: “The Board wishes to stress that cannabis is a harmful drug, requiring 
strong control under the 1961 Convention. The Board urges the Government of 
Jamaica to ensure that a clear and correct message is sent to the public regarding 
the dangers of cannabis abuse.” 184 Similarly, the US is firmly opposed to any 
attempts at legalisation or decriminalisation, and can utilise extensive political and 
economic leverage in the form of threats of de-certification or the imposition of fines 
for commercial goods or passengers that arrive in the US with drugs to ensure 
compliance. This imposition of fines has occurred before, and involved significant 
financial costs for vital industries and enterprises.185 Moreover, it is unlikely that the 
GOJ would be allowed to implement such policies, even if they proved to be 
beneficial, as this would directly assist in undermining the continuation of strong 
anti-drug policy objectives of the US, and this action could set a precedent that 
could influence negotiations between the US and other Caribbean or South 
American states.  
 
However, US policy is not monolithic, as US-style drug courts have been 
established in Jamaica. Alternative sentencing measures, a greater focus upon 
harm reduction and specific court mechanisms designed to deal with drug offenders 
could provide an option that avoids the complexities and pitfalls associated with 
legalisation or decriminalisation. Though, in the opinion of Harriot and Jones, drug 
courts are unlikely to ameliorate drug-related insecurity, as they are designed to 
manage non-violent offenders with drug dependency, rather than the gangs and 
organised criminal groups that are directly involved in trafficking and the associated 
violence.186 Furthermore, in one example provided by Harriot and Jones, more drug 
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offenders were sentenced to prison than diverted, and the achievements of such 
alternatives are, as yet, inconclusive.187 Decriminalisation could represent a positive 
action by the GOJ, as it would free up resources for the JCF to combat the greater 
threats posed by gangs and criminal groups. Such actions could also ensure that 
the domestic cultivation and sale of marijuana were economically unviable, though 
this would further encourage its trafficking to neighbouring states. It is highly 
unlikely that the GOJ will be able to formally legalise or decriminalise marijuana, 
though informal arrangements may be possible. Lastly, the ability of the US and the 
INCB to exert significant influence upon domestic policy raises serious implications 
regarding Jamaican sovereignty and GOJ state-society relations, given the strong 
social support for marijuana present throughout the country.188 
 
Responses of the Jamaican Government to Drugs 
 
The GOJ is not oblivious to the fundamentally detrimental influence of drugs 
upon state security and stability. These concerns are clearly demonstrated by its 
continued investment and allocation of resources for security agencies, the 
frequency of media statements and government reports, and the centrality of drug 
issues in domestic and foreign policy. For example, Knight has asserted that: “The 
pattern and scale of violence that have resulted from the dramatic rise in illicit drug-
related activity have unleashed a new level of terror in our societies.” 189 
Furthermore, cross-party political consensus is evident between the JLP and the 
PNP, and as Derrick Smith, the current Minister for National Security, observes: “A 
change of administration does not in any way mean a change of course in relation 
to the country’s fight against the narcotics trade. In fact, what it means is full speed 
ahead against the drug traffickers and all those involved in the drug trade.” 190 The 
threat posed by drugs to the state has clearly been recognised. Importantly, the GOJ 
recognises that drugs have a multidimensional character, and as such, the 
response of the state and its strategies have increasingly reflected this 
understanding. A holistic, whole-of-government approach is evident throughout its 
policy documents and actions.  
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The NSP comprehensively acknowledges the diversity of threats posed to 
state security by drugs. As such, it provides a master plan for the participation of all 
state agencies and the utilisation of all state resources for creating a secure 
domestic environment, with a specific focus upon changing the environment itself.191 
The involvement of local communities, the restructuring of law enforcement 
agencies, the enhancement of mechanisms for governmental oversight and the 
expansion of judicial capacity represent just a few of the measures and priorities 
that have been identified. Within the NSP, the presence of drugs, gangs and 
organised crime combined with the availability of SALW are presented as symbiotic 
threats. Accordingly, it states that: “Jamaican officials have acknowledged that the 
drug trade nurtures the violence and lawlessness pervading the society. Left 
unchecked, the very survival of the State will be at risk.” 192 Furthermore, according 
to Knight: “…for years we have been the victims of gun smugglers. Since gun 
smugglers are also drug smugglers and dealers, it is necessary to attack that aspect 
of the problem simultaneously.” 193 These statements clearly demonstrate that the 
presence of drugs throughout the country has been securitised, and the survival of 
the state has been accorded as the object requiring security.  Specific attention is 
devoted to the promotion of foreign policy priorities and the strengthening of 
bilateral relations that are in the interests of national security.194 These include the 
need to maintain and strengthen a strong lobbying presence within the US, UK and 
Canada, and the fact that the security interests of Jamaica are intimately tied up with 
the security perceptions of these states is also recognised as a potential asset for 
obtaining future assistance.195  
 
Additionally, in order to reduce the burden upon the judical system, 
alternative sentencing mechanisms and restorative justice programmes have been 
discussed. However, there are also barriers that could prevent the institution of the 
priorities outlined in the NSP; these include institutional apathy, maladministration, 
corruption and poor funding. Moreover, the fact that gangs and criminal groups are 
autonomous and could potentially have strong patronage structures ensure that 
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there could be strong opposition to any attempts at establishing new security 
arrangements that specifically target their illicit business interests. The 
implementation of further security strategies aimed at controlling and removing the 
threat posed by those involved with drugs could also provoke them to employ a 
counter strategy of heightened violence to ensure the failure of these initiatives.  
Strategic Security Goals Outlined in the National Security Policy 
 
1. Reduce violent crime and dismantle organised criminal networks 
2. Strengthen the Justice System and promote the respect of rule of law 
3. Protect Jamaica from Terrorism 
4. Protect and control Jamaican territory 
5. Strengthen the integrity of government institutions 
6. Increase Jamaica’s contribution to regional and international security 
7. Provide an environment for a stable economy and effective social service delivery  
8. Protect Jamaica’s natural resources and reduce the risk of disasters 
Table adapted from Government of Jamaica, National Security Policy for Jamaica; Towards a Secure and 
Prosperous Nation (2007) p.vi 
 
Specific Security Initiatives Outlined in the National Security Policy 
 
1. Strengthen Jamaica’s National Intelligence System 
2. Strategically review and modernise critical National Security Agencies 
3. Establish a national task force to strengthen the overall effectiveness of Jamaica’s Justice System and to review 
and strengthen the laws and law making processes 
4. Establish a National Security Council and a National Security Strategy Implementation Unit 
5. Enhance programmes to promote community safety and security 
6. Promote the use of a National Strategic Communications Programme to facilitate public information, awareness, 
solidarity, engagement and support for the NSP and National and Human Security  
Table adapted from Government of Jamaica, National Security Policy for Jamaica; Towards a Secure and 
Prosperous Nation (2007) p.vi-vii 
 
In spite of fluctuating economic circumstances and severe budget 
constraints, the GOJ has continually invested in enhancing both the capacity of law 
enforcement agencies and the ability of the state to enforce its sovereignty.196 The 
2003 INCS Report acknowledged this fact, noting that foreign debt service required 
around 60 percent of the annual budget, and that in spite of this, the GOJ continued 
to provide resources for drug interdiction.197 Financial investments have paralleled 
this multidimensional understanding of the drug threat, and have focused upon 
enhancing the technical and human resources of security agencies. For example, 
the JCG has developed and expanded its multilateral working relationships with 
both the Colombian Navy and Cuban in order to identify potential shipments as they 
leave or approach each other’s jurisdiction, and similar cooperation occurs with the 
US and other Caribbean states. The capabilities of the Marine Police has been 
enhanced through the provision of 27 new vessels, at a cost of around JD$340 
million dollars.198 Furthermore, in 2005, British law enforcement specialists were 
hired to assist with the modernisation of the JCF, and its ability to operation within a 
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transforming and challenging environment. Lastly, during 2003, USD$21 million 
was invested to enhance seaport security and for acquiring non-intrusive 
equipment for inspecting cargo, and laboratory facilities have also been 
established.199  
 
A strong focus upon improving interagency cooperation is also evident. For 
example, the sharing of intelligence between the Financial Investigation Division 
and the Narcotics Division of the JCF resulted in the seizure of an estimated 
JD$350 million in drug-related income between 2005 and 2007.200 Resources have 
also been directed towards improving and instituting new domestic legislation, for 
example, new laws now enable the seizure of criminal assets, while bilateral 
legislation with the US has received increasing attention, with the institution of a 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty and an Extradition Treaty. As these developments 
demonstrate, the GOJ has committed itself to strengthening its ability to reassert its 
internal and external sovereignty and to reimposing its authority over criminal 
groups and gangs that are tacking advantage of, and maintaining, insecurity. The 
provision of new technical equipment and the implementation of new laws 
heightens the risks for those involved with drugs, and directly facilitates greater 
control over Jamaica’s territorial borders. 
 
Impressively, governmental committees, such as the National Committee on 
Crime and Violence, have acknowledged the previous failures of the GOJ as well 
as the shortcomings of counter measures. For example, Jamaican citizens and 
communities were inadequately incorporated into JCF anti-drug strategies, and this 
key failure resulted in the policing of these communities rather than policing in 
conjunction with them. 201 Furthermore, as a consequence, previous strategies 
focused upon confronting the appearance of drug-related insecurity and the 
multitude of actors, rather than the foundational causes that facilitated cultivation 
and trafficking, which encouraged the involvement of ordinary citizens.  
 
The GOJ has established a National Drug Control Abuse Prevention and 
Control Master Plan (NMP) that methodically examines the presence of drugs and 
outlines both current responses and future priorities. The NMP also summarised the 
threats posed to the state. For example, it asserts that: “An attitude of active or 
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passive cooperation will create a state of lawlessness which erodes the authority of 
a nation and its underlying ethical values and beliefs.” 202 This document represents 
an active policy guideline that aims to coordinate the efforts of the JCF, JDF, JCG 
and the efforts of other bureaucratic agencies involved in combating drugs. 
Importantly, the NMP recognises that a dual strategy of demand reduction and 
interdiction needs to be instituted simultaneously in order to have an effective 
impact with demonstrable results. Furthermore, it also highlights the sophistry 
involved in treating different classes of drugs with an uneven attitude, as the income 
from all drugs assist in sustaining insecurity by maintaining the power of gangs and 
criminal groups, which ensures the continued weakness of the state. 
 
Operation Kingfish serves as a perfect example where the investment of 
financial, technical and human resources combined with the inclusion of new 
policing strategies has resulted in overwhelming success.203 Kingfish represents a 
multi-agency organisation established to coordinate operations and disseminate 
intelligence, and as such, the organisation is comprised of personnel drawn and 
vetted from the JCF, JDF and other security agencies. It also relies upon multilateral 
intelligence obtained from the US, UK and other Caribbean states. It was provided 
with the mandate of dismantling organised criminal groups and their leadership 
structures. The high level of success is demonstrated by its involvement in over 
2,000 operations, and the seizure of some 300 SALW, over 21,000 rounds of 
ammunition, 13,000kgs of cocaine, 19,508.2kgs of marijuana and 73 boats.204 A 
strong element of the operation has been the incorporation of ordinary citizens and 
business people in order to gather community-based intelligence. Preventing the 
transhipment of drugs via sea vessels represents another primary objective. The 
number of boats seized so far attests to the centrality of this method of trafficking, 
and as a consequence of this success, operations have now began to target 
clandestine airfields, as it is believed that trafficking via aircraft will become more 
popular in response to the enhanced capacity of the JCG and maritime elements of 
the JDF.  In order for Kingfish to maintain its effectiveness, it will require the 
continued investment of significant state resources and continued cooperation with 
other regional agencies to respond to changes within the domestic and regional 
                                                
202
 National Council on Drug Abuse, 1997, p.7  
203
 http://www.jamaicapolice.org.jm/kingfish/home.htm; Ingrid Brown, “Operation Kingfish Achieving Major 
Objective”, Jamaican Information Service, December 6, 2005; Alicia Dunkley, “Operation Kingfish Netting 
Big”, Jamaican Information Service, December 14, 2004 
204
 http://www.jamaicapolice.org.jm/kingfish/home.htm  (Accessed online 30/04/08) 
 81
drug market.  It will also need to avoid the challenges posed by political interference 
and patron-client relationships that could reduce its effectiveness.  
 
The GOJ has also employed a strategy of politicisation that attempts to 
partially shift the responsibility for the use of the country for trafficking activities onto 
the consumption demands present within the US, as well as upon the failures of 
other regional states, such as Colombia, which have been unable to successfully 
intervene into their own domestic drug problems. As Phillips observes: “Failure to 
stem the flow of drugs northward must be of primary importance, not only to us, but 
to the United States and to all countries in the hemisphere.” 205 Comments made by 
Knight reinforce this assertion: “The Jamaican Government urges the international 
community to backs its verbal commitment for alternative development with 
tangible, practical support and innovative programmes.” 206 These attempts at 
diverting attention from Jamaica have two functions. They can be viewed as an 
attempt to increase the political pressure upon the US and other international 
contributors in order to obtain further assistance with anti-drug measures, and they 
can also be characterised as an attempt to relieve some of the political pressure 
exerted by the US upon the GOJ to achieve imposed eradication and seizure 
targets.    
 
 With regard to Buzan et al, the securisation of drugs has occurred though not 
strictly according to their definition or their vision of the processes associated with 
an object receiving the status as a valued and threatened existential object. The 
state has clearly been accorded by the GOJ as the primary object requiring security, 
and the location of that threat is defined as that posed by the relationship between 
drugs, SALW, gangs and criminal groups. This process of securitisation has 
evolved over a very long period of time, though emergency measures have 
previously been imposed to reassert the authority of the state during period of civil 
unrest and drug-related violence. According to Clarke, during 2001 the PNP used a 
state of emergency during an outbreak of violence to seize the political initiative, 
and to assist with its deteriorating public image during a pre-election period.207 This 
action by the PNP would fit precisely within the concepts developed by Buzan et al, 
though it only provides a parsimonious insight into drug-related insecurity and is 
specifically confined to one event during a short period of time. Furthermore, while 
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Buzan et al are concern with the attempts by governments to obtain extraordinary 
powers, aggressive anti-drug counter-measures have traditionally been utilised 
without the resort to public legitimisation, and it can be asserted with certainty that 
the level of discrimination against those located in poor communities ensures that 
these measures would have wide public support.208 It is highly likely that aggressive 
JCF and JDF measures will continue in the future, and that the incorporation of the 
JDF within activities that are normally reserved for police adds a militarised aspect 
to counter measures that is likely to result in higher levels of violence.  
 
While the politicisation of drug-related issues has occurred domestically, at 
this point in time a consensus between the major political parties is observable, and 
politicisation, as discussed above, is focused internationally at present. Lastly, while 
Jamaica is firmly located with the US RSC, unlike other weak Caribbean states it 
has been able to maintain a degree of sovereignty and reciprocity during its 
negotiations with other more powerful actors, though its ability to do so should not 
be over stated. The strong level of GOJ commitment to anti-drug measures is clearly 
illustrated by their actions and available government policy documents, though the 
presence of corruption, relationships between leaders, the JCF and criminals and 
the autonomy of gangs and criminal organisation present challenges that will 
ensure the cultivation and trafficking of drugs continues in the future. 
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Case Study Two 
 
Haiti 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Though a modicum of security and stability has been enforced throughout 
Haiti by the presence of the UN peacekeeping mission MINUSTAH, this situation 
remains fragile, and riots have recently occurred over the price and availability of 
food. It must also be recognised that this situation varies between those areas 
patrolled by the Haitian National Police (HNP) or UN, and within rural and urban 
locations. This environment of insecurity was summarised by the Overseas Security 
Advisory Council during August 2007, when it observed that: “Visitors and residents 
must remain vigilant due to the absence of an effective police force in much of Haiti, 
the potential for looting, the presence of intermittent roadblocks set by armed gangs 
or by the police, and the possibility of random violent crime, including carjacking 
and assault.” 209 Furthermore, while direct and open challenges to the state from 
armed groups may have abated, the potential for instability remains strong, as they 
remain operational and armed.  
 
This case study is important as it vividly demonstrates how the failure of the 
state derives from a combination of government weakness, the authoritarian 
manner in which it was previously governed and the ubiquitous trafficking of 
cocaine. It can be confidently asserted that, in spite of international efforts to 
reconstruct the state and reimpose its sovereignty, a symbiotic relationship between 
political instability, armed conflict and drugs has developed, which will ensure 
continued state weakness in the future. 
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News Coverage of Drugs in Haiti 
 
Source Date Headline 
The New York Times October 27, 1998 “Haiti Paralysis Brings a Boom in Drug Trade” 
The New York Times July 30, 2000 “Drug Runners Are Finding the Going Easy in Haiti” 
Chicago Tribune February 29, 2004 “Drug money reportedly funding Haiti fighting” 
The Boston Globe March 1, 2004 “Drug allegation gave U.S. leverage on Aristide” 
Chronicle Foreign Service March 4, 
2004 
“Haiti rebels linked to drug trade: Records show leaders’ ties to 
Colombians”  
BBC News March 19, 2004 “Haiti’s drug money scourge” 
The New York Times May 16, 2004 “Drug Traffickers Find Haiti a Hospitable Port of Call” 
The Miami Herald July 22, 2005 “Jury: Haitian smuggled drugs” 
Miami Herald September 24, 2005 “Star witness names ex-Haitian official in drug case” 
www.haiti-news.com January 9, 2007 “Haiti’s president say U.S. not doing enough to help fight narcotics 
trade” 
Washington Post January 10, 2007 “U.S. Defends Anti-Drug Effort in Haiti” 
Washington Post January 13, 2007 “Sen.: Drugs Smuggled to Haiti by Plane” 
Reuters June 21, 2007 “Interview-Haitian leader says priorities drugs, corruption” 
The Guardian Unlimited July 20, 2007 “Haiti, U.S. to Continue Joint Offensives” 
Miami Herald September 6, 2007 “More than 150 arrested in Little Haiti raids” 
Finding news articles concerning Haiti represents a difficult task, and those that are available from outside the country are often limited 
to websites that are of dubious character, and as such these have been avoided.   
 
 
Overview of Illicit Drugs in Haiti 
The trafficking of cocaine is ubiquitous, and marijuana is also believed to be 
cultivated, though new concerns have begun to arise that include the increasing 
availability of crack and ATS. However, there is an overwhelming absence of 
statistics and research concerning the presence of drugs throughout the state, and 
both the news media and government press releases are equally devoid of 
information on seizures. During 2007, the Haitian Counter Narcotics Unit (BLTS) 
destroyed five hectares of marijuana, though it is believed that local marijuana is of 
a poor quality, and is only grown to satisfy domestic demand.210 However, this 
assessment of the situation may not be accurate, as figures presented by the 
UNODC for 1997 and 1998 state that a total of 18,255kgs of marijuana were seized 
over these two years.211 This marijuana could have originated in Jamaica, though 
without forensic testing or detailed information on those involved this cannot be 
established. Similarly, the INCS Report for 2003 stated that Haitian Coast Guard 
(HCG) intercepted a boat carrying 18.18kgs of marijuana.212 The lack of statistical 
information represents a fundamental obstacle for the Government of Haiti (GOH) in 
combating their presence, as it is not definitively known whether the trafficking of 
cocaine is a more important issue than the domestic cultivation of marijuana, and as 
a consequence, the GOH cannot accurately allocate its limited resources towards 
obtaining maximum results.  
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Disturbingly, only a limited number of other seizure examples are available, 
and these are primarily related to shipments that have arrived in the US after 
transiting Haiti. For example, the inspection of five vessels that arrived in Miami 
during 2003 resulted in the seizure of 551.82kgs of cocaine.213 Few domestic 
seizure examples are available. As an example, during October 2003, a light plane 
carrying 500kgs of cocaine landed near Cap-Haitien; those involved were only 
arrested after strong pressure from the DEA forced the Secretary of Public Security 
to have those involved arrested.214 Additionally, during October 2007, the DEA 
recorded that 914kgs of cocaine and marijuana were seized as a direct 
consequence of the assistance they provide for airport baggage inspection, and the 
provision of both air and sea support vessels.215 These few examples demonstrate 
the level of complicity and support that exists for traffickers among even public 
officials, and the challenges posed for law enforcement agencies. The fact that so 
few seizures have been recorded (though those that have been depict such large 
quantities of both marijuana and cocaine) attests to the significance of the trafficking 
that occurs. These examples also illustrate the overriding importance of foreign 
assistance that is required for operational success to occur. 
 
The seizure of criminal assets and drug-related profits also illustrates the 
volume and profitability of drugs. For example, during November 2003, HNP officers 
confiscated USD$400,000 dollars from the vessel M/V Niklas Π, while efforts of the 
Central Financial Intelligence Unit during 2005 resulted in the freezing of USD$ 
17.1 million in drug assets that belonged to Serge Edouard.216 These examples 
further reveal the complexities of the challenges posed to securing the state from 
drugs, as highly technical expertise is increasingly required for activities such as 
asset freezing, and this necessitates the allocation of extensive and potentially 
limited financial resources to apprehend those involved.  
 
The near-total absence of statistics has been universally acknowledged, and 
the figures that are quoted often tend to be estimates that are presented as rough 
percentages of the total regional trade. For example, according to International 
Crisis Group (ICG): “The volume of cocaine in transit rose from around 5 per cent of 
annual U.S. imports in the early 1990’s to 13 per cent in 1999, then declined to 8 
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per cent in 2000 and remained around that level through 2004.” 217 During 2002, the 
INCB estimated that between 15 and 20 percent of cocaine trafficked within the 
Caribbean passed through Haiti, while the Board was also concerned that poor 
control over the licit drug trade had encouraged the development of a parallel illicit 
drug market.218 Lastly, the United States Institute of Peace (UNIP) estimated that 
around 83 metric tons of cocaine was trafficked through either Haiti or the 
Dominican Republic during 2006.219 This situation ensures that there is no objective 
way of assessing the level of success for the counter measures that are employed, 
moreover, it also prevents the GOH from presenting its situation to neighbouring 
states such as the US or regional forums such as CARICOM in an effort to gain 
further assistance. Furthermore, from these estimates, it is clearly observable that a 
large volume of drugs are available in and transit through Haiti, while additional 
issues such as poor control over prescription drugs may assist with the 
development of alternative drug preferences.  
 
In spite of the absence of statistics, it is logical to assume that the high 
degree of trafficking will ensure the development of a domestic drug consuming 
market, and that this market would conform to the economic conditions that are 
present. However, this is not uniformly accepted. For example, in the opinion of 
UNIP, both low purchasing power and cultural beliefs have ensured a low level of 
drug consumption, though, UNIP did recognise the potential for this situation to 
change in line with the experiences of other transit states, where the leakage of 
drugs in transit has assisted with the creation of a domestic market.220 In contrast, 
the US Department of State (DOS) has observed that: domestic marijuana and 
cocaine use, while low, continues to rise.221 Similarly, the UNODC has recorded the 
retail price of a gram of cocaine in 2001 as USD$8, compared with USD$80 in the 
US and USD$90 within Canada.222 The domestic demand for drugs is clearly 
present throughout the country, and this situation poses significant challenges to 
law enforcement agencies, which already have to cope with the presence of armed 
groups and gangs. The occurrence of additional changes with the domestic market 
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are likely to overwhelm these agencies, for example, clandestine laboratories could 
become established to meet increasing demands for ATS, while the near total 
absence of treatment facilities ensures that domestic demand is unlikely to 
decrease in the future.  
 
Dangerous transformations have already been observed within the domestic 
market. For example, while the role of Haitians was previously confined to that of 
drug couriers, this situation is believed to have changed, and they are now believed 
to be involved in all aspects of the trade, from smuggling to transportation and 
wholesale.223 It is also likely that Haitians have been paid for their services directly 
with drugs, and this assists with establishing and sustaining consumer demand. 
Furthermore, according to the DEA, significant diversification into heroin has been 
occurring among Dominican criminal groups, as 63 percent of the heroin seized in 
the US originated from South America and this could spill over into the domestic 
market in Haiti. 224 Additionally, the 2003 INCS Report noted that unsuccessful 
illegal migrants that had attempted to make their way to the US also intended to 
smuggle drugs as well.225 All of these changes could result in Haiti becoming the 
primary zone for trafficking operations in the Caribbean, and this would ensure that 
those involved would continue to have their power and autonomy increased in 
relation to the state. One positive aspect to this development would be that it would 
allow the centralisation of regional policing resources within Haiti, though given the 
fluid nature of trafficking, this situation would rapidly change as greater success was 
achieved. Lastly, it is likely that illegal migrants have utilised drug-related income, 
or have attempted to smuggle drugs, to support their endeavours for a considerable 
period of time, and gangs or criminal groups could also seek to exploit them for their 
own trafficking activities, if this has not already happened.  
 
Issues that include the near total absence of border controls, poor anti-drug 
cooperation and coordination between Haiti and the Dominican Republic and the 
failure of the state itself have assisted in creating a favourable environment for 
traffickers, who can effectively operate with impunity along the borders of both 
states. With regard to transportation methods, the DEA has continuously noted the 
high levels of drug flights landing from South America in the border areas between 
both states. Furthermore, Haiti was cited as an intensive operational area for go-fast 
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boats trafficking between its territorial borders and those of Jamaica and the US.226 
The volume of both commercial and private vessels transiting the country ensures 
the impossibility of strong interdiction measures and the ability of individuals and 
non-state actors to quickly adapt their methods, with the option of either single, 
large shipments or smaller, more frequent ones.  
 
United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime 
Drugs Seized in Haiti 1994-2001 
 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Cocaine 
(kgs) 
716 1,357 956 2,100 1,272 380 594 436 
Marijuana 
(kgs) 
46 0 0 9,000 9,255 31 401 1,750 
Table adapted from United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime Caribbean Regional Office, Caribbean Drug Trends 2001-2002 (2003). 
 
 
Political Security Concerns 
Challenges to domestic security derive from the relative absence of law and 
order and the near total failure of the state, which has included the dissipation and 
usurpation of its sovereignty by both former-state and non-state actors. Disputes 
over the control of the state represent a fundamental dimension of the armed 
conflicts that have occurred, as the political culture of the state has not been 
amenable to cooperation or accommodation. Haitian politics have traditionally been 
defined by a zero-sum approach to governance and power as demonstrated by the 
authoritarian control exercised by its national leaders. As Perez observes, Haiti is a 
prebendary state defined by presidential personality cults and the use of state 
resources for personal enrichment.227 Muggah also adroitly characterises the 
political situation, and asserts that: “Haiti is trapped in a state of chronic political 
instability. For at least the past two decades, it has faced a combination of social 
and state collapse from the centre and accruing armed influence at the periphery. 
Some analysts have observed a tradition of localized—as opposed to national—
rule was enforced under President Aristide in the 1990s and again in the years after 
his landslide election and reinstatement in 2001.” 228 Drugs and the insecurity that is 
created by them have therefore been inserted into a domestic environment that was 
already characterised by a multitude of powerful actors that preferred to destabilise 
the state for personal enrichment. As a consequence, drugs and the associated 
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profits have accelerated this process, and have formed a symbiotic relationship with 
these powerful actors, resulting in the creation of a cycle of political violence and 
the weakening of the state. 
 
The influence of drugs and drug profits upon the state has been disastrous, 
and they continue to exert a strong influence upon both the GOH and the attempts 
of international actors at rehabilitating the state. This situation has been widely 
recognised, and as the INCB observed during 2001: “Drug traffickers have been 
taking advantage of the unstable political situation in Haiti by routing drugs through 
that country...” 229 Furthermore, in the opinion of the DEA, drug corruption is all 
encompassing throughout the GOH, and this is evident even among the states 
leadership, as an example of this impropriety, there are allegations that former 
President Aristide was himself involved with drug trafficking. 230 Lastly, IGC offers a 
corresponding observation, and asserts that: “Groups linked to criminal activities, 
particularly drug trafficking and contraband (in Haiti and abroad), are behind much 
of the current wave of violence. It is plausible that they will attempt to establish (or 
indeed have already established) ties to political parties, and will offer financing or 
other kinds of support.” 231  The continued presence of political instability has 
provided an ideal opportunity for drugs to become further entrenched, and this 
ensures that the internal sovereignty of the state cannot be meaningfully reinstituted 
without also simultaneously undermining this relationship. The penetration of the 
GOH and the bureaucracy further ensures that the state is unable to effectively 
direct its resources, as anti-drug efforts are likely to be internally undermined. It is 
also likely that all competing political factions utilise drug profits to sustain 
themselves, and to assist with providing patronage to armed groups or gangs that 
support them.   
 
Overview of the Haitian Judicial System 
Before the outbreak of conflict in 2004, judicial institutions were already 
affected by politicisation, corruption and mismanagement, and they continue to be 
characterised by dysfunction as a consequence of their antiquated legal practices 
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and the near total lack of resources.232 Compounding this situation is the fact that 
judicial infrastructure has been destroyed in many areas, and in spite of the 
prosecution of members of Fanmi Lavalas, the political party of former-President 
Aristide, there has been a failure to prosecute those who were involved in 
committing atrocities under previous dictators. 233 This has resulted in accusations 
that the judiciary is open to manipulation and is effectively controlled by partisan 
influences. According to ICG, a popular perception exists that criminal justice and 
prosecution are defined by the ability of defendants to bribe judges, while there are 
also corresponding suggestions of organised collusion and corruption with the 
HNP.234 As an example, Salim Jean Batrony, a well-known trafficker, was arrested 
during 2002 while in possession of 58kgs of cocaine, however, the presiding judge 
released him, and he was not subsequently re-arrested despite the judge being 
dismissed over his decision.235  
 
The judicial system has been provided with significant foreign assistance to 
facilitate its reform, though as long as the presence of drugs and drug profits remain 
it cannot combat their presence or remove itself from their influence. Its inability to 
prosecute even those involved with minor crimes attests to the problems associated 
with tackling major drug offenders, and it has been estimated that 98 percent of the 
prison population have not yet been convicted of committing any crime. 236 Major 
criminal figures are likely to have access to significant financial resources to ensure 
acquittal. Additionally, the extensive number of potential criminal cases that involve 
drug-related offences ensure that the judicial system is completely overwhelmed by 
the associated costs and required resources. While judicial ineffectiveness and 
corruption remain, this ensures that impunity presides, and the role of the judiciary 
as the arbiter of law and governmental accountability is completely unfeasible. 
 
The Haitian National Police Force 
In order to successfully combat the presence of drugs throughout the country, 
Haiti requires an effective police force that can simultaneously maintain law and 
                                                
232
 Amnesty International, “Breaking the cycle of violence: A last chance for Haiti”, AI Index 36/038/2004 
(June, 2004) p.4-5; United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Security Council mission to Haiti, 13th to 
16th April 2005”, Report Number S/2005/302 p.13; International Crisis Group, “Haiti: Justice Reform and the 
Security Crisis”, Policy Briefing Latin America/Caribbean Briefing, No.14 (31 January 2007) 
233
 Amnesty International, 2004, p.8 
234
 International Crisis Group, 2007, p.4 & p.10; International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), “Analysis of the 
World Situation”, in Annual Report of the International Narcotics Control for 2003, p.45; Nick Caistor, “Haiti’s 
drug money scourge”, BBC News, March 19, 2004    
235
 INCS Report, 2003 
236
 Harvard Law Student Advocates for Human Rights & Centro de Justica Global, Keeping the Peace in 
Haiti? (March 2005) p.39 
 91
order, as well as the credibility and capacity to undertake counter-drug operations. 
However, prior to the outbreak of violence in 2004, it was estimated that there were 
only between 3,000 and 5,000 police officers nationally for 8.5 million people, 
though the number of active officers cannot be accurately accounted for, and their 
ability to maintain internal security was already compromised.237 The HNP was 
severely understaffed, and this becomes apparent when the new reform plan is 
taken into account, as MINUSTAH and the HNP have agreed upon a police force 
comprising 14,000 officers.238 This situation ensured that the HNP was not only 
unable to confront gangs and criminal groups involved with drugs, it was also 
fundamentally unable to combat the appearance of drug-related crime and 
violence, and as a consequence, the HNP became both ineffective and corrupted.  
 
The existence of close relationships between members of the HNP, criminals 
and those associated with drugs was therefore firmly established. According to the 
DEA, members of the HNP continue to be intimately involved with drug deliveries, 
and they frequently assist with diverting public vehicle traffic, as well as the 
offloading of drugs and the provision of security for consignments.239 Additionally, 
according to the testimony of one former member of the Medellin cartel before the 
US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, during the late 1980s Lieutenant Colonel 
Joseph Michael Francois, the commander of the HNP, had formed the equivalent of 
a business partnership with criminals that was dedicated to cocaine trafficking.240 
This situation ensures that even if the political will did exist among Haiti’s 
leadership and the GOH, it would not be able to effectively employ the HNP to 
counter the presence of drugs. Despite the provision of large amounts of foreign 
financial and technical assistance for the reform and development of the HNP, this 
relationship is likely to continue. It is highly unlikely that these relationships would 
end on their own accord, as those involved with trafficking would be able to easily 
corrupt officers and offer significant financial incentives for either their direct 
assistance, or tacit compliance, with drug-related activities. Lastly, the existence of 
relationships with criminals ensures that a climate of distrust and fear exists, as 
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citizens and communities would, in all likelihood, face retaliation if they chose to 
speak out against either side. 
 
 The HNP have been frequently implicated for their involvement in 
committing serious human rights abuses such as extrajudicial killings. For example, 
in one incident police are reputed to have executed 13 people in a Port-au-Prince 
neighbourhood, and as a consequence of their involvement local fears of 
government-sponsored death squads were raised.241 The United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) has commented upon this climate of distrust, and has asserted 
that: “…a culture of impunity remained pervasive, marked by arbitrary arrest, 
wrongful detention, inhumane prison conditions, excessive use of force, and 
extrajudicial executions.” 242 There is also a perception that the HNP has a partisan 
approach towards enforcing the law as a consequence of its forceful strategies 
employed against pro-Aristide/Fanmi Lavalas gangs, which has not been equally 
applied to other dangerous groups.243 For ordinary citizens, and especially those 
living within poor areas, the HNP has increasingly alienated itself through the use of 
repressive measures, and given this situation, it is unlikely that communities would 
either trust, or voluntarily assist, with anti-drug operations or the provision of 
intelligence. The HNP cannot credibly commit to creating a secure domestic 
environment while they are simultaneously involved with its maintenance, and 
public perceptions of it have been further undermined by the integration of former 
military personal (FADH) who have, similarly, been implicated in human rights 
abuses.  
 
Military Security Concerns 
 
The Availability of Small Arms and Light Weapons 
 
The proliferation of SALW represents a significant security concern and an 
issue of fundamental importance given the number of former-state and non-state 
actors that have inserted themselves into the political vacuum created by the failure 
of the state. Grey and black market weapons transfers are common, though analysis 
of these activity is limited, and weapons have been sourced from a variety of foreign 
states. It is estimated that there are around 170,000 firearms owned by civilians, 
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and there is a long history of homemade firearms.244 Furthermore, in spite of an 
embargo placed upon the export of SALW to Haiti by the US, approved deliveries 
have been shipped to the HNP, while other states have also ignored these 
sanctions.245 The trafficking of marijuana and guns between Haiti and Jamaica is 
also believed to occur on a regular basis. The availability of SALW ensures that the 
state is fundamentally unable to reassert its sovereignty, as these weapons directly 
assist these groups in enhancing their autonomy and coercive capacity in relation 
to the state. The state is effective only one of many armed actors. While an 
environment of insecurity is pervasive, it is also unlikely that the demand for SALW 
among ordinary citizens will decline. The availability of drugs and their use as a 
financial resource provides a significant, and potentially limitless, source of funding 
for SALW acquisition, and this effectively allows these actors to support their 
domestic objectives in spite of international intervention. 
 
The widespread occurrence of armed conflict, violence and crime can be 
characterised as a low intensity conflict, where conflict is not yet representative of 
that associated with civil war, though equally, the conflict that is presence has not 
been brought under control and peace has not been established. The presence of 
multiple armed actors and the ambiguous attitude displayed by the GOH towards 
these different armed actors has not assisted with the creation of security. Maggah 
summaries the complexity of the armed actors involved:  
Human and national security is undermined by a wide variety of non-state armed groups 
currently operating throughout the country. There are at least a dozen distinct types of 
armed groups in possession of varying numbers and calibres of small arms and light 
weapons: Ops, baz armes, zenglendos, ex-army (FADH), former paramilitaries 
(Revolutionary Armed Forces for the Progress of Haiti—FRAPH), the ex-Presidential 
Guard, prison escapees, organised criminal groups, self-defence militia, private security 
companies, civilians and politicians. Each of these groups draws on a rich vein of local 
support. The alliances among these groups are fluid, and motivations stem from a 
complex combination of predatory and protective behaviour—itself firmly tied to local 
interests. 246 
 
This vividly demonstrates the difficulty of the disarmament process and the long 
duration required to reinstitute the sovereignty and authority of the state. Both the 
UNSC and AI have expressed concerns surrounding the partisan approach 
directed towards disarmament, with only members of Fanmi Lavalas being 
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disarmed.247 The Harvard Human Rights Programme (HHRP) has also observed 
that there is a general lack of political will for undertaking proper disarmament, and 
this is in spite of the means to do so being provided by the presence of 
MINUSTAH.248 Given these observations and the clear relationship between SALW 
acquisition, the maintenance of insecurity and drugs, Haiti will continue to 
experience instability. The state will remain unable to reassert its control, while its 
future actions and policies may in fact precipitate an armed response from these 
actors. Many former-state and non-state actors have little incentive to participate 
with the rehabilitation of state, as stability is antithetical to both their rational political 
and economic interests and involvement with drugs.  
 
The Haitian Military 
The FADH were historically defined by their employment as an instrument for 
the maintenance of power against domestic political challengers and competition, 
than as a force that provided for the external security of the state. This paradox is 
demonstrated by their frequent involvement with the repression and murder of 
citizens.249 Furthermore, in spite of the disbanding of the FADH and the 
demobilisation of its members, many continue to maintain the belief that they have a 
legitimate constitutional role within the politics, and disturbingly, they still maintain 
their SALW.250 Of critical importance to this thesis is the assertion that under Jean-
Claude Duvalier, the FADH were encouraged to pursue private economic 
enterprise in order to finance itself, and like other government departments, 
members became involved with trafficking activities during the 1980s.251 This 
situation continues to be relevant now, as the UN has observed that both former 
FADH personnel and armed gangs have formed working relationships with criminal 
groups tied to both drugs and SALW trafficking. 252 The involvement of the FADH 
with drugs is significant, as many of its members would have had little reason to 
maintain the pretence of their domestic duties. Furthermore, the ability of the FADH 
to self-finance effectively removed it from under the control of the GOH. As a 
                                                
247
 Amnesty International, 2004, p.12; United Nations Security Council, 2005, p.6; Harvard Law Student 
Advocates for Human Rights, 2005, p.44  
248 Harvard Law Student Advocates for Human Rights, 2005, p.12 
249
 Amnesty International, 2004, p.15; Alfonso Chardy, “Ex-general accused of role in mass killing in Haiti”, 
The Miami Herald, January 15, 2004; Harvard Law Student Advocates for Human Rights, 2005 p.5-7 
250
 Maggah, 2005, p.19-21 
251
 Perez, 2000, p.143-145; Ivelaw L. Griffith, “Caribbean Security on the Eve of the 21st Century”, Institute 
for National Strategic Studies: National Defence University, McNair Paper No.54 (Washington, INSS, 1996) 
p.41; Gray Barnes, 2002, p.23; International Crisis Group, 2005, p.5-6; Steven Dudley, “Haitian rebels linked 
to Drug trade: Records show leaders’ ties to Colombians”, Chronical Foreign Service, March 4, 2004 
252
 United Nations Security Council, 2005, p.3; International Crisis Group, 2005, p.6 
 95
consequence, the FADH would have quickly deteriorated and they now 
increasingly resemble the gangs and criminal groups that are involved with 
trafficking. Unfortunately, they would have continued to maintain a patina of state 
legitimacy, which would have assisted in shielding them from the judicial system 
and international sanctions. The contemporary formation of partnerships with 
criminals is of significant concern, as they could become proxies for achieving 
criminal objectives.   
 
Anecdotally, it has been suggested that the participation of former FADH 
personnel in the coup against President Aristide was in response to his efforts to 
curb the presence of corruption and drug trafficking.253 It may also be possible, 
given the suggestions that Aristide financially benefited from the occurrence of 
trafficking, that he was attempting to use the power of the state to reduce the 
involvement of other domestic actors involved with drugs for his own financial 
benefit. This scenario has some credibility, as national leaders have traditionally 
used the state for their personal enrichment.  
 
Societal Security Concerns 
 
Accurately depicting the negative influence of drugs upon societal security is 
a daunting proposition, as there is a near total lack of detailed research concerning 
their influence. A broad spectrum of Haitian society is compliant or explicitly 
involved with trafficking activities, and this ensures the impossibility of addressing 
their presence through the institution of prompt measures. 254 Furthermore, ICG has 
characterised Haitian society as: “… an atomised agglomeration of contradictory 
and antagonistic interests, relying on violence as the ultimate way to resolve 
conflict”, furthermore: “The seeds of Haiti’s violence are in the acute social and 
economic inequalities which have historically marked the country.” 255 When this 
description of Haitian society is combined with the traditional use of violence by 
both the HNP and FADH, and the fact that these measures have been extensively 
utilised throughout poor neighbourhoods, then understanding the basis for the 
instability and conflict that has occurred becomes straightforward. This history of 
violence, discrimination and socio-economic conflict effectively allows the state to 
justify and legitimise employing highly aggressive strategies to combat the 
presence of instability, which is viewed as arising primarily within these poor 
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communities. When the issue of drugs is combined with this situation, and the 
perception that drug-related activities are believed to primarily occur within these 
areas then the state can easily employ violence to reassert its authority with these 
areas.  
 
The research by Kolbe and Hutson represents one of the few studies that 
have attempted to examine this extreme environment of violence. They conducted a 
random survey of households in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince between 
February 2004 and December 2005, and according to their results, an estimated 
8,000 people were murdered, of which, they attribute approximately 21.7 percent to 
the HNP and other security forces, 13 percent to anti-Lavalas groups and 47.8 
percent to criminals.256 Accordingly, the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) suggests that there is a 34.4 percent chance of not surviving past the age of 
40 because of these socio-economic conditions.257  
 
Understandably, citizens have come to fear the HNP as much as armed non-
state actors, gangs and criminals. In other countries, the expansion of domestic 
drug cultivation and trafficking has resulted in the escalation of violence and crime, 
and it is likely that situation has occurred in Haiti. For example, gangs and criminal 
groups involved with drugs may try to eliminate their competition, and they would 
without doubt use intimidation and violence to ensure a favourable host 
environment. Individual criminal acts and violence are also likely to increase due to 
the need to acquire drugs.  Lastly, the presence of drugs could become more 
complex, if it has not already, if those involved with drugs develop or cultivate a role 
as social service providers or social patrons for local communities. This would 
effectively mean that the little legitimacy the state currently enjoys in some areas 
would be completely eroded, if it has not happened already through its frequent 
resort to violence. 
 
Economic Security Concerns 
 
The extreme conditions of poverty and unemployment throughout the country 
are fundamentally associated within the insecurity and instability that is present. 
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According to the UNDP, 50 percent of the adult population is unemployed and 40 
percent of households are affected by food insecurity.258 The UNDP further asserts 
that the underdevelopment of Haiti ranks alongside that of Sub Saharan Africa, and 
well below the development of other Latin American and Caribbean states.259 IGC 
summarise the economic conditions throughout Haiti, and asserts that: “The 
economic model is one of the underlying obstacles to political as well as economic 
progress. Its main goal has been to maintain the power, interests and advantages of 
a few families that monopolise most of its sectors.” 260 It is within this economic 
environment that drugs have become a source of income for not only branches of 
the state and criminal groups, but also for everyday individuals and communities.  
 
Drugs are likely to provide communities with an important source of income 
that would not otherwise be available to them. Though, paradoxically, this income is 
directly related to the presence of conflict and insecurity, and the violence 
associated with drugs prevents economic development and the establishment of 
industries such as tourism. This insecurity requires the GOH to continually invest its 
limited financial resources in the provision of security arrangements in order to 
reassert its sovereignty and to provide security for economic development. The 
magnitude of drug activities and the potential income ensures the continued 
corruptibility of state law enforcement agencies and the maintenance of a 
hospitable trafficking environment. Moreover, it is unlikely that ordinary Haitian 
citizens will be dissuaded from offering support for anti-drug measures unless there 
is a fundamental shift in their present economic circumstances. Furthermore, if the 
political objectives of some of those armed actors that are present transform 
towards more economic motives then they would become further entrenched. It is 
likely that this scenario is already occurring.  
 
The Involvement of MINUSTAH in Haiti 
 
The UN peacekeeping mission MINUSTAH has been inserted into a complex 
operational environment where the continued trafficking of drugs threatens to not 
only maintain instability and lawlessness, but also prevent the attainment of its 
objectives. Importantly, MINUSTAH has undertaken a series of operations aimed at 
combating armed gangs believed to be associated with trafficking. However, it 
appears that combating the presence of drugs does not represent an essential 
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objective, as according to General Carlos Alberto Dos Santos Cruz, Commander of 
the mission, drugs are responsible for a considerable amount of violence, though 
he was unsure as to what degree they were responsible for the overarching 
environment of insecurity.261 The failure to identify the role of drugs in maintaining 
insecurity represents a fundamental flaw within the approach of MINUSTAH to 
reconstructing the state.  
 
At this point in time, counter drug strategies have primarily focused upon 
arresting and disbanding gangs and their leadership. Unfortunately, this approach 
creates a vacuum that is quickly filled by other non-state actors and criminals, and 
this does not impact upon the overall facilitating environment. Moreover, according 
to some observers, the presence of a de facto ceasefire between gangs and 
MINUSTAH has been utilised by these groups to consolidate their position.262 
Between January and March 2007, combined MINUSTAH-HNP anti-gang 
operations resulted in the arrest of some 400 suspects. 263 However, while these 
figures demonstrate a high level of success, few resources are available to properly 
prosecute and investigate these suspects, and it is questionable whether the 
judicial system can prove their involvement with drug activities. The UN has 
admitted that it utilised anomous information gathered via telephone hotlines, and 
as such, allegations of personal involvement are as likely to true, as much as they 
are a practical form of social retribution against political opponents or a product of 
discrimination. 
 
It has been suggested that MINUSTAH has not succeeded in its mandated 
task of reforming the HNP, and it has also been asserted that the UN mission has, 
tacitly or otherwise, provided cover for further human rights abuses by the HNP 
during operations.264 According to the HHRP, the presence of MINUSTAH has 
encouraged more aggressive and assertive missions by the HNP as a 
consequence of the increased logistical and firepower support provided by the UN. 
As such, it asserted that: “The most charitable assessment of MINUSTAH with 
regard to the police reform portion of its mandate is one of utter ineffectiveness.” 265 
Allegations also continue to persist concerning the involvement of MINUSTAH itself 
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in committing human rights abuses.266 Donais has suggests that international 
assistance to the HNP has focused too much upon the technical aspects of policing, 
rather than the environment in which they are policing, ignoring the dynamics that 
exist between domestic politics, the functions of the police and state-societal 
relations as a whole.267 The continued presence of drugs will undermine any future 
attempts at reforming the HNP. 
  
Compounding this situation, CIVPOL, the policing arm of MINUSTAH, 
maintained no constitutionally sanctioned policing powers throughout 2005, and 
around a third of officers at that time could not speak French, this reduced the 
effectiveness of its law enforcement role.268 MINUSTAH was equipped with a strong 
mandate to support constitutional and political reform and public safety. If it is 
unable to combat, challenge and reduce the presence of drugs throughout Haiti 
then these objectives will not be accomplished with any lasting significance. 
Paradoxically, the involvement of MINUSTAH in combating gangs and drug 
activities may also compromise the mission and provoke further violent conflict by 
challenging those with vested interests in it, while damaging its reputation in the 
eyes of the population. More fundamentally, anti-drug operations may require a 
radical shift in the approach of the UN towards post-conflict reconstruction in Haiti, 
and during other interventions. This strategy would be subjected to forthright 
domestic and international debate, and potentially strong opposition as questions 
regarding sovereignty, the applicability of anti-drug measures and objectives of 
foreign agendas would arise without doubt.  
 
The Involvement of the United States in Haiti 
 
The involvement of the US in supporting the UN mission and its own 
provision of significant technical and financial assistance has been predicated upon 
the overriding principle of national security.269 The position of the US is articulated 
by R. Nicholas Burns, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, who asserted that 
the deployment of MINUSTAH is fundamental for the security and stability of Haiti, 
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and for preventing the further penetration of criminal and drug trafficking 
organisations under the cover of political instability.270 This observation is further 
reinforced by concerns expressed by the US Senate in 2005, which asserted that: 
“the failure to establish a secure and stable environment and to conduct credible 
and conclusive elections will likely result in Haiti’s complete transition from a failed 
state to a criminal state.” 271 The Cornerstone case in Miami serves as an example 
of the volume of drugs trafficked into the US, where the inspection of just six 
commercial cargo shipments resulted in the seizure of 25 tons of cocaine over two 
years.272 The US clearly views the expansion of criminal activities in Haiti as a direct 
threat to its own domestic security. 
 
However, support for intervention and the provision of assistance has not 
been universally accepted within US domestic political discussions. For example, 
USIP contends that US interests have: “fluctuated between the extremes of 
disinterest and armed intervention.” 273 US security imperatives have clearly 
influenced support for intervention, and these concerns are likely to parallel current 
US anti-drug policies throughout the Caribbean. It can also be asserted with 
confidence that this focus upon drugs has been fundamentally reinforced by the 
dominance of the post-September 11th security discourse, which regards state 
failure as a source of insecurity for neighbouring states, and regional security as a 
whole. Haiti is therefore firmly with the US RSC. Though this raises important and 
difficult questions regarding the issue of sovereignty and the securitisation of drugs 
by the US, and this is especially so during the period when Haiti was effectively a 
failed state and the authority of the GOH was contested. For example, anti-drug 
measures where required to assist with stabilisation, though consent for the 
domestic measures employed by both the US and UN were effectively absent.  
 
In spite of the de-certification of Haiti by on the annual Narcotics Certification 
Report, due to the total failure of the government to comply with even the minimum 
requirements of controlling drug activities, the US deemed that it was a national 
security priority to ensure that it did not become further associated with trafficking, 
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and as such, economic assistance was not suspended. 274 Importantly, 
Undersecretary Burns acknowledged the relationship between drugs and economic 
underdevelopment, and expressed the desire to expand the mandate of 
MINUSTAH while it was available as it could provide security for such activities.275 
Congress has recognised the economic dimensions of the conflict, and has 
provided support by a preferential trade agreement, continuing aid, and has also 
supported efforts for the relief of Haiti’s international debt.276 Moreover, the US has 
emphasised that unless a secure environment can be provided and the sovereignty 
of the state reasserted then it is unlikely that counter-drug operations could be 
conducted with even minimal success. However, the complexity and magnitude of 
the US government ensures that a coherent policy that allows for economic 
development and anti-drug measures to be instituted may not be possible, and 
bureaucratic competition between different branches of the state will influence any 
strategies that are instituted.  
 
Contrasting opinions of the GOH and the complexities and sensitivities 
associated with foreign relations that involve drug issues are clearly evident within 
the same US government department. This is best demonstrated by the views 
expressed by the DOS within the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. 
For example, in 2003, the DOS described the counter-drug commitment of the GOH 
as very weak, and cited the direct involvement of both GOH and HNP officials with 
trafficking activities. 277 Furthermore, in 2006 the DOS asserted that the HNP have 
not adequately attempted to disarm those gangs that actively supported trafficking, 
and moreover, it noted that there was little GOH support for combating drugs, and 
that no drug-related prosecutions were conducted during 2005.278 These blunt 
assessments should be contrasted with statements made during 2008, as the anti-
drug commitment of the GOH was highly praised, and the anti-drug operations and 
efforts to reduce corruption were outlined more positively than within previous 
reports. The DOS  explicitly asserted that: 
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 As a matter of policy, the GOH does not encourage or facilitate the shipment of 
narcotics through Haiti, and does not discourage the investigation or prosecution of such 
acts. Moreover, the GOH has demonstrated willingness to undertake law enforcement and 
legal measures to prevent, investigate, prosecute, and punish public corruption.279 
 
It is obvious that greater levels of funding for both the GOH and the HNP combined 
with the creation of a more secure environment would result in increased 
operational success. However, the attitude and impressions of the DOS statements 
are strikingly different to those previously expressed. This is important, as it is likely 
that large segments of the bureaucracy, national leadership and the HNP are still 
significantly involved with trafficking activities and drug profits. These statements 
may point to greater US sensitivity towards achieving its anti-drug policies 
throughout the Caribbean, and may also signify a change within its approach away 
from reliance upon coercive means and aggressive statements, which are counter-
productive, towards a more positive engagement with neighbouring states.  
 
The primary focus of US bilateral counter-drug assistance has centred on 
providing financial and technical resources to the HNP. This has included USD$8.2 
million in funding during 2005, as well as the provision of vehicles for 
transportation, police equipment and experienced personnel.280 There has been a 
long history of cooperation between US and Haitian law enforcement agencies. For 
example, a Special Investigations Unit was established during 2007 to examine 
criminal groups operating between both countries, while cooperation between both 
coast guard agencies has also occurred, during 1997 this resulted in the seizure of 
over nine tons of marijuana and 2.1 tons of cocaine.281 Significant assistance has 
also been provided to the HCG in order to return to operation, and intelligence on 
suspected drug flights has also been provided.282 Importantly, the US has focused 
upon building a bilateral relationship between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, 
as few coordinated anti-drug operations and no border patrols have been 
undertaken between the two states in spite of their intimate relationship with 
traffickers.283   
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Responses of the Haitian Government to Drugs 
In spite of the ubiquitous presence of cocaine trafficking throughout the 
country, successive GOH administrations have consecutively failed to implement 
credible measures towards combating their presence. Legislative measures have 
been consistently blocked by political impasses among the country’s competing 
leadership, and in many respects, the transitional government that has been 
supported by the international community has brought about greater political 
polarisation. The GOH has also previously failed to provide the necessary 
resources to the HNP, HCG and other agencies to enhance their capacity and 
ability to seize drugs. The absence of credible political commitment towards a 
holistic process of demobilisation, disarmament and the reintegration of former 
FADH members and other armed non-state actors throughout Haiti is indicative of 
the poor attitude and responses towards anti-drug measures by the GOH. The 
successive failure of GOH administrations to combat drugs can be distilled into 
several explanations: a total lack of financial resources and the presence of political 
conflict among competing factions has ensured the weakness of the state while 
providing an ideal environment for traffickers; the magnitude of the trade itself has 
ensured the total corruption and involvement of all government agencies, the 
bureaucracy and citizens; a total lack of commitment to undertake operations by 
national leaders; and lastly, the development of a symbiotic relationship between 
armed conflict and the use of drugs as a financial resource has ensured that the 
state is less powerful than these actors, and cannot intervene into drug activities. 
However, in spite of the convergence of these factors, some positive progression in 
anti-drug measures is evident within recent GOH actions.   
 
The ability of the HNP and other domestic agencies to seize drugs and 
implement counter-drug strategies has fluctuated according to the level of 
commitment displayed by the GOH, the amount of funding available and the 
presence of armed conflict throughout the country. Praise was offered by the INCB 
over increasing cooperation with the US Coast Guard and the return of the HCG to 
maritime interdiction.284 However, serious questions are raised concerning its 
sustainability and capacity to seriously impede the use of the country as a 
transhipment hub. The return of the HCG is more of a symbolic victory, than a 
meaningful contribution to border security. During 2005, the HNP expanded the 
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number of officers assigned to the BLTS, though operations continue to be limited 
by the lack of available resources.285 Action has been undertaken to prevent money 
laundering and financial crimes that assist traffickers; the interim government 
reorganised the Central Financial Intelligence and the Financial Crimes Task Force, 
though the DOS noted that in spite of some 400 investigations, there had been little 
success.286 The GOH has also cooperated with the US to expel criminals for 
prosecution, and the DEA has been allowed to establish a Sensitive Investigation 
Unit in the country.287 Attempts at public education have occurred through the use of 
radio advertisements, though no demand-reduction or rehabilitation programmes 
are present.288 It is evident that there has been an increasing level of commitment to 
anti-drug measures, though the overall magnitude of the trade ensures that even a 
strong response by the GOH is not likely to seriously impede trafficking operations.  
 
The GOH has also failed to take advantage of bilateral legal assistance, and 
its ability to enforce the provisions of current bilateral agreements is weak. For 
example, in 2002 it became a party to a Maritime Counter Narcotics Agreement with 
the US, though there is no formal agreement concerning mutual legal assistance 
between the two states, and requests have traditionally been made on an ad-hoc 
basis, though these requests have occurred infrequently. The GOH is also party to 
other international anti-drug agreements such as the 1988 UN Drug Convention 
and the 1961 UN Convention on Narcotic Drugs, however, it has not ratified other 
international agreements such as the UN Convention against Organised Crime, the 
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and the Caribbean Regional 
Maritime Agreement. The GOH has clearly failed to employ these agreements for its 
benefit, as it is likely that it requires substantial assistance to implement them. It is 
also unlikely that it will be able to enforce them adequately even if they were 
ratified.  
 
Bilateral relations with other important regional actors such as CARICOM 
have been difficult, though the head of the Organization of American States’ (OAS) 
Anti-Drug Commission visited during August 2007 to review the GOH progress with 
implementing anti-drug measures.289 Unfortunately, relations with the Dominican 
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Republic have traditionally been both volatile and combative, and the degree to 
which this animosity can be overcome by either state to enhance their cooperation 
on anti-drug initiatives is unknown. Contemporary relations with France have also 
been difficult, though France has continued to provide assistance for judicial 
training and for social and economic development projects, though direct 
assistance for anti-drug measures are not observable.290 However, the existence of 
drug and SALW trafficking between Haiti and Jamaica has assisted with the 
strengthening of bilateral ties between both states with a strong focus upon mutual 
security imperatives.291 Haiti’s foreign relations have clearly fluctuated according to 
its domestic political environment and they have also been affected by the 
personalities of its more recent leaders. As a greater level of stability has been 
provided, it appears that the GOH has been able to focus more upon bilateral 
relations, and especially those related to acquiring anti-drug assistance. 
 
Examining the discourse and actions of the GOH provides an opportunity to 
examine its attitudes toward the threats associated with drugs as outlined by the 
NFA devised by Buzan et al. However, this is approach is problematic, as there is a 
complete lack of available official information due to instability and the cycle of 
failures, and there is also a paucity of working government websites and official 
publications. Furthermore, as a French speaking country, the nuances of language 
associated with the use of translated statements may disguise and distort the 
meaning and context of GOH statements. This represents a significant problem 
associated with the use of discourse analysis as outlined by the NFA.  
 
From the statements that are available, it appears as if a dual strategy, 
whether formalised or ad-hoc, is occurring. The GOH has attempted to publicise the 
failure of foreign assistance, and especially that provided by the US, while the 
magnitude of domestic trafficking has been played down. 292 For example, in his 
annual address to parliament during 2007, President Preval presented Haiti as the 
victim of Western consumer demands. According to a translation of one of his 
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statements, he asserted that: “A lot of crimes happening in the country are 
connected to drugs. But everybody knows that Haiti doesn’t produce drugs. Haiti 
isn’t a big consumer of drugs…Haiti is the victim of drug-consuming countries, 
mainly the United States”.293 It is correct to assert that Haiti is a victim of external 
influences, and while its security cannot be divorced from the influence of US 
consumer demand for drugs, the historical reliance of the GOH upon violence 
combined with the corruption of previous national leaders and the bureaucracy 
bare considerable responsibility for the failure of the state and the entrenchment of 
drug activities.  
 
The strategies of the GOH are also evident throughout other official 
statements. For example, Jean Reynald Clerisme, Haiti’s Foreign Minister, has 
asserted that: “The government, with the police and MINUSTAH, are trying to 
disband this connection [to armed groups and drug funding] and create the space 
for security in the country.” 294Additionally, according to Ira Kurzban, General 
Counsel to the GOH and an Adviser to former President Aristide, Haiti did have a 
problem with trafficking, but this issue was not a major problem, and he suggested 
that allegations concerning the entrenchment of drugs under President Aristide 
were part of a smear campaign.295 The actions of the GOH could be characterised 
as a deliberate attempt to politicise the issue of foreign aid and assistance to Haiti in 
order to continue receiving financial support, upon which the state is dependant for 
its survival. The promotion of recent drug interdiction efforts, however minimal they 
are, could also be viewed as an attempted to avoid de-certification by the US and 
the possible loss of aid. Though equally, they could represent the beginnings of a 
concerted attempt to overcome the insecurity created by drugs. Unfortunately, in the 
opinion of Barnes, the Haitian government has acknowledged the centrality of Haiti 
in the trafficking of cocaine, though combating drugs has been prioritised as 
secondary to the objectives of political stability, law and order, and economic 
development. 296 This fundamentally ignores the centrality of drugs in undermining 
the state, and the GOH will be unable to achieve these objectives without 
simultaneous addressing the presence of drugs; though this is likely to be beyond 
the capabilities of the GOH. While drug trafficking remains, the state will remain 
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insecure and non-state actors will continue to maintain a high level of autonomy 
and coercive capacity to the detriment of Haiti. 
 
Recent actions such as closer bilateral relations with the OAS and Jamaica 
demonstrate the recent changes that have occurred in the priorities and 
commitment of the GOH to combating the presence of drugs, though it is 
questionable whether the use of Haiti for these activities can be significantly 
reduced. Furthermore, given the previous discussion regarding the failure to 
implement credible measures, to support key law enforcement agencies and the 
pervasiveness of drug-related corruption then it is unlikely that the GOH could 
deploy significant anti-drug measures, now that some political commitment is 
evident.  
 
With regard to the definitions of securitisation and politicisation employed by 
Buzan et al, drug-related insecurity has been securitised to some extent, though this 
securitisation is problematic. It is has not occurred during an emergency, though the 
failure of the state clearly represented an emergency situation, and the employment 
of violent and repressive measures to combat the gangs and non-actors involved 
with drugs has not required the government to seek formal approval or legitimacy 
for aggressive measures, as these have traditionally been employed to tackle 
security threats by the HNP, and it is likely that such strategies will continue.297 
Furthermore, because of a lack of information specifically concerning drugs and 
internal political debate, this thesis cannot realistically discusses the domestic 
politicisation of drugs that may have occurred between the major and multitude of 
smaller political parties present throughout Haiti.298  
 
A definitive conclusion regarding why higher security priorities have been 
attached to other issues cannot be reached. However, it is possible to suggest that 
the current measures are viewed as those most likely to result in success. 
Furthermore, national political debate regarding drugs and drug-related insecurity 
has not happened to the degree that is required for them to gain an elevated priority 
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and it also possible that other issues have been given a higher priority as a 
consequence of the influence of external actors. For example, the failure of the 
MINUSTAH to define drugs as a primary threat could therefore exert an influence 
upon GOH assessment of their domestic security requirements. Equally, the focus of 
MINUSTAH and other external actors upon the demobilisation, disarmament and 
reintegration of both former FADH personnel and other armed actors would have 
influenced the lower priority attached to drugs. When dealing with a failed state and 
the subject of drugs, the ability of state itself to maintain its sovereignty against 
domestic actors is clearly limited, and this limitation extends to the ability of it to 
define the most pressing security concerns given the strong influence of external 
actors.   
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Chapter Four 
 
Pacific Regional Overview 
 
 
Introduction  
 
The Pacific encompasses an incredibly diverse region that is dominated by—
with the exception of PNG and Australia—small and microstates. It is comprised of 
three primary ethnic groups, Melanesian, Micronesian and Polynesian, and unlike 
many other regions throughout the globe (with the exception of the Caribbean) it is 
still characterised by complex sovereignty arrangements. The political, economic 
and strategic interests of Australia, New Zealand, France, the US, and the overlay of 
the competition between China and Taiwan still largely define and influence the 
domestic and foreign relations of PIS. With regard to security and the appearance of 
armed conflict, the region has traditionally been perceived as relatively benign. 
However, recent publications such as Securing a Peaceful Pacific (2005) have 
demonstrated that threats to state security increasingly include violence and rising 
levels of crime, protracted armed conflicts relating to independence, issues that 
derive from economic development, poor governance, and the appearance and 
growth of TNC. The cultivation, production and trafficking of drugs poses a further 
security threat to the region, though one that is not easily observable. Commercial 
links between Australia, New Zealand, Asian, Canada, North America and South 
American all converge on the Pacific, and PIS serve as a bridge between these 
countries. Given its strategic location, the perception of PIS as relatively weak and 
the strength of domestic demand for drugs within states that surround the region, 
they are ideally suit for exploitation by both regionally based and foreign criminal 
groups.    
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News Coverage of Drugs in Pacific Regional 
 
Source Date Headline 
PACNEWS/Ioane March 18, 1998 “Kiribati and Tuvalu Sailors Imprisoned For Drug Trafficking” 
Radio Cook Islands/PINA Nius 
Online 
March 25, 2001 “COOK ISLANDS: Drug dog brings quick arrests in Cooks 
crackdown” 
Samoan Observer/PINA Nius 
Online 
February 15, 2002 “Samoa: Judge tells of Samoan drugs worry” 
Sydney Morning Herald/AP April 26, 2002 “Pacific Drug Ring Smashed, Say Police” 
ABC News Online November 27, 2003 “Drugs, Fraud Called Pacific Threat” 
Radio New Zealand 
International/PINA 
April 7, 2004 “REGION: Two Samoans in Major Drug Bust” 
The Age August 27, 2005 “Four arrested in $72m drug bust” 
Tahitipresse September 8, 2005 “Ten sentenced for Drug Trafficking in Papeete” 
Pacific Magazine October 11, 2005 “New Zealand: Record Amounts of Crystal Meth Seized” 
ABC Online February 7, 
2006 
“Three arrested in $17.5m drug bust” 
Samoa News June 1, 2006 “American Samoan Reports Target Drug Problems” 
Tahitipresse August 15, 2006 “French Polynesia: Cocaine Found In Marquesas Islands” 
The Press September 11, 2006 “Drugs gangs exploit Pacific” 
TODAY Online December 21, 2006 “Singaporean nabbed in $61m Australian drug bust” 
Daily Telegraph January 4, 2007 “Cops make $540m drug bust” 
The Press October 23, 2007 “NZ gangs linked to Asian drug cartels” 
 
 
Examples of Regional Drugs Seizures 1994-2007 
 
Year Location Origin/ 
Details 
Operation 
Name 
Agencies 
Involved 
Illicit Drug  Estimated 
Value 
1994 Hervey Bay 
Queensland 
via PNG 
Pakistan Caribou AFP & authorities 
from PNG and 
Noumea 
15,000kgs Hashish  
1997 Sydney Air passengers 
from Tonga 
 Customs 7.2kgs cocaine  
1997/199
8 
Torres Strait  Tibia AFP 100kgs Marijuana  
2000 PNG Attempted 
importation from 
India  
 INCB warning to 
PNG Govt. 
8000kgs Ephedrine  
2000 PNG Attempted 
importation from 
China 
 INCB warning to 
PNG Govt. 
4000kgs 
Pseudoephedrine 
 
2000 Fiji Police operation Log Runner Multinational 357kgs Heroin  
2001 Tonga  Sunset  101kgs Cocaine  
2002 Vanuatu    150kgs Heroine   
2004 Marshall 
Islands 
Washed ashore 
at Bikini atoll 
  30kgs Cocaine  
2004 Vanuatu Discovered in 
village 
 Police and 
Transnational 
Crime Unit 
120kgs Cocaine  
2004 Fiji  Outrigger Multinational Meth super laboratory  
2005 Marshall 
Islands 
Woman 
arrested in 
possession 
  20kgs of cocaine  
2006 Samoa Police raid on 
criminal 
syndicate  
 Police 570 grams of cocaine USD$360,000   
2006 Solomon 
Islands 
Cultivated in 
village 
 Police 3,200 marijuana 
plants, estimated 
1000kgs 
 
2007 Vanuatu Cultivated in 
village 
 Police Estimated 1000kgs of 
marijuana 
 
Table constructed from news media, police and customs reports. 
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Overview of Illicit Drugs throughout the Pacific 
 
It must be resolutely reiterated that PIS are not insulated from the domestic 
demand for drugs, nor are they protected from the negative consequences 
associated with their cultivation, production and trafficking. Viable domestic drug 
markets are present throughout all PIS, and their governments have increasing 
expressed their concerns over the presence of drugs within their societies. 
However, until recently, the presence of marijuana represented the only significant 
concern, though evidence from law enforcement agencies and other supporting 
organizations have emphasised the fact that drug consumption patterns are also 
transforming.299 An increasing demand for methamphetamine and ATS has been 
observed, and large consignments of both cocaine and heroin have been seized on 
regular occasions. This provides credible evidence to reinforce the assertion that 
PIS are being utilised for trafficking activities, and are also beginning to display their 
own emerging, and disturbing, trends. 
 
The drug market throughout the region is dynamic and open to 
transformation. The INCB has frequently asserted that the PIS are increasingly 
involved in the transhipment of heroine, cocaine, and crystal methamphetamine, 
and has also noted increasing levels of methamphetamine addiction.300 Similarly, 
the Forum has noted the appearance of contemporary global trends, and has cited 
the increasing use of ATS.301 The DEA offers a corresponding observation, and 
asserted that: “The Pacific Region is becoming a significant transit and consumption 
area for crystal methamphetamine. China and the Philippines are the major sources 
for crystal methamphetamine, which transits through, or is consumed in, the region.” 
302
 Disturbingly, authorities in the Northern Marianas are aware of the fact that 
cocaine has been distributed for free in an attempt to test the viability of their 
domestic market.303 Police in New Zealand have expressed similar concerns, and 
have noted that houses that are traditionally used for the sale of marijuana have 
offered free samples of methamphetamine in order to establish a new, more 
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profitable, market.304 All of these developments are concerning, as the 
establishment of domestic demand encourages the participation of local criminals, 
and can conceivably provide opportunities for foreign criminals to exploit these new 
opportunities.  
 
 Unfortunately, as the region represents an ideal bridge between drug 
cultivation, production and consumption areas, criminal groups are able to disguise 
the origin of their shipments and to circumvent measures to combat their trafficking. 
As an example, routes for trafficking have included US to Tahiti, Fiji to Tonga, Tonga 
to Australia, the US to French Polynesia and Canada to Australia, though because 
of the extensive links between the Pacific and surrounding regions it is probable 
that trafficking routes have involved all PIS at some stage, and will unquestionably 
involve all of them in the future.305 According to the UNDCP, large-scale shipments 
of marijuana from Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines have utilised New 
Caledonia, the Solomon Islands and PNG.306 More disturbingly, according to 
analysis of trafficking and seizure patterns conducted by the Colombia government 
and cited by the UNODC, an estimated 60 percent of the cocaine leaving the 
country transits the Pacific Coast.307 The vast majority of cocaine will, in all 
likelihood, be directed towards the US, though the seizure of several large 
shipments within French Pacific territories demonstrates that some of this trade is 
being diverted, and this could be directed towards the Australian market. 
Alternatively, it could become part of a concerted attempt to evade US law 
enforcement agencies and security arrangements, which would ensure the 
entrenchment of trafficking activities throughout PIS located closer to the US or its 
Pacific territories.  
 
As a further example of the concern over the expansion of drugs throughout 
the Pacific, the Australian National Council on Drugs (ANCD) has asserted that: 
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“The rising use of the Pacific Islands as a transit route for illicit drugs poses a 
significant threat at a number of levels, including national security (e.g. corruption) 
and the potential leakage of transited drugs to create a domestic market of drug 
use.” 308 Furthermore: “The concern for the Pacific region is, if large amounts of illicit 
drugs are moving through local communities, then seepage of the drugs into local 
communities will result and the social impacts of drug dependency will be 
experienced.” 309 Disturbingly, the scenario has already begun to materialise. 
According to Evans, individuals that were arrested in Tonga for their involvement 
with the organisation of a large shipment of cocaine destined for Fiji were also paid 
with it.310 This represents a significant transformation. While it is likely that locals 
have been paid for their services with marijuana before, the payment of them with 
other drugs directly assists with establishing alternative consumption demands, and 
this could encouraged the participation of foreign criminals to meet this demand. 
The increasing involvement of foreign criminal groups from South America and Asia 
has already been observed as a consequence of operational and seizure(s) 
success. Lastly, Pacific islanders are being arrested in increasing numbers 
throughout the region and in surrounding countries, including both the US and in 
South America.  
 
Problems Associated with Statistical Analysis and the 
 Identification of Trends 
 
At present, the ability to assess changing trends, conduct analysis and 
provide recommendations upon the drug situation is difficult, as publicly available 
statistics for the region are largely absent. The UNODC has endeavoured to 
construct an assessment of contemporary drug trends throughout the globe. 
However, it appears as if the Pacific does not present an area of tangible concern; 
this is clearly evident throughout UNODC World Drug Reports. Moreover, with the 
exception of New Zealand, Australia and PNG, other PIS do not feature within the 
maps presented within the reports, and PNG is often cited for the near total absence 
of available statistics. When compared to global drug seizure totals, the region is 
not statistically significant. As an example, cocaine seizure figures for 2006 were 
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cited as 245kgs and accounted for less than 0.05 percent of global seizures.311 This 
is a significant amount of cocaine for the region, given the fact that its total 
population is estimated as 33,569,718 people, and of this, only an estimated 
2,703,066 inhabit the islands (not including Australia, New Zealand and PNG) and 
are not believed to have any significant drug consuming population.312 This data 
becomes more compelling when seizure figures for cocaine throughout the whole 
of Asia are given for 2004 as 0.05 percent, or less than 300kgs, of the global total.313 
Given the obvious population, size and income differences of both regions, it is 
extremely unlikely that their seizure figures would be comparable. Furthermore, 
comparing the Pacific to areas where large seizures are regularly reported, 
combined with the reliance upon statistics that are overwhelmingly concerned with 
both New Zealand and Australia, may in fact obscure the importance of the region 
as a hub for drug activities, and could potentially blind the judgement of 
international actors to contemporary developments. Lastly, the small number of 
seizures that have taken place may be an indication of the inability of regional law 
enforcement agencies to intercept shipments, undertake operations or accurately 
record incidents, and not a lack of drug activity. 
 
The methodological approach employed by the UNODC does not assist in 
accurately illustrating drug-related changes, as it utilises a combination of the 
perceptions of domestic drug experts, self-reporting by states themselves and 
statistical changes observed by drug treatment facilities.314 Equally concerning is 
the fact that the UNODC report Patterns and Trends of Amphetamine-Type 
Stimulants (ATS) and Other Drugs of Abuse in East Asia and the Pacific (2005) only 
discusses the situation present in Australia, while the report published by the ANCD 
Situational Analysis of the Illicit Drug Issues and Responses in the Asia-Pacific 
(2006) provides an incredibly parsimonious and otiose assessment of the Pacific, 
and focuses attention upon the widely documented problems present throughout 
Asia. The methodology of the UNODC does not accurately account for the changing 
situation, as too few treatment centres exist, there is an inadequate ability to monitor 
developments that occur upon dispersed islands, and informal or ad-hoc reporting 
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measures both inside of, and between, different law enforcement agencies hinders 
an accurate examination. Importantly, some PIS have undertaken domestic 
research to estimate the extent of consumption and the associated issues such as 
crime. The National Substance Abuse Advisory Council in Fiji (NSAAC) represents 
just one example, though research such as this has either been overlooked, or is 
poorly publicised. In order for an accurate assessment of current and future drugs 
trends to occurr, PIS require the capacity to undertake research, collate drug related 
statistics and publish their findings, and it is clear that organisations such as the 
UNODC need to refine their methodology in order to account for the difficulties of 
self-reporting that are commonly experienced by developing states. 
 
Outdated attitudes towards the Pacific are also likely to have prevented an 
accurate assessment and its potential for occupying a central position within the 
global drug trade. In 2003, the UNODC asserted that: “Drug production in the 
Pacific is believed to be very limited, and none of the islands in the region are 
considered major global drug producers of any drug.” 315  This statement contradicts 
other UNODC statements that have characterised PNG as having the worst 
marijuana abuse problems in the world. Furthermore, the UNODC has also 
asserted that marijuana consumption increased globally during 2006, with the 
exception of the Pacific, where it believed that some decline had occurred.316 Given 
the paucity of available information concerning PIS, the ability of the UNODC to 
discuss regional marijuana trends is questionable. Importantly, the UNDOC has 
noted that a large majority of methamphetamine produced in South East Asia was 
being trafficked to Australia and New Zealand.317 It may be possible to suggest that 
drug trafficking has had both a strong presence and long history, and that law 
enforcement agencies and Pacific governments have only begun to recognise the 
negative impact of drugs upon their societies, and therefore state security, in the 
past decade.  
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New Zealand and Australia: Magnets for Regional Drug Activities 
 
Both New Zealand and Australia are significant drug consuming markets, 
and the combination of high levels of disposable income and the potential for large 
profits ensure that both will remain prime targets for domestic and international 
criminal groups. Increasing seizure figures have been reported by police and 
customs agencies in both states, and these attest to the significance and 
importance of their domestic markets to foreign criminals. The perceived 
vulnerability and weakness of neighbouring PIS and their security arrangements 
will ensure their continued use as transhipment hubs to these consumer markets.  
 
According to media releases from Customs New Zealand, the country was 
experiencing a three-pronged assault from drugs. It has become a target market for 
transnational drug trafficking syndicates supplying domestic demand, as well as a 
significant tranship point and destination for precursor chemicals used in domestic 
methamphetamine production for foreign markets.318 Furthermore, according to 
figures released by Customs Australia, cocaine seizures increased from 78kgs 
during the 2005-06 period to 610kgs during 2006-07, while seizures of MDMA also 
rose, increasing from 435kgs during 2005-06 to 812kgs during 2006-07.319 
According to the INCB, New Zealand and PIS were being utilised by traffickers 
targeting Australia. For example, 37 South American drug couriers were arrested 
between March 1996 and June 1999 in Australia after arriving on Aerolineas 
Argentinas flights that transited New Zealand.320 Given the seizure figures 
presented below, Australia clearly has a significant problem concerning the 
consumption and production of methamphetamine and ATS.  At this point in time, it 
must be noted that Australian criminal groups have had extensive involvement with 
trafficking activities throughout Asia and the Pacific since the early 1980s, and it is 
very likely that this situation will continue into the future.321 
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Examples of Recent Drug Seizures in New Zealand 
 
Year Location Origin of Shipment/Details Agencies Involved Illicit Drug Estimated 
Value 
(NZD) 
2006 Tauranga 2 Shipping containers organised 
by a Hong Kong national 
Customs 95Kgs of methamphetamine 
+ 
Ephedrine with capacity to 
make 43Kgs of meth 
$95 million 
+ 
$43 million 
2006 Auckland Bolted to the side of the ships M 
V Tamper and M V Taronga 
New Zealand and 
Australian Police and 
Customs 
27Kgs of cocaine $9.45 
million 
2006 Christchurch Fijian stowaway aboard the ship 
Capitaine Wallis 
 13,500 pseudoephedrine 
tablets 
 
2007 Wellington Posted from China Police and Customs 8.193Kgs of 
methamphetamine 
$8 million 
2007 Auckland Inside bicycles from China Customs and Police 45Kgs of methamphetamine 
precursor chemicals 
$13 million 
2007  Container shipment from China Police and Customs 32 litres of liquid 
methamphetamine 
 
2007  Drugs hidden inside roofing tiles 
imported from China 
Customs 127Kgs contactNT 
pseudoephedrine 
 
2008 Welcome 
Bay, 
Tauranga 
Plantation Police 990 marijuana plants $1 million 
 
Examples of Recent Drug Seizures in Australia 
 
Year Location Origin of Shipment/Details Agencies Involved Illicit Drug  Estimated 
Value 
(AUSD) 
1998 Port 
Macquarie 
Operation ‘Linnet’, freighter 
Uniana confiscated  
Australian Federal 
Police (AFP) 
390kgs Heroin  
2000 Sydney Yacht transfer from the Bora Bora 
Π to the Ngaire Wha 
Multinational 502kgs of Cocaine  
2001 Dulverton 
Bay 
 AFP 938kgs of Cocaine  
2002 Sydney Police operation AFP, NSW police and 
NSW Crime 
Commission 
235kgs of MDMA $45 Million 
2005 Sydney Inside statues from Vietnam AFP and Customs 400kgs of Ephedrine $72 Million  
2006 Sydney Inside speedboat from Canada AFP and Customs 46kgs 
Methamphetamine 
$17.5 Million  
2006 Geelong, 
Australia 
N/A Victorian Police 340 Litres Liquid 
Ecstasy 
$51 Million  
2007 Sydney  Industrial Complex South-East Asian 
Crime Squad, Police 
and AFP 
1900 Litres Liquid 
Ecstasy 
$540 Million  
2007 Sydney Inside hot water cylinders from 
Israel  
Customs and AFP 113kgs of MDMA 
powder 
$37 Million  
2007 Sydney  Inside flowerpots from Mexico AFP and Customs 35kgs of Cocaine $35 Million  
2007 Sydney Inside Vietnamese drug mule Customs and AFP 200Grams of Heroin  N/A 
2007 Sydney Inside candles from Canada Joint Asian Crime 
Group (JACG) 
20kgs of Crystal 
Methamphetamine 
  $8 Million 
2007 Sydney and 
Melbourne 
International 
Criminal Syndicate 
JACG, Canadian 
Agencies and US DEA 
28.6kgs of crystal 
methamphetamine, 
23kgs of ecstasy 
$13.7 Million 
2007 Sydney Inside Coffee from Cambodia Customs and AFP 105kgs of ephedrine  $35 Million 
2008 Sydney Inside green tea bags, shipping 
container 
Multi-Agency, Joint 
Asian Crime Group 
(JACG) 
250kgs of cocaine $87.5 Million 
2008 Sydney Inside imported wooden furniture  AFP, Customs and 
state Police 
28kgs of heroin $8.4 Million 
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Pacific Territories of the United States 
 
 Information concerning the cultivation, production, trafficking and 
consumption of drugs within US Pacific territories is more obtainable and complete 
than for other states in the region, and as such, consultation of these resources 
assists in illustrating contemporary developments that have the potential to affect 
the entire region; if they have not already.322 The negative consequences commonly 
associated with drugs, such as increasing levels of crime and violence, are visible 
in these territories. As the National Drug Intelligence Centre (NDIC) summarises: 
“The Abuse and availability of crystal methamphetamine is likely to continue to 
increase on Guam, leading to more violent crime. A similar pattern of abuse and 
violence is now occurring in Hawaii and American Samoa.” 323 This situation has the 
potential to affect neighbouring states and reinforces the fact that PIS are both 
vulnerable to drugs and represent both potential and viable drug consuming 
markets. Furthermore, as US territories, these states are not fully sovereign, and as 
such, their drug policies and legislation are modelled upon those present in the 
mainland, despite being under the control of their own state legislatures. This is 
important because these territories would need to convince mainland authorities of 
the importance of drug related developments, as they could not effectively securitise 
the presence of drugs without the their assistance. It is also likely that mainland 
authorities are likely to prioritise the presence of drugs within their external 
territories according to their own strategic. This is demonstrated by the level of 
concern over the availability of drugs within Guam, which houses a significant US 
military facility and personnel, and may account for why authorities in American 
Samoa, where there are no strategic assets, feel ignored by US anti-drug agencies. 
Once drugs are trafficked to a US territory it is possible that they could avoid further 
domestic security arrangements—this situation has been observed in Caribbean—
and this would provide incentives for directing drugs shipments to these territories. 
Unfortunately, the entrenchment of drugs among any of these states is likely to have 
a detrimental impact upon the security of the Pacific and other neighbouring PIS.   
 
American Samoa 
 
American Samoa is affected by the presence of both marijuana and high 
quality methamphetamine. According to Customs Officials, over 91.91kgs of 
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methamphetamine and 4545.45kgs of marijuana were confiscated during fiscal 
year 2000.324 The sheer volume of drugs confiscated demonstrates the seriousness 
of the situation, and assists in accounting for the passing of strict laws that impose 
mandatory minimum prison sentences for the possession of even small amounts of 
drugs. The NDIC has also noted that drug-related statistics were not centralised, 
that there were no drug testing facilities.325 Lastly, it was also asserted that Western 
Samoa was primarily responsible for the presence of marijuana in American 
Samoa, and that domestic laboratories for the production of methamphetamine had 
been established in response to the successful interruption of trafficking 
operations.326 The establishment of local production facilities serves as a warning to 
other PIS that domestic production will develop to cater to consumption demands.  
 
Guam 
 
 Guam is seriously affected by the consumption of high quality 
methamphetamine, and there is continued demand for marijuana. According to the 
NDIC, no evidence exists concerning the presence of local methamphetamine 
production, it is believed that the majority of it is trafficked from the Philippines and 
other Asian states such as Hong Kong, China and Taiwan.327 As a consequence of 
these high levels of drug consumption, police in Guam have recorded increases in 
the amount of violence and crime. For example, methamphetamine-related arrests 
rose from 47 during 1994 to 333 in 1999, and armed robberies rose from 32 during 
1990 to 105 in 1998.328 Interestingly, besides the involvement of Asian criminal 
groups, Mexican groups based in both Mexico and California were also cited as a 
growing concern as a consequence of their involvement in trafficking activities. The 
NDIC recorded significant price increases for marijuana during the 1990s; they 
estimated that the price for one pound increased from around USD$2,500 to 
between $5,000 and $8,000. 329 This situation proves that the population has an 
ability to pay for drugs, even when significant price increases occur, and Palau was 
also cited as the primary source of marijuana supplied to Guam.  
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Hawaii 
 
 The cultivation, production and trafficking of high quality methamphetamine 
and marijuana present a serious threat to the security and stability of Hawaii, and 
the availability of heroin and cocaine also represent core concerns for local 
authorities. The involvement of multiple domestic and internationally connected 
criminal groups that traffic drugs to, from, and through Hawaii present a dynamic 
challenge for law enforcement agencies, and the development and implementation 
of interdiction strategies. Groups that are involved include indigenous Hawaiians, 
local street gangs, motorcycle gangs, and organised Mexican and Asian criminal 
groups. According to the NDIC, there were around 140 gangs with an estimated 
1,500 members present in Hawaii, and concerns were also expressed regarding 
the relocation of Hispanic gang members from California to Hawaii.330 In regard to 
the economic cost for Hawaii, an estimated USD$430 million (8.6 percent) from its 
1998 annual budget was spent on a range of substance abuse programmes, while 
an estimated 8,011 people were treated by publicly funded facilities for 
methamphetamine-related addictions between 1994 and 2000.331 This 
demonstrates the economic costs associated with drug addiction, without taking into 
account the loss of revenue incurred through increased law enforcement spending 
or the loss of tourist income through the presence or perceptions of violence and 
threats to personal safety.    
 
Pacific Regional Actors and the Securitisation of Drugs 
 
The Domestic Concerns of New Zealand and its Influence Upon 
Regional Drug Strategies   
 
Security assessments concerning the Pacific have traditionally approached 
the subject from an integrated and holistic position. The South Pacific Policy Review 
Group in Towards A Pacific Islands Community (1990) observed that regional 
security required a comprehensive approach that included economic, societal, 
environmental and military issues, and as such, it asserted that: “…Pacific Island 
Governments do not view security primarily in military terms.” 332 Of specific 
importance to this thesis is their observation that drugs were a potential security 
issue for the region as there was widespread marijuana cultivation and increasing 
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instances of trafficking.333 However, the report concluded that drugs were not a 
major concern at that point in time, as they were being trafficked from Asian 
countries to more developed ones, and therefore did not represent an immediate 
security issue. The report asserted that:  
The countries of the region can fairly argue that as illicit drugs are an international problem 
– and island countries themselves do not have a serious domestic problem of consumption – the 
resources to combat the problem should come from multilateral sources. It would be inappropriate, 
in the view of the Review Group, to expect Pacific Island countries to divert presently available 
resources (such as New Zealand ODA) from economic development in order to control the flow of 
drugs from Asian countries to the larger developed countries. 334  
 
This assessment has changed considerably. There are now serious concerns 
surrounding the expansion of drugs and the threat they pose to state security, and it 
is unfortunate that the review did not consider the development of domestic drug 
consumption as a by-product of trafficking activities at the time. Moreover, as a 
consequence of the heightened threat presented by drugs and TNC, PIS have been 
forced to devote and reposition an increasing amount of financial resources to 
combating their presence, and both New Zealand and Australia continue their 
extensive investment in these measures.  
 
Despite these changing circumstances and the presence of significant 
problems related to drug consumption throughout New Zealand, until recently the 
National party had not sought to use drugs as a political campaign platform against 
the governing Labour party. Equally, drugs had failed to attract serious political 
attention during the intervening periods between national elections, with the 
exception of the legal status of “party pills” and a moderate level of debate 
concerning the dangers associated methamphetamine. The magnitude of domestic 
drug consumption is illustrated by Annette King, the Minister for Justice, who 
reported the estimated value of methamphetamine sales were worth between 
NZD$750 million to NZD$1.5 billion, while according to Jim Anderton, the Associate 
Health Minister, the negative social costs associated with drug use were estimated 
at NZD$1.31 billion.335 While the social and crime issues related to 
methamphetamine use have received media attention,  according to Ross Bell, 
Executive Director of the New Zealand Drug Foundation, other drugs such as 
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marijuana have received little political attention because they represent an area 
where public opinion is divided regarding its legal status, and therefore represent 
an issue where little political advantage can be gained by politicising the issue.336 
Additionally, while political support for the decriminalisation of marijuana has 
previously existed, it is likely that the police have shifted their focus away from 
targeting individual consumers in an effort to focus upon the organised criminal 
groups that are involved with its cultivation, and the production of 
methamphetamine.  
 
This situation has recently transformed, and as John Key, leader of the 
National Party, has asserted: “Today I’m sending a warning to every single P dealer 
[methamphetamine], every P manufacturer and every gang involved in the P trade: 
National will not put up with your criminal activity.” 337 This represents a clear 
indication that National will attempt to securitise the dual threat posed by 
methamphetamine and the involvement of gangs and organised criminal groups, 
and their intention to use this as a primary platform within a broader law and order 
policy package for their election campaign. This decision comes after King unveiled 
a new government strategy to target organised crime as a consequence of previous 
admissions that law enforcement agencies were struggling to combat these 
interrelated criminal issues.338 This situation demonstrates that in order for drugs to 
become a political issue, political parties need to perceive a level of strategic value 
to justify becoming involved. This also demonstrates that some drugs present a 
more accessible campaign platform, and are likely to engender greater levels of 
public support for assertive law enforcement action than others.  
 
Drugs are beginning to emerge as an important election issue and their 
potential threats to domestic security are clearly recognised. However, this domestic 
concern and already instituted strategies have not linked the increasing 
entrenchment of drugs and drug-related activities throughout PIS with their 
availability throughout New Zealand, and to date, the government has not 
presented this scenario as a fundamental security threat for the country. Some 
policy documents have acknowledged their increasing importance, for example the 
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New Zealand External Assessments Bureau analysed the contemporary security 
environment in Strategic Assessment 2000, and asserted that: “The Pacific Islands 
are particularly vulnerable to being exploited for these [drugs, people smuggling 
and money laundering] purposes. Controlling such trades requires a collective 
international response. ” 339 Moreover: “Despite a major US focus on drugs, they are 
still a problem in the region [Latin America]. There are risks that the Pacific could 
become a regular transit point or soft target for drug barons.” 340 The assessment 
asserted that an increased international response was required to meet these 
challenges, though the need for a more assertive regional response by the New 
Zealand government itself was not proposed. This assessment is comparable to the 
recent National Drug Policy 2007-2012 (2007), which acknowledges the need to 
control the country’s borders more effectively and the intent to continue with joint 
international law enforcement operations. However, it did not explicitly state 
whether the region would become a primary focus for its strategies.341 Moreover, the 
primary objectives of the Ministry of Justice that were outlined within its Organised 
Crime Strategy (2008) focused upon strengthening the response and cooperation 
of domestic agencies and internal security arrangements, and little attention was 
focused upon wider engagement with the region within its future initiatives.342 The 
development of a fortress approach for creating a barrier to the availability of drugs 
combined with the enhancing of domestic strategies for combating orgnaised crime 
are commendable, however, the increasing involvement of PIS will fundamentally 
undermine these strategies and will place increasing financial and technical 
burdens upon them. 
 
It appears that only the New Zealand Customs Service and Police have 
explicitly asserted that greater regional engagement represents a fundamental 
priority. Customs has continuously outlined its objectives of enhancing the capacity 
of PIS customs agencies and strengthening their border controls, while it has also 
focused upon the implementation of regional multilateral strategies and intelligence 
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sharing activities.343 The Police have established the International Service Group to 
manage foreign operations, and have officers deployed throughout the region to 
enhance the capacity of PIS law enforcement agencies.344 Furthermore, they are 
actively involved in collaborative anti-drug investigations throughout the region, 
such as Operation Outrigger. Assistance has also been provided by New Zealand 
for the establishment of regional agencies such as Oceania Customs Organisation. 
Unfortunately, it appears that a specific and robust strategy of regional engagement 
has not been widely instituted, and the consultation of policy documents indicates 
that while regional security features highly among government discussions, this 
concern has not been equally translated into concerted action and concrete 
policies. It is possible that while the New Zealand government clearly recognises 
the primacy of drugs and new security threats throughout the Pacific, and even 
though agencies such as Police and Customs have significantly incorporated this 
discourse into their regional strategies, the historical view that the country is largely 
protected by physical isolation and a benign strategic environment could remain 
strong within contemporary policy and decisions.  
 
The Domestic Concerns of Australia and its Influence Upon Regional 
Drug Strategies   
 
The approach of the Australian government (GOA) and its explicitly stated 
strategy of greater regional engagement to combat the presence of drugs contrasts 
starkly with those devised by New Zealand. The GOA is extremely concerned about 
the domestic availability of drugs, and its apprehension has deepened as the 
number of exceptionally large shipments and the frequency with which they have 
been seized increases.345 Policy documents such as The National Illicit Drug 
Strategy 1997-2001 clearly outline the objectives of the GOA, and forthrightly assert 
that: “Australia must take the fight to the source of criminality, not wait passively as 
easy victims”, moreover: “Australia cannot regard itself as a fortress standing alone 
against transnational crime. It is important that Australia has a presence in the 
region in order to share essential intelligence on organised crime.” 346 The 
objectives of the GOA can be explained by the development of two interrelated 
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scenarios; the increasing availability of drugs within PIS and their further 
entrenchment throughout the region and the negative impact that this will have 
upon the domestic availability of drugs in Australia. Moreover, domestic anti-drug 
strategies have become increasingly incorporated into other Australian security 
paradigms, such as the ‘Arc of Instability’ and the desire for a more proactive role 
throughout the region.347  
 
 As a consequence, the GOA has been instrumental in establishing regional 
anti-drug measures and the Australian Federal Police (AFP) have adopted a highly 
visible and vigorous regional policing role. The AFP have assisted with the 
development and establishment of the Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination 
Centre (PTCCC), and the GOA continues to provide significant financial, technical 
and human resources to strengthen regional law enforcement agencies. 
Additionally, other programmes such as the Pacific Patrol Boat Programme have 
been extended, and are projected to continue until 2025. This provides PIS with the 
direct ability to monitor and control their borders while the establishment of maritime 
surveillance centres enhances their intelligence capabilities.348 Other GOA 
measures have included enhancing the domestic legal environment and the rule of 
law in PIS through the Law Enforcement Cooperation Programme. Furthermore, 
mobile drug strike teams and liaison offices for gathering regional intelligence and 
orgnaising operations have been established, and forensic facilities have been 
instituted to determine the geographical origins of heroin seizures and assist with 
AFP operations.349 This demonstrates the strong commitment of the GOA towards 
enhancing its security against the threats posed by drugs, and it can be confidently 
asserted that the regionally focused strategies of the GOA have become 
increasingly inseparable from domestic security arrangements. 
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The reason for such a strong level of commitment derives from a combination 
of the highly emotive and politicised domestic drug debates and the merging of 
these with both traditional and new Australian security concerns. For example, 
during John Howard’s leadership of the Liberal Party, drugs were unquestionably 
securitised, and as a consequence they were presented as a direct threat to 
Australian domestic security. This situation resulted in a number of wide-ranging 
initiatives that included the institution of a “zero tolerance policy to drugs”, 
nationwide anti-drug campaigns and the provision of significant financial resources 
for rehabilitation services, law enforcement agencies and anti-drugs strategies.350 
Additionally, the ANCD was established to coordinate a centralised government 
strategy, while during the last year of the Howard government AUSD$150 million 
was allocated for specifically combating methamphetamine and to enhance the 
capabilities of both the AFP and the Australian Customs Service.351 As a further 
example of the predominant political attitude towards drug-related issues, during 
2002 a drug injecting room was established for addicts in Sydney, which 
subsequently resulted in domestic political furore. 352 This example accurately 
illustrates the overwhelming level of politicisation that drug-related issues receive in 
Australia, and the occurrence of such political conflict highlights the lack of 
bipartisan support that exists among the major political parties for alternative drug 
initiatives, and drugs in general.  
 
The domestic approach of the GOA to drugs has clearly merged with 
important developments within international security paradigms, such as the post-
September 11 security discourse, the War on Terror and the deliberate targeting of 
both Australian citizens and interests by terrorists as a consequence of its support 
for US foreign policies. The subsequent actions of the Howard government against 
drugs and the perceived security threats present throughout the Pacific have been 
overwhelmingly influenced by the interaction of these two discourses, and they 
have crystallised into policies that provided greater legitimacy for regional 
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intervention and a larger regional security role. The institution of Greg Urwin as the 
Secretary General of the Forum should be viewed as a further example of GOA 
objectives that are concerned with enhancing its influence throughout the Pacific. 
 
The Concerns of the Pacific Islands Forum 
The extent of the Forum’s concern is demonstrated by the sustained 
acknowledgement of drugs and TNC throughout the Honiara (1992), Aitutaki 
(1997), Biketawa (2000) and Nasonini (2002) Declarations and within official media 
statements. The recent report by the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat Transnational 
Crime Strategic Assessment 2006 (TCSA) further illustrates the depth of its concern. 
The TCSA asserted that: “Evidence assembled by law enforcement agencies 
indicate that TNC groups view the FICs [Forum Islands Countries] as desirable 
locations because of perceived weakness in border management systems, border 
and domestic legislation and weak in-country governance infrastructure.” 353 
Furthermore: “The transhipment of drugs such as cocaine, heroin and ATS, through 
Pacific Island countries to Australia, New Zealand and North America has been 
identified as a significant criminal threat within the Pacific region.”  Importantly, the 
TCSA recognised that the involvement of criminals with drugs has merged with 
other legal and illegal business enterprises, and that future consequences would 
include  undermining domestic governance through crime, corruption and 
economic instability. Additional issues included the potential for increasing 
cooperation between local and foreign criminals, and the possibility that private 
security agencies could become involved with criminal enterprises.  
 
The TCSA clearly demonstrates that the Forum is conscious of the security 
threats presented by drugs and the associated TNC, and that it is receptive towards 
the dynamic characteristics of these threats. This is important, as understanding this 
diversity assists in the development of comprehensive regional strategies for 
combating their presence. Furthermore, as a regional organisation, it is highly likely 
that both Australia and New Zealand have exerted significant influence upon the 
Forum and PIS to recognise the threat that drugs increasingly pose to state security. 
However, given that PIS tend to view security as multidimensional, with a strong 
focus upon economic development, it is also quite possible that PIS are extremely 
concerned about, and are highly receptive to, the threats posed by drugs 
themselves, though because of financial, technical and human resource 
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constraints, they have been unable to act. Lastly, official post-conference 
communiqués explicitly illustrate the concerns of the Forum, and these have been 
consistently repeated since 2000, as an example:  
 
The 2000 Forum Communiqué states: The Forum expressed its concern over the 
increase in drug trafficking and in local production of illicit drugs in the region and called on 
the international community to cooperate with the region, particularly with regional law 
enforcement agencies and the Secretariat to combat the movement of drugs into the 
region. 354 
 
Transnational Crime Facilitating Characteristics According to the Forum 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 
Transnational Crime Strategic Assessment, produced in conjunction with Oceania Customs Organisation, 
Pacific Immigration Directors Conference, Pacific Islands Chief of Police Conference, Pacific Transnational 
Crime Network, April 2006, p.15 
 
Southeast Asian Regional Security Complex According to 
 Buzan and Waever 
 
 
This depiction of the RSC that is in operation throughout the Pacific and Asia is 
correct in the fact that Australia is highly concerned about neighbouring Indonesia 
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1. Official Corruption 
2. Incomplete or weak legislation 
3. Poor enforcement of existing laws 
4. Non-transparent financial institutions 
5. Unfavourable economic conditions 
6. Lack of respect for the rule of law in society 
7. Poorly guarded national boundaries 
8. Lack of political will to establish the rule of law 
9. Geographic location (e.g. along arms or illicit drug trafficking routes) 
10. Regional geopolitical issues (e.g. long-standing territorial disputes) 
 
Figure 1 
Figure 2 
 129
and PNG. However, it does not accurately illustrate the regional drugs concerns of 
Australia, New Zealand and the Forum. The boundaries of the complex include 
PNG and the Solomon Islands and extended to the right to include all PIS (Figure 
1). Furthermore, in many respects, the drug concerns of the US are beginning to 
extend into the region as well, beyond its own territories (Figure 2).  
 
 
The Presence of Small Arms and Light Weapons  
 
The availability of SALW is an issue of significant importance for the region 
as they present a tangible and highly visible threat to PIS security and stability. At 
this point in time, the majority of weapons available in the Pacific are located 
throughout Melanesia, and these have been sourced from domestic stockpiles 
through a combination of corruption, armoury leakage and theft. Moreover, large-
scale illicit arms shipments have been discovered either in or while on transit to 
both Fiji and New Caledonia, and the occurrence of such activities serves as a 
disturbing precedent for the future.355 As a consequence, extensive resources have 
been devoted to researching their impact and how they are acquired, as well as to 
projects that are focused upon reducing their availability through initiatives such as 
improved armoury security and weapons amnesties. Unfortunately, the relationship 
between drugs and SALW acquisition has not received a similar level of attention, 
despite the known and extensive use of drugs as a financial resource within 
conflicts throughout South East Asia.356 With regard to the Pacific, the UNODC has 
asserted that: “Locally it is known that firearms are traded for cannabis fuelling 
domestic drug problems as well as international concern.” 357 Woodman and Bergin 
reinforce this assertion, with the observe that: “While there is insufficient wealth to 
make the South Pacific an attractive market for drugs or illegal firearms, a relatively 
small amount of money or quantity of weapons can have a disproportionate effect.” 
358
 This relationship requires further investigation, as interrelated issues that include 
burgeoning TNC, the presence of local and foreign criminals and weak law 
enforcement capacity characterise parts of the region. Of further concern is the fact 
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that both non-state actors and criminal groups could potentially achieve a level of 
coercive capacity that many PIS do not currently possess. 
 
According to research conducted by Capie, the extremes of gun-related 
violence and weapons trafficking experienced by PIS are not comparable to those 
experienced by other regions.359 Though, it must also be acknowledged that for 
many PIS, the presence of even a few weapons can cause significant instability, as 
demonstrated by the Speight Coup in Fiji during 2000. Capie has also asserted 
that: “…while legislation in the region is not flawless, even ‘perfect’ laws would not 
address all the challenges presented by firearms in the Pacific. While law reform is 
an important and worthwhile objective, major questions remain about the ability of 
some Pacific states to enforce the laws that are already on their books.” 360 This is 
observation is significant, given the fact that PIS are already challenged by the 
problems associated with the availability of SALW, then the presence of a situation 
where drugs are used as a financial resource for their acquisition could easily 
overwhelm their law enforcement capacity. Furthermore, if current anti-gun 
legislation is unsuccessful in assisting PIS to enhance their internal sovereignty, 
then future anti-drug legislation is likely to be equally ineffective, and any attempts 
to intervene in the connection between the two issues could be futile. If local gangs 
and criminal groups were able to acquire SALW then the internal sovereignty of PIS 
could be called into question, and the ability of them to intervene into other illegal 
activities would be equally severely restricted. There is also a strong possibility that 
conflicts will spread to neighbouring states, or that the presence of conflict will 
encourage the recycling of SALW between PIS. Examples of this situation are 
readily available, and include the trafficking of SALW between PNG, Bougainville 
and the Solomon Islands. 
 
A strong consensus exists within the Pacific SALW literature regarding the 
impact that the injection of modern weapons has had upon the dynamics of 
traditional conflict, violence and crime, and the inability of these states to maintain 
their internal sovereignty.361 This consensus is also apparent regarding the low 
purchasing power of individuals and groups that are intent on acquiring weapons. 
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According to Alpers and Twyford: “none of these recent conflicts appear to have 
generated sufficient demand to prompt an influx of arms from countries outside the 
region, or even from other Pacific states. In addition, few combatants have the 
financial resources to procure a shipment of any size.” 362 As Capie observes, there 
is currently little demand and a low financial capacity to afford SALW, though in his 
opinion, this current situation should not be taken for granted.363 This thesis 
challenges these assertions, and suggests that within the Pacific there is, and will 
continue to be, sufficient means for acquiring SALW. Given that drugs are utilised 
for SALW acquisition in the Caribbean and throughout other areas experiencing 
armed conflict, combined with the fact that marijuana is believed to be ubiquitously 
present throughout many PIS, then the potential for it to be used as a financial 
resource or as a tradable commodity represents a credible contemporary and future 
scenario.  
 
Example of a Recent Weapon Seizure  
 
 
“The Northern Marianas reported a seizure of 2,300 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition and 3000 rounds of 5.56 mm 
ammunition with tracer tips as well as one Glock 19 pistol, one unassembled AR-15 .223 calibre and one other assault 
weapon with eight 30 round magazines.”  
 
The man had just completed his military service and had stored the weapons in his check-in baggage. He travelled from the 
US via Japan to the Northern Marianas. This demonstrates how easy it is for SALW to be brought into the region. 
 
Oceania Customs Organisation, “Analysis Report”, Issue 19, December 2007 p.13 
 
 
Gangs and Criminal Deportees 
 
The increasing appearance of gangs, the deportation of criminals and the 
spread of US gang culture throughout the Pacific has received increasing 
attention.364 According to Willie Maea, Counties Manukau Police Pacific Coordinator 
in New Zealand, Pacific island families are sending their young relatives who have 
been involved in crime back to their home islands to remove them from this 
negative environment. This situation may assist in exporting individuals and their 
criminal connections back to places that are unable to manage, or unaware of, the 
prior activities of these individuals.365 There is a strong potential for the development 
of transnational criminal links between gangs members present in neighbouring 
PIS, and the use of such connections for drug or other criminal purposes has 
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already occurred throughout the Caribbean, Central and South America. 
Furthermore, according to the TCSA forms of organisation that once demarcated 
criminal groups, such as affiliation through ethnicity, are decreasing, and groups or 
organisations that were previously hostile to one another have shown signs of 
increasing collaboration, this scenario has already occurred within New Zealand as 
a consequence of the profits associated with the production and sale of 
methamphetamine.366 The penetration of the Pacific by Asian, and especially 
Chinese organised crime, was viewed as the most pressing future security threat by 
the TCSA. 
 
Involvement of Pacific States in United Nations Anti-Drug Conventions 
 
 1961 Convention 
on Narcotic 
Drugs 
1971 
Convention on 
Psychotropic 
Substances 
1988 Convention against 
Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances 
2003 UN 
Convention 
against 
Transnational 
Organised rime
Australia + + + + 
Cook Islands - - + + 
Fiji + + + - 
Kiribati - - - + 
Marshall Islands + + - - 
Micronesia + + + + 
Nauru - - - + 
New Zealand + + + + 
Niue - - - - 
Palau + + - - 
Papua New 
Guinea 
+ + - - 
Samoa - - + - 
Solomon Islands + - - - 
Tonga + + + - 
Tuvalu - - - - 
Vanuatu - - + + 
+ Indicates Convention Signed; - Indicates that the Convention has not been signed. This table does not indicate whether these 
measures have been implemented. Source: http://www.unodc.org/ 
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Case Study Three 
 
Papua New Guinea 
 
 
Introduction  
The state exists within a complex post-colonial environment within Papua 
New Guinea. The sovereignty and authority of the government of Papua New Guinea 
(GOPNG) is accepted, contested and suborned at multiple levels of society, and the 
apparatus of Western models of political governance and economic development 
have been grafted upon traditional Melanesian cultural practices. As a consequence, 
PNG citizens exist between two parallel social organising systems, each entailing 
their own specific codes of conduct, behaviour and regulation.367 The presence of 
political instability, official corruption and a poorly functioning bureaucracy both result 
from, and add to, this domestic environment. According to Richard Sikani, a former 
member of the PNG National Intelligence Organisation and the current 
Commissioner for Correctional Services, the domestic situation is one where: “The 
occurrence of serious crimes, in both the urban and rural communities, is considered 
as the biggest threat to national security, as well as social, political, and economic 
development…” 368 As this case study will demonstrate, the coercive capacity of the 
GOPNG has been significantly undermined and is open to armed challengers, while 
its ability to confront criminals, those involved with the cultivation of marijuana and 
other drug activities is limited. Understanding how the ubiquitous presence of 
marijuana has merged with this particular domestic environment, and the negative 
influence of it upon political, military, social and economic spheres is fundamental for 
conducting an assessment of the current and future security of PNG.   
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News Coverage of Drugs in Papua New Guinea 
 
Source Date Headline 
PNG Post-Courier October 12, 1999 “PNG Drug Abuse Rating Ahead of Fiji and Samoa, Highest in Pacific 
Islands Region” 
The National/PINA 
Nius Onine 
April 30, 
2000 
“PNG May Become Transit Zone for Drug Dealers” 
PNG Post-
Courier/PINA Nius 
Online 
June 28, 
2000 
“Drug Trafficking in PNG Growing” 
NAU-FM/PINA Nius 
Online 
April19, 
2001 
“Drug and Gun Trade Threat to National Security, Says PNG’s Sir Rabbie 
Namaliu” 
The National/PINA 
Nius Online 
May 11, 2001 “Region: Papua New Guinea worries about illegal fishing, drugs on borders” 
Radio Australia January 30, 2002 “Marijuana for Guns Claims PNG Police Officer” 
PNG Post-Courier October 2, 2003 “PNG Security Chief Says Intelligence In “Shambles” 
The National January 8, 2004 “Drugs A Big Industry In PNG” 
The National January 7, 2005 “PNG Drug Runners Get Jail Terms In Papua” 
PNG Post-Courier March 25, 2005 Editorial “PNG Borders Wide Open to Guns, Drugs” 
PNG Post-Courier April 5, 2005 “Smugglers Trade Guns For PNG Marijuana” 
PNG Post-Courier August 18, 2005 “PNG Needs War On Drugs” 
Pacific Magazine September 1, 2006 “A Grass Not Greener: PNG’s Lack of A Drug Policy is Hurting Youth” 
PNG Post-Courier September 13, 2007 “Smell of Marijuana in Air in PNG’S Mt Hagen” 
The National October 9, 2007 “Marijuana Dealing on Rise in PNG’S Rabaul” 
 
 
Overview of Illicit Drugs in Papua New Guinea 
 
The cultivation of marijuana throughout PNG presents the most pressing 
drug concern at this point in time. However, constructing a picture of the 
contemporary drug situation throughout the country is an arduous task that is 
complicated by a combination of poor statistics, poorly resourced law enforcement 
agencies, inadequate research and conflicting opinions. According to statistics 
released by the Magisterial Services, 488 criminal cases relating to drugs had gone 
before the courts between January and September 2006.369 Furthermore, attempts 
at importing large volumes of precursor chemicals have previously occurred; for 
example, there was an attempt at importing 8000kgs of ephedrine and 4000kgs of 
pseudoephedrine that are used in the production of ATS and methamphetamine 
during 2000.370 Concerns over the increasing availability and consumption of 
methamphetamine have been expressed in local newspapers, and the UNODC has 
also cited evidence of Filipino and Asian criminal involvement.371 According to 
Police Minister Mathias Karani, there is evidence to suggest that harder drugs such 
as heroin, cocaine and ATS are being trafficked to PNG.372 If these reports are 
accurate, then the country will have to deal with potentially significant challenges 
such as those posed by both the establishment of local ATS production facilities 
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and the use of the country for the trafficking of harder drugs to neighbouring states. 
This situation could be potentially disastrous, as the GOPNG currently cannot cope 
with the presence of marijuana consumption, cultivation and the associated 
consequences such as drugs-related crime.  
 
Significant attention has been focused upon the occurrence of an interstate 
trade in drugs for guns between PNG and Australia via the Torres Strait. However, 
in the opinion of the AFP, this situation can be characterised as disorganised-
organised crime, as issues that include poor transportation infrastructure between 
the major cultivation and shipping areas prevents the expansion of the trade and 
the serious involvement of Australian criminal groups. 373 The Torres Strait should 
not be considered as the only point for trafficking activities simply because it 
represents the closest point between the two states. It is likely that illicit activities 
have shifted to areas that are less patrolled, which creates new challenges for law 
enforcement agencies attempting to monitor the borders. Moreover, the ever 
present expression of concern over the trading of drugs for guns should not be the 
sole focus of investigations, as Australia currency would be equally sough after and 
more difficult for authorities to trace than the origin of the weapons that have been 
discovered to date. 
 
The issue of marijuana trafficking from PNG to other states has also been the 
subject of conflicting opinions and evidence. According to Nerys Evans, Intelligence 
Coordinator for the State Crime Command Drug Squad of the New South Wales 
Police, the economic incentives for trafficking from PNG to Australia are not 
conducive for the continuation of any trade that may have existed, as locally grown, 
high-quality cannabis is already available for consumption.374 Similarly, Inguba 
suggests that the majority of marijuana grown in PNG is for domestic consumption 
with little coordinated organisation.375 The 2006 INCB Report reached a similar 
conclusion, asserting that Australia had become self-sufficient in the cultivation of 
cannabis for domestic consumption.376 However, the 2005 INCB Report observed 
that: “Cannabis originating in Papua New Guinea has been seized in Australia and 
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New Zealand.” 377 Additionally, the 2000 INCB Report has previously asserted that: 
“The price of the drug [marijuana] in Australia, the key consumer market for 
cannabis cultivated in Papua New Guinea, decreased in 1999.” 378 The DEA has 
also noted that the marijuana cultivated in PNG has been discovered in both 
Europe and the US, though in its assessment, no significant criminal group is 
involved with its trafficking.379 This situation clearly demonstrates that both 
international and regional agencies are unsure of the domestic importance of 
marijuana, and that they are also unable to account for the role of the country in 
supplying neighbouring states or the involvement of criminal groups. It is likely that 
the trafficking of marijuana has been subjected to significant changes over time, 
and domestic developments such as fluctuating political stability or the presence of 
armed conflict may have influenced the level of cultivation.  
 
Coordination and cooperation between different domestic law enforcement 
agencies is critically important for implementing successful anti-drug measures and 
for overcoming the asymmetrical difficulties associated with gathering criminal 
intelligence. Unfortunately the INCB noted during a visited during 2003, that its 
recommendations delivered to the government in 1995 had still not been 
implemented. The INCB originally observed that there was a need to revise the 
drug control legislation and that both the National Narcotics Control Board and 
National Narcotics Bureau were not functioning, while interagency relationships did 
not appear to exist. 380 Moreover, at this point in time, no national anti-drug strategy 
exists.  
 
 
Major Drug Seizures in Papua New Guinea 
 
Date Location Operation name/ 
Details 
Agencies Involved Illicit Drug Estimated Value 
(K) 
1994 PNG Shipment from Pakistan PNG Customs 15,000kgs 
Hashish 
 
2000  Attempted importation 
from India 
INCB warning to 
PNG government 
8000kgs 
Ephedrine 
 
2000  Attempted importation 
from India 
INCB warning to 
PNG government 
4000kgs 
Pseudoephedrine 
 
2005 Lae Hidden inside sacks of 
potatoes  
Port security guards 82Kgs of 
Marijuana 
$1 Million Kina 
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Political Security Concerns 
 
The internal and external sovereignty of the GOPNG is not universally 
present throughout the country, and as such it is accepted, rejected and 
incorporated into the lives of PNG citizens and within traditional political 
competitions.381 As Ketan observes: “National politics, for instance, is characterised 
by parochial struggles, nepotism, and clientelism, while at the same time being 
concerned—at least in name and law—with the governance of the country as a 
whole. These are manifestations of a wider process of competing legitimacies, 
particularly when one set of moral values is superimposed upon another.” 382 
Furthermore, the enforcement of national legislation is primarily limited to major 
urban areas. 383 As a consequence, PNG is trapped in a cycle of instability that 
derives, in part, from a combination of culturally sanctioned behaviour and the 
importation of foreign governance norms. The GOPNG is clearly not in a position to 
assert its sovereignty within domestic affairs, and this situation allows both villages 
and clans to maintain both political and economic autonomy. It is likely that the 
cultivation of marijuana is involved, to some extent, in facilitating this independence, 
while the appearance of drug-related crime and the potential for other 
developments, such as increased incidents of trafficking, are likely to impact upon 
the stability of the political system in the future.  
 
A combination of official and bureaucratic corruption facilitates a hospitable 
environment for drugs, and this ensures that the GOPNG is unable to intervene to 
combat the sources of its weakness, as it cannot effectively employ its resources or 
direct its law enforcement agencies. According to the 2007 Corruption Perception 
Index employed by AI, corruption is rampant throughout PNG, and the state ranks at 
162nd place out of a total of 179 states.384 Incidents have regularly occurred that 
illustrate the divergence between cultural identity and national duty, and as Ketan 
illustrates, members of parliament are viewed as patrons, and their role is to 
distribute state resources back to their political base as a precondition of their 
election. 385 Similarly, Sikani observes that: “The firearms and drugs trade in this 
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country is an organised thing, even with some politicians—especially those from 
marijuana-growing areas.” 386 Stealing from the state is therefore an accepted and 
expected duty of political representatives, and the presence of official corruption 
undermines the stability of the state and the capacity of the GOPNG to meet the 
challenges of providing domestic security and economic development.  
 
The presence of bureaucratic corruption has resulted in the poor allocation 
and diversion of GOPNG limited financial resources, and as a consequence, 
essential government agencies that include the Royal Papua New Guinean 
Constabulary (RPNGC) are unable to function effectively.387 According to a recent 
report by the Auditor General, government employees stole an estimated USD$ 
318.5 million from development funds every year, and insufficient legislation was 
available for the prosecution of these individuals.388 The presence of corruption 
among some of the political leadership of the country has clearly facilitated an 
environment that is conducive to the cultivation of marijuana. Furthermore, the 
institution of measures to combat the presence of drugs are unlikely to be 
successful, if they can be implemented at all, as strong incentives for their failure 
exist among those responsible for instituting and monitoring them. The GOPNG is 
already unable to intervene into controlling the presence of marijuana, and the 
appearance of additional issues such as drug trafficking and the occurrence of 
associated TNC will result in additional challenges that are potentially beyond its 
capabilities. There are few mechanisms for oversight, though this may be changing 
with the presence of Australian administrational assistance to the GOPNG.  
 
The Royal Papua New Guinean Constabulary 
The presence of corruption and increasing suspicions over the development 
of criminal links between senior officers and Asian criminal groups has received 
considerable recent attention. According to Barry Turner, Commander of the 
Australian Police detachment present in PNG, Asian organised crime represented a 
significant and growing threat throughout the country.389 This situation is not helped 
by the presence of negative public perceptions of the RPNGC as a consequence of 
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their excessive displays of force, combined with both increasing levels of crime and 
the implementation of ineffective policing strategies.390 Additionally, the police riot 
squads have a historical reputation for violence and human rights abuses due to 
their involvement within the conflicts in both the Central Highlands and while in 
Bougainville.391 A review commissioned during 2005 by Bire Kimisopa, former 
Minister for Internal Security, concluded that not only did the RPNGC lack 
leadership and resources; it also had systemic problems that threatened its 
viability.392 This combination of issues raises serious concerns regarding the 
effectiveness of the RPNGC in maintaining law and order, as well as the ability of 
the state to intervene into security issues with the potential for significant escalation. 
Furthermore, if relationships between members of the RPNGC and Asian criminals 
are developing, then the appearance of other drug activities may not only be 
beyond the capabilities of law enforcement agencies, but these relationships would 
undermine the effectiveness of any attempts at intervention. This situation also 
ensures that the GOPNG would be effectively unable to marshal its agencies in 
response to future developments associated with drugs and drug-related crime.  
 
Military Security Concerns 
 
The Availability of Small Arms and Light Weapons,  
Marijuana and Insecurity 
 
At this point in time, the majority of SALW have been sourced from domestic 
stocks through theft and inappropriate sale, and additionally, there are a 
considerable number of homemade firearms in circulation. Instances of poor 
discipline and corruption among members of the Papua New Guinea Defence 
Force (PNGDF) and the RPNGC combined with poor armoury administration and 
insecurity have also assisted with their availability.393 According to Strathern, 
intense local political competitions and a tripartite relationship between 
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businessmen, raskol gangs and tribes have assisted with the accelerated 
introduction of SALW into local warfare.394 In order to demonstrate how the 
cultivation of marijuana represents a fundamental threat to the security and stability 
of the state, it is important to illustrate the impact of SALW in a society where conflict 
is viewed as an integral part of social relations.395  
 
As a consequence of the introduction of SALW, traditional conflict strategies 
have undergone significant transformation, which include the hiring of mercenaries 
and individual weapons, as well as the relocation of rural tribal conflicts into urban 
areas.396 Of significant concern is the observation that social norms and traditional 
rules are weakening as tactics transform away from those of display and 
intimidation towards an emphasis upon killing.397 Ketan provides a similar 
observation, and asserts that tactics such as raiding, ambush and indiscriminate 
killing, which had not previously been a feature of warfare in the Mount Hagen 
region, have become increasingly common.398 Major General (Rtd) Jerry Singirok 
reinforces this changing reality, and suggests that former soldiers have returned to 
their traditional communities equipped with their military training. This situation has 
coincided with the prevalence of SALW, resulting in the introduction of military- style 
tactics into traditional warfare.399 The GOPNG has increasingly become a bystander 
to tribal conflicts. The presence of SALW represents a clear threat to the security 
and stability, as these weapons ensure that domestic actors are able to employ a 
level of coercion similar to that of the state, while the ability of individuals and gangs 
to commit crime is directly enhanced. Moreover, in the future, conflicts may not be 
amendable to traditional forms of resolution and amelioration, and as a 
consequence, they could become more violent, widespread and ultimately, more 
destabilising than at present.  
 
Political changes have also resulted from the introduction of SALW. They 
have been employed in an increasing number of instances to coerce and intimidate 
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voters and election candidates during national and local elections.400 The demand 
for SALW is unlikely to decrease, as the presence of conflict and the absence of 
credible deterrents to armed conflict, such as the internal weakness of the GOPNG, 
are likely to remain. SALW acquisition represents a logical and rational reaction by 
groups locked into competitive, localised conflicts. The presence of this situation 
also raises serious concerns regarding the legitimacy of the GOPNG. For example, 
in the event that candidate(s) or political party(s) are, or are perceived to have been, 
elected through coercive means, then this could encourage armed conflict in 
response to election results. The inability of the GOPNG to prevent armed domestic 
conflict ensures that its sovereignty is undermined, while the inability of law 
enforcement agencies to secure the borders of the country guarantees that there 
are no credible deterrents to prevent acquisition activities from foreign markets, with 
the exception of the need for the financial resources to do so.  
 
The recycling of weapons between domestic conflicts present throughout 
PNG, West Papua, Bougainville and the Solomon Islands is well known, and 
represents a fundamental threat to regional security.401 Discussion concerning the 
trafficking of SALW appears to be widespread throughout PNG society. Anecdotally, 
students that attended a public lecture in West New Britain expressed concern that 
SALW were being trafficked to the island so that they could be used in the event that 
conflict erupted between new settlers and traditional landowners.402 The INCB has 
also noted the occurrence of a coastal trade, and observed that: “There have been 
reports of barter trade involving the exchange of illicit drugs for arms in the coastal 
cities of Lae, Madang, Wewak and Port Moresby…” 403 Both logging and fishing 
vessels are frequently cited as the primary method in which these weapons are 
transported, and the weak capabilities of the Papua New Guinea Customs Service 
(PNGCS) and other customs agencies in the region ensures that there are few 
barriers to prevent trafficking.404 As a large island positioned between Asia and the 
Pacific, PNG is ideally located close to both areas already experiencing armed 
conflict and established trafficking routes. Lastly, as efforts are increased to secure 
domestic sources of SALW—such as PNGDF and RPNGC armouries—foreign illicit 
markets may become the focus of demand and acquisition activities. 
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The Availability of Small Arms and Weapons in Papua New Guinea According to 
Contemporary Research 
 
Alpers observes that: In the volatile Southern Highlands Province (SHP) of Papua New Guinea 
(PNG) approximately 2,450 factory-made firearms are held by private owners. These include 
between 500 and 1,040 high-powered weapons, most of which are assault rifles. Very few of the 
guns in SHP were smuggled from foreign countries. Instead, police and soldiers within PNG 
supplied the most destructive firearms used in crime and conflict. 
 
Furthermore: An August 2004 audit of remaining PNGDF small arms showed that 16 per cent, or 
1,501, ‘unaccounted for’. This was five times higher than any previous estimate of military losses, 
and included 907 assault rifles and 102 machine guns. 
Philip Alpers, Gun running in PNG: From Arrows to Assault Weapons (2005) p.24 & p.26 
 
According to Capie, weapons that feature within tribal conflicts include: M60 machine guns, M16, 
SLR and AR15 rifles, M203 grenade launchers, World War II rifles, and pump-action and single-
shot shotguns... 
David Capie, Under the Gun: The Small Arms Challenge in the Pacific (Wellington, Victoria University Press, 2003) p.92 
 
LeBrun and Muggah assert that: In a Wogia village, a similar exercise identified tribal fighters, 
defence and army personnel, politicians and criminals as the most-armed individuals, and M16s, 
SLRs, AR15s, AK-47s, and pump-action shotguns and the most common weapons. 
  
Moreover: Exercises conducted in Pokapa indicated that that ex-combatants had access to the 
following small arms and light weapons: home-made guns, M16s, SLRs, sub-machine guns, 
.303s, pistols, hand grenades, and AR15s. M16s and home-made guns were highlighted as the 
most common arms.  
Emile LeBrun and Robert Muggah, ed., “Silencing Guns: Local Perspectives on Small Arms and Armed Violence in Rural Pacific Island 
Communities”, in Small Arms Survey, Occasional Paper 15, June 2005 p.12 
 
The Estimated Price of SALW and Ammunition in Papua New Guinea 
 
According to Alpers: In two differing reports, PNGDF sources later quoted the price paid for the six 
SLRs, pistol, and ammunition as being between PGN 90,000 and 200,00 (USD 30,000-67,000). 
This puts the price of a single SLR, with 150 rounds of ammunition at PGK 15,000-33,000 (USD 
5,000-11,000). 
Philip Alpers, “Gun-Running in Papua New Guinea: From Arrows to Assault Weapons in the Southern 
Highlands”, Small Arms Survey, Special Report No.5 (2005) p.67 
 
 
Muggah asserts that: There is, however, a considerable diversity of weapons available and prices 
range from the equivalent of K2,000 (USD630) for pistol to K24,000 (USD 7,550) for an M60. 
Common semi-automatic assault rifles are valued at some K5,000-8,000 (USD1,575-USD2,520), 
though prices appear to vary considerably.  
Rober Muggah, “Diagnosing Demand: Assessing The Motivations And Means For Firearms Acquisition In The Solomon Islands And 
Papua New Guinea”, in State, Society and Governance in Melanesia, Discussion Paper No. 7 (2004) p.9 
 
The Estimated Cost of Cartridges According to Ketan 
 
Variables 1 Shot 5 Shots 10 Shots 20 Shots 
1 Day 250 1,250 2,500 5,000 
1 Week (7 Days) 1,750 8,750 17,500 35,000 
1 Month (30 Days) 7,500 37,500 75,000 150,000 
1 Year (365) 91,250 456,250 912,000 1,825,000 
Table copied from Joseph Ketan, The Name Must Not Go Down: Political Competition and State-Society Relations in Mount 
Hagen, Papua New Guinea (Fiji, Institute of Pacific Studies; University of the South Pacific, 2004) p.185. Prices are given in PNG 
Kina (K).  Ketan bases his estimate of the cost of ammunition used during intertribal conflict on the possession of 50 guns per clan 
(c.5,000 people) and a constant black market price of K5.00 per cartridge.  
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Marijuana as a Financial Resource for SALW Acquisition 
 
While the ramifications associated with the spread of SALW are 
fundamentally important, the ability to acquire them is equally significant. The 
research of Alpers, Muggah and Ketan clearly illustrate the excessive financial 
costs associated with the acquisition of SALW, the initiation of conflict and the 
impact of these weapons upon domestic security and stability.405 Furthermore, the 
prices paid for these weapons are clearly beyond the capabilities of clans and 
villages that are still reliant, in many instances, upon subsistence agriculture for 
their livelihoods. Ketan provides the answer to this problem, and asserts that: 
“Eventually, many people resorted to the cultivation and sale of marijuana.” 406 This 
observation has been noted elsewhere. According to former Mendi Police Inspector 
Mark Yangen, there is a close relationship between drugs and guns that is openly 
acknowledged among the population within the Southern Highlands.407 In the 
opinion of Herman Ambai, a villager from Waigar in Chimbu province, the diffusion 
of weapons has been facilitated by the use of marijuana.408 The cultivation of 
marijuana clearly represents an activity of fundamental concern for the domestic 
security of PNG, as the profits that are generated are reinvested in the provision of 
both individual and clan security, and this assists in providing the economic support 
necessary for the initiation, extension and continuation of armed conflict.  
 
The extension of GOPNG sovereignty and the maintenance of a secure 
domestic environment are challenged by this fundamental security predicament. 
Unfortunately, as a consequence of its weakness, the GOPNG is, and will continue 
to be, unable to tackle either the proliferation of weapons or the ability to acquire 
them unless a coordinated and multifaceted programme of coercive and 
remunerative means is simultaneously instituted. This approach requires an 
extensive level of administration and organisation that is potentially above its 
current capabilities, as any programme that was not instituted to combat both the 
presence of SALW and the cultivation of marijuana is likely to be unsuccessful. For 
example, during 2006 a State of Emergency was instituted by the GOPNG to 
remove the presence of SALW and reinstitute its sovereignty throughout the 
Highlands region. However, given the overriding presence of localised conflict, it is 
unlikely that a substantial amount of weapons, beyond homemade ones, will be 
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surrendered. Furthermore, as the briefing paper prepared for Mac Grace, the New 
Zealand Defence Attaché in Port Moresby, illustrates, the local population were 
reluctant to surrender their weapons in spite of an amnesty and the presence of 
both the PNGDF and RPNGC that provided a secure environment. Only an 
estimated two percent of locally held weapons were recovered.409 The use of 
marijuana as a financial resource could provide villages and clans with a potentially 
limitless source of income, and even if the GOPNG was able to remove the majority 
of SALW then marijuana could provide domestic actors with the financial resources 
to access regional weapons trafficking routes. More disturbingly, the further 
development of drug trafficking activities through PNG could introduce alternative 
drugs, such as cheaply made ATS, where potentially higher profits could be 
employed for SALW acquisition. 
 
Societal Security Concerns 
 
Although qualitative and quantitative research is not available concerning 
the manner in which PNG society is being transformed by the presence of 
marijuana, a number of individuals have commented upon its increasingly negative 
impact. According to Sikani: “Drug abuse is rapidly becoming more widespread in 
Papua New Guinea: it is fast becoming a serious problem as it is beginning to 
destroy the very social fabric of Papua New Guinean society.” 410 Additional issues 
that include increasing urbanisation and the growth of shantytowns, widespread 
poverty, increasing rates of serious crime and cultural transformation could 
collective assist with, or account for, greater levels of marijuana consumption and 
become future sources of instability.  
 
PNG is already characterised as an extremely dangerous country. For 
example, the Australia Department of Foreign Affairs has asserted that: “Crime is 
random and particularly prevalent in urban areas such as Port Moresby, Lae and Mt 
Hagen. Settlement areas of towns and cities are particularly dangerous. Violence 
and use of 'bush knives' (machetes) and firearms are often used in assault and theft 
attempts. Carjackings, assaults (including sexual assaults), bag snatching and 
robberies are common.” 411 The development of drug-related violence or 
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competitative conflicts between gangs over the control of the domestic drug market 
would add to this pervasive environment of violence. The presence of alternative 
drugs, such as methamphetamine and ATS, and any subsequent change in 
consumer preferences also represent a credible future scenario as a by-product of 
any trafficking activities that occur. 
 
The introduction of alternative drugs would place an additional burden upon 
health and social services throughout the country, and would challenge the ability 
of the GOPNG to fund any new initiatives. There is an absolute absence of drug 
treatment facilities, and the health system already faces considerable burdens, with 
an estimated 275 doctors to attend to the needs of a population consisting of 
around 5.13 million people that are geographically dispersed.412 The appearance 
and growth of drug addiction, as well as possible changes in social behaviour such 
as an increase in prostitution to fund drug habits, adds to the already overwhelmed 
position of services that will have to manage with increasing rates of HIV/AIDS 
infection in the future. Concerns surrounding the involvement and abuse of 
marijuana by young people have also been increasingly expressed.413 Furthermore, 
according to Yala, conflict has occurred over the provision of state social services 
and health centres. In some areas health centres have been destroyed as local 
clans and villages have viewed the allocation of services as a zero-sum 
competition, and an act of GOPNG favouritism.414 The development of demand 
among young people and the absence of rehabilitation services directly assists with 
the entrenchment of marijuana throughout PNG, if this has not already occurred, 
and this situation could also encourage alternative drugs to become available 
because of this demand.    
 
The Harris Prediction: Gangs, Crime and Marijuana 
The presence of Raskol gangs throughout PNG is a serious cause for 
concern, as they are believed to be responsible for committing the majority of 
serious and organised crimes that occur. During the late 1980s, Harris predicted 
that these gangs would increasingly present a significant challenge for the GOPNG, 
as their criminal activities would become more organised, while their position within 
society could result in them becoming de facto political instruments utilised by 
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political parties to manipulate domestic politics.415 In many respects, these 
predictions have materialised through the involvement of gangs with the domestic 
sale of marijuana, and the possible trafficking of it to neighbouring states. The 
widespread availability of SALW further assists with the empowerment of gangs, as 
it directly enhances their coercive capacity in relation to that of the GOPNG and the 
RPNGC. 
 
Harris originally observed that gangs and gang culture had undergone 
significant development since their inception within urban areas.  According to his 
research, they had transformed from being unorganised and involved in 
opportunistic burglaries towards more organised hierarchical groups that were 
equipped with both leadership structures and the ability to self-finance.416 
Furthermore, Harris suggested that an ineffectual and militarised response by law 
enforcement agencies, where less than 3 percent of crimes committed during the 
1980s resulted in arrest, provided raskol gangs with a carte blanche for committing 
crime. 417 This situation is likely to have directly encouraged the development of new 
tactics. The ability of the RPNGC to combat raskol gangs has also been affected by 
their position within society. According to Kilick, there is significant support for them 
among rural villages, as they are viewed as akin to traditional big men and 
enforcers of traditional values against the encroachment of business interests, and 
the authority of both the RPNGC and the GOPNG.418 The social legitimacy 
commanded by these gangs is a source of power in itself, and when this is 
combined with a weak GOPNG and its inability to provide social services across the 
country, then there is a strong potential for them to develop into a parallel source of 
authority, which will further weaken the internal sovereignty and legitimacy 
exercised by the GOPNG.   
 
Disturbingly, raskol gangs had already organised an illicit business model for 
the distribution and sale of stolen property by the time of Harris’s observations.419 
This established business model would provide an ideal organisational structure 
that could be employed for the distribution of marijuana, though the degree of 
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organisation and the extent that previous business linkages are employed by gangs 
to distribute marijuana is impossible to ascertain. In the opinion of Nibbrig, raskol 
gangs have increasingly evolved from groups based on mutual benefit through 
association, towards organizations that are more concerned with commercial 
goals.420 Sikani offers a similar observation, and asserts that: “It [marijuana] is no 
longer a business involving ordinary Papua New Guinean subsistence farmers. It is 
run by other groups who are well-organised and capable when it comes to drug 
dealing.” 421 Considerable evidence therefore exists to demonstrate that gangs are 
involved with the sale and cultivation of marijuana. The lucrative profits generated 
by their involvement represents a serious cause for concern, as this would directly 
enhance their autonomy, capabilities and ability to acquire SALW, and would 
provide gangs with the ability to self-finance. This represents a dangerous 
development in the evolution of these gangs, especially when the ability of the 
government to finance the RPNGC and other important agencies such as the 
PNGCS is restricted. The forging of international criminal linkages, the 
establishment of relations with increasing numbers of illegal Chinese migrants and 
their traffickers, and the utilisation of corruption as a business strategy would further 
assist with the development of a scenario where gangs command a similar or 
greater level of coercive capacity and legitimacy than the GOPNG; this may already 
be in progress.  
 
The use of gangs for political purposes and the development of a political-
crime nexus could present another significant threat, which has already 
materialised to some extent. Harris suggested that forms of accommodation 
between politicians and raskols had begun to occur, and that the distribution of 
marijuana represented an ideal commodity for this relationship to base itself 
upon.422 According to Kulick, this scenario was in progress during the early 
1990s.423 Dinnen makes a similar observation, and suggests that politicians have 
realised that gangs are ideal for mobilising political support among poor 
communities. He highlights an incident were former Prime Minister Bill Skate 
boasted of his use of criminal connections to commit murder.424 Harris observed 
that: “It is a process I have seen occur in several other venues in which I have 
                                                
420
 Nibbrig, 1992, p.199   
421
 Sikani, 2000, p.44 
422
 Harris, 1988, p.49 
423
 Kulick, 1993, p.12 
424
 Sinclair Dinnen, “Threatening the State: Crime and Public Order in Papua New Guinea”, in Australia and 
Papua New Guinea: Crime and the Bilateral Relationship, ed. Beno Boeha and John McFarlane (University of 
New South Wales Press, 2000) p. 73; Dinnen (A), 2000, p.79 
 148
studied; in its most extreme form in the inner city of Kingston, Jamaica.” 425 This form 
of accommodation is extremely detrimental, as it is likely to result in the use of 
gangs for the achievement of political objectives and an increase in the level of 
crime and violence throughout communities. Further instability could arise if poor 
communities become politicised, if drug activities are perceived to be primarily 
located within these communities or if gangs are utilised to mobilise and coerce 
voters during election periods. Lastly, if these patronage structures weaken, then 
the power that gangs potentially obtain from drugs would further enhance their 
autonomy and the threat that they pose to the state, as they would be effectively 
uncontrollable. The potential for gangs to become proxies for foreign criminals also 
represents a credible scenario.  
 
Economic Security Concerns 
PNG has experienced fluctuating economic circumstances since 
independence, and those that have migrated into urban areas have experienced 
this changing economic climate directly with high rates of unemployment. In the 
opinion of Marshall, economic decline and low primary commodity prices during the 
1980s more than likely encouraged the development of marijuana cultivation 
because of the high profits available and its role as a replacement cash crop for 
daily subsistence requirements.426 Inguba offers a similar opinion, and states that: 
“…it is obvious that many local coffee, tea, and vegetable growers are more 
interested in growing cannabis because of the income potential, and the large 
amount of money involved. In some areas, cannabis is used as a form of currency, 
which is exchanged for food and other essential items.” 427 Though the cultivation of 
marijuana may not be subject to significant organisation, it clearly provides a 
substantial source of income, and is important during times of economic hardship. 
Furthermore, the economic security of PNG is clearly undermined by the cultivation 
of marijuana, as it assists with the maintenance of a pervasive environment of 
conflict and crime that discourages foreign investment, inhibits the expansion of 
tourism and undermines the ability of the GOPNG to generate income.  
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Throughout PNG, issues such as economic development, resource 
extraction, modernisation and the expansion of the state are not viewed as benign 
acts; they entail significant and tangible consequences. This aspect of PNG society 
becomes apparent when external actors, such as those involved in resource 
extraction and mining, are inserted in to rural areas. Fluid social relations, open 
clan composition and weak corporate identity are elements that engender conflict 
and dispute when foreign economic opportunities are introduced, which distort local 
economic patterns.428 As a consequence conflict both among and within clans or 
villages often occurs. The GOPNG is therefore forced to continually invest in 
security arrangements and in law enforcement agencies in order for economic 
development to occur, draining its limited revenue that would otherwise be directed 
towards other more important priorities.  
 
Bougainville: Lessons for Understanding  
Future Conflict Dynamics  
 
 The conflict that developed within Bougainville was the result of 
several complex and interrelated issues that included grievances related to the 
environmental, economic and social impact of the Panguna copper mine, and 
previous ethno-nationalistic desires for succession.429 As a popular case study, 
Bougainville has been extensively examined from two perspectives; those 
concerned with the origins of the conflict and those that deal with the long and 
innovate attempts at its resolution. Additionally, Regan has also examined the 
conflict from the perspective of the greed versus grievance discourse in order to 
uncover the motives of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA). He observes 
that: “Although grievances about distribution of mine revenue were central to the 
origins of the conflict, the conflict was not primarily about rebel access to the wealth 
of the mine, nor did that wealth provide the funding needed to make the rebellion 
more viable and thereby contribute to its persistence.” 430 Understanding this last 
aspect, the financing of the conflict, is essential, though it has been inadequately 
focused upon. Attempting to examine how the BRA acquired SALW and funded its 
participation throughout the duration of the conflict (1988-1998) is important for 
illustrating how future Melanesian conflicts may be sustained. However, there are 
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two major problems associated with such questions; firstly, the fact that, as with the 
rest of Melanesia, the majority of people rely on subsistence farming for their 
livelihoods; and secondly, the conflict was complicated by the complexity of the 
actors involved. Armed conflict occurred between the BRA and PNGDF, while 
conflict between local villages, the BRA and the Bougainville Resistance Force 
(BRF) also occurred. Examining Bougainville is important, as marijuana could have 
played a minor role in sustaining the conflict, and this would have significant 
implications for the initiation or continuation of future conflicts. 
 
While there is agreement concerning the relatively few number of 
combatants, with suggestions that the BRA comprised an estimated 2000 semi-
autonomous men and the BRF with around 1,500 that were supplied with SALW by 
the PNGDF, the same consensus is not present regarding the manner in which 
SALW were acquired by the BRA.431 According to Regan, the BRA were initially 
able to fund themselves through a combination of subsistence farming and the 
looting of the Panguna mine, though in his opinion, very little financial support was 
provided by the diaspora community.432 Regan also asserts that SALW were 
primarily sourced from domestic sources, and weapons were purchased, acquired 
through raids or from dead PNGDF personnel.433 The BRA also became 
increasingly adept at manufacturing homemade guns and reconditioning weapons 
left over from World War Two. Importantly, Regan asserts that few weapons were 
sourced from outside the islands, as a result of the imposition of a naval blockade, 
and that the victories of the BRA over both the PNGDF and BRF were due to 
superior guerrilla warfare tactics and the presence of a large support base among 
the population.434 Sam Kauona Sirivi, a commander within the BRA, has expressed 
a similar opinion: “In the first stages of the fighting patrols from the PNG forces were 
ambushed and the Bougainvilleans captured weapons of a high standard – M16s, 
SLRs, M79 Grenade Launcher, and ammunition. This became the means of the 
BRA acquiring arms and re-suppling its men. The BRA never imported or bought 
any arms from abroad.” 435 However, given the decentralised nature of the BRA and 
the internal conflict that developed among BRA supporters, it cannot be stated with 
certainty that members did not acquire weapons from outside the island.  
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In contrast to Regan and Sirivi, Capie suggests that the BRA sourced 
weapons from the Solomon Islands and that individuals linked to the BRA were 
frequently involved in armed disturbances there.436 Capie also provides a 
breakdown of the SALW that were surrendered during 2002.437 These figures 
demonstrate that homemade weapons were more numerous than military, though it 
is possible that homemade weapons were surrendered more frequently as they 
may have been valued less than military ones. Additionally, perceptions of 
insecurity are likely to have remained for a substantial period of time following the 
conflict, and this could have encouraged the stockpiling of SALW for future needs. 
There have also been suggestions that Solomon leaders and citizens provided 
assistance to the BRA. This represents a credible scenario given the shared cultural 
and ethnic ties, and this is evidenced by the fact that the Bougainville government 
renamed itself the North Solomon Provincial Government during the 1970s.438 
Incursions by the PNGDF into Solomon territory may have also encouraged both 
official and unofficial support.439 It is also highly unlikely that the naval blockade of 
Bougainville was successful in stopping all border traffic, as this would require the 
involvement of a significant number of vessels. As an example, Ben Bohane, an 
Australian journalist, was able to cross the blockade in 1994, and spent two months 
documenting the actions of the BRA.440 These examples all serve to reinforce the 
assertion that SALW could have been sourced from outside of Bougainville. 
 
With regard to the financing of the BRA, the research that is available does 
not discuss this aspect in any significant depth. Income derived from employment at 
the mine may have supported the initial beginnings of the conflict and the 
purchasing of SALW, though it is unlikely that this income featured prominently as 
the conflict progressed. According to estimates by Regan, less than 50 percent of 
the mineworkers were local residents.441 Furthermore, the local economy was 
ruined as a consequence of the closure of the mine, the destruction of local 
plantations and the interruption of localised agriculture by the pervasive 
environment of violence and forced dislocation. The BRA would have found it 
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increasingly difficult to purchase SALW and ammunition as the conflict continued 
and as unsupportive villages or opponents sought to arm themselves as well. The 
internal conflict that developed would have also alienated the BRA from parts of its 
support network. SALW appropriated or purchased from the PNGDF would have 
provided an ideal solution to this situation, though it cannot be definitively asserted 
that this was the only means by which SALW were acquired.  
 
In contrast to Regan’s opinion that gold from the mine represented an 
unlootable resource, it has been asserted that members of the BRA utilised the 
presence of alluvial gold deposits as a source of income, and according to Bohane, 
the BRA sent this gold to Chinese merchants in the Solomon Islands.442 This 
represents a fundamentally important financial resource, and if this observation is 
accurate, then the BRA would have had a substantial source of income to support 
itself and to acquire SALW. It is also possible that former members of the BRA and 
the multitude of other armed actors present in Bougainville have not publicised this 
aspect, as it could still be an important source of income now, and in the future. 
Unfortunately, this thesis has not been unable to substantiate whether marijuana 
was used as a financial resource by the BRA or other combatants. However, it has 
been cultivated on Bougainville and could represent an important source of finance 
for future conflicts.443  
 
As a consequence of the availability of SALW combined with the 
contemporary use of marijuana as a financial resource for their acquisition, 
intractable conflicts similar to that experienced in Bougainville could become more 
frequent throughout PNG and the Solomon Islands. Furthermore, Bougainville is 
relevant to this thesis as supporting the PNGDF for the duration of the conflict was 
extremely costly and the economic impact of the mine closure was enormous, the 
GOPNG was forced to request International Monetary Fund assistance. The 
contracting of mercenaries to end the conflict, commonly referred to as the Sandline 
Affair, created extensive domestic political difficulties for the GOPNG and for civil-
military relations. Bougainville also effectively endangered the economic security of 
the entire state, and its capacity to effectively fund both law enforcement and 
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essential social and development services. Lastly, the potential for conflict between 
competing clans, as well as between the state and these clans will always exist 
within PNG as long as the state remains weak, these groups remain autonomous 
and resource extraction continues. For example, inter-clan conflict has also 
occurred over the revenue generated by Kutubu oil project.444  
 
Weapons Surrendered to the United Nations Observer Mission on Bougainville 
(UNOMB) by September 2002 
 
Weapon Type Bougainville Resistance Force (BRF) Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) 
High-powered/ Military 141 151 
Sporting 149 123 
Homemade 253 610 
WWII 45 100 
Total 588 984 
David Capie, Under the Gun: The Small Arms Challenge in the Pacific (Wellington, Victoria University Press, 
2003) p.138  
 
Australian Involvement in Papua New Guinea 
 The extensive engagement of Australia with PNG is overwhelmingly defined 
by concerns for its national security and the impact that PNG’s weakness could 
have upon regional security. According to historical and contemporary Australian 
assessments, the potential for the development of both traditional and new security 
threats are considerable, and the most recent manifestations of these concerns 
have appeared in the arch of instability discourse.445 As early as 1997, the 
Honourable Alexander Downer, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, asserted that 
both foreign relations and events within PNG had not been given the attention that 
they deserved, and that new issues such as drug trafficking and TNC required the 
investment of additional resources and the expansion of the security architecture for 
the region.446 The primacy of these concerns are evident in recent policies and 
operations, such as the RAMSI mission to the Solomon Islands, which emphasised 
the overwhelming importance of Australian reengagement with regional security.  
 
Bilateral relations between both states are strong, and important examples 
include the Australia-Papua New Guinea Ministerial Forum and the institution of the 
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Enhanced Cooperation Package (EPC).  However, these relations are open to 
significant fluctuation; events such as the searching of Prime Minister Sir Michael 
Somare at Brisbane Airport and the assistance provided to Julian Moti to escape to 
the Solomon Islands have caused significant strains and difficulties within this 
important bilateral relationship.447 Australia remains the most important bilateral 
relationship for the GOPNG.  
 
As a consequence of Australian concerns and both the development and 
security assistance that the GOPNG requires, PNG is firmly entrenched within 
Australia’s RSC. The extent of Australia’s involvement, influence and, at times 
aggressive approach has raised GOPNG concerns regarding the impact of these 
actions upon its sovereignty. With regard to drugs, it appears as if the Australian 
strategy for assisting the GOPNG to combat their presence has been subsumed 
within its overall approach to strengthening governance and law and order, which 
form the core of current policies. In the event of a potentially serious situation, the 
AFP would be available to assist RPNGC and a permanent office has existed in 
Port Moresby since 1994.  
 
Security issues feature highly within the bilateral discourse. One such 
example is the possibility that significant trafficking of SALW for marijuana occurs 
via the Torres Strait. However, in spite of the investment of significant research and 
resources into determining the extent of any trade, a conclusive answer has not 
been reached. This uncertainty is evident in statements made by Mick Keelty, 
current Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police, within one publication. 
Keelty has asserted that: “To this point in time, PNG has been a source country only 
for cannabis. But even in the case of cannabis, the problem of the Torres Strait 
border can best be described as being a low threat.” 448 Furthermore: “Seizure 
figures show an increase in the quantities detected. In one detection, reliable 
information was received that a syndicate operating in the Torres Strait has, over a 
period of time, shipped over 1000 kilograms of cannabis to Australia in quantities of 
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two kilograms to fifty kilograms at a time.” 449 Lastly: “The possibility of PNG being 
used as a transit point for the shipment of drugs to Australia cannot be ruled out 
particularly with large Asian populations in the country.” 450 Changing drug and 
criminal intelligence assessments combined with the shifting domestic security 
discourse in Australia undoubtedly account for the varying characterisation of the 
threat posed by criminal activities within the Torres Strait. This security discourse is 
likely to remain the focus of attention in the future, and will continue to be influenced 
by Australian political and cultural perceptions of the GOPNG and the domestic 
security environment. 
 
As a consequence of this history of concern, an estimated AUSD $15.5 
billion in assistance and aid has been provided, and current assistance is directed 
through the ECP.451 According to Keelty, authorities in both Australia and PNG have 
viewed the prospect of increasing cross-border crime between the two states 
seriously. This relationship is best viewed through the level of cooperation exerted 
in the establishment of joint intelligence groups, ad-hoc personnel training 
initiatives and assistance to the RPNGC to enhance its performance in law 
enforcement.452 Assistance has also been provided by Australia through joint 
maritime patrols, the provision of AFP liaison officers and assistance with the 
establishment of the National Drug Squad and the National Criminal Intelligence 
Unit. Importantly, the ECP has resulted in the drafting of new extradition, mutual 
assistance and proceeds of crime legislation. Unfortunately, in spite of significant 
cooperation, the GOPNG is still unable to control its land and sea borders, 
according to Buku, PNGCS officers stopped boarding ships to inspect their cargo in 
2005, though this situation may have changed.453 
  
The enormous amount of aid and technical assistance provided by Australia 
will be of little consequence unless the GOPNG can reassert both its internal and 
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external sovereignty. The presence of marijuana and its relationship to armed 
conflict, political and social instability will undermine Australian efforts at 
rehabilitating the GOPNG, and will assists in maintaining an environment of 
instability. Moreover, the provision of economic assistance and the development of 
improved infrastructure will, paradoxically, open up the country. This could facilitate 
a more organised approach towards drugs and criminal activity in the future, as the 
sovereignty of the GOPNG and its ability to enforce the rule of law throughout both 
rural and urban areas is unlikely to expand to the degree required. However, given 
the overwhelming concerns present in Australian over drugs, TNC and terrorism, it 
is highly unlikely that the GOPNG would be allowed to regresses back towards state 
failure. Unfortunately, this thesis was unable to uncover any specific instances 
where Australia had attempted to influence GOPNG policies regarding the 
presence of drugs, though undoubtedly, as the consumption of alternative drugs 
such as methamphetamine increases and the relationship between marijuana and 
SALW acquisition gains more publicity Australia will become more assertive and 
provide greater assistance to the GOPNG in order to control this issue. 
 
Responses of the Papua New Guinean Government to Drugs 
The ability of the GOPNG to undertake anti-drug operations and to improve 
domestic security faces significant challenges. These include re-occurring issues of 
limited financial, technical and human resources, the pervasive presence of tribal 
conflict and high levels of crime and corruption. Unfortunately, information from the 
GOPNG regarding its perception of drugs as a security threat is not available, and 
as such, any concerns must be obtained by examining other resources: this 
presents a problem for employing the concepts developed by Buzan et al. The 
GOPNG views the presence of armed conflict and the impact of this upon economic 
development as the primary threat to national security, and as far as can be 
ascertained, the ubiquitous presence of marijuana and the potential for alternative 
drugs in the immediate future are not yet a significant concern. Furthermore, the 
presence of SALW throughout the country has been securitised, though the 
relationship between marijuana and SALW acquisition, or marijuana and the 
maintenance of domestic insecurity has received equal attention.  
 
However, the GOPNG is not ignorant of the presence of domestic instability, 
and as a consequence a considerable proportion of its resources have been 
devoted towards combating crime and violence. For example, 1996 was dedicated 
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as the Year of Law Enforcement. However, these measures have consistently failed 
to institute an environment where security prevails. A range of answers may 
account for the failure of the government to combat drugs and provide security; it 
may be possible that relationship between the presence of marijuana, tribal conflict 
and crime are poorly understood; that the government is well aware of this 
relationship, but is unable to act effectively; that this relationship is ignored or given 
a low priority because of more pressing concerns; or, that some political and 
community leaders benefit from an environment of insecurity and the profits derived 
from marijuana. It is likely that a combination of all of these reasons prevents the 
government from undertaking decisive action against drugs. 
 
Importantly, personnel from some law enforcement agencies recognise that 
drugs are an issue for the state. According to Gerry Kella, a RPNGC drug expert, the 
establishment of a domestic market for harder drugs was viewed as a real 
possibility.454 Both Police Minister Mathias Karani and Marku Maruse, Director of 
Drug Education for the National Narcotics Bureau (NNB), recognised that ordinary 
citizens were becoming involved because of the potential profits.455 The GOPNG is 
fundamentally unable to institute nationwide measures to control its borders, or to 
seize and disrupt the cultivation, sale and trafficking of marijuana on a meaningful 
scale.  
 
A rapid situational assessment of drugs was conducted between 1998-1999 
after discussions between the NNB and the UNODC. Importantly, the assessment 
interviewed and questioned citizens regarding the presence of drugs. However, the 
employment of other techniques, such as the utilisation of government statistics and 
domestic research, was not possible because these are almost entirely non-
existent.456 According to McDonald, the NNB has been totally unsuccessful in 
convincing successive governments of the need to update domestic drug 
legislation, though the presence of a few community drug education initiatives was 
noted.457 The assessment was unable to make any definitive conclusions, as no 
information was available, while the lack of GOPNG resources and the funding of 
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priorities considered more important ensured that any recommendations that were 
made have not been instituted. This situation demonstrates the difficulties facing the 
government and its inability to tackle drugs, and accounts for the focus of foreign 
research upon more visible concerns such as the availability of SALW.   
 
The National Drug Squad (NDS) has undertaken operations to intercept 
marijuana travelling from the Highlands to other provinces for the specific purpose 
of SALW acquisition. In the opinion of the NDS, marijuana is trafficked from coastal 
regions to other neighbouring states, though as NDS staff indicated, the strength 
and sustainability of their interception operations were dependant upon the 
availability of financial and human resources.458 The NDS is trying to monitor and 
close the routes used for internal trafficking, though the lack of infrastructure and the 
traditional use of bush pathways ensures that the trade is widely dispersed, and not 
amenable to easy disruption. Some operational success is evident, for example, 
intelligence supplied by the Transnational Crime Unit (TCU) resulted in an 
undercover operation that successfully tracked and seized an 8kg shipment of 
marijuana at Daru airport.459 The detectives involved suggested that the drugs could 
have been linked to a trafficking ring that operates between PNG, Indonesia and 
Australia. The NNB has also recently implemented the first ever anti-drug 
awareness programme, “kick drugs out of PNG”, in conjunction with a local martial 
arts gym.460  
 
The ability of the government to sustain anti-drug counter measures, such as 
border patrols, is questionable. It has been widely noted that the border with West 
Papua is not patrolled, and it is believed that members of the Free West Papua 
Movement (Organisesi Papua Merdeka, OPM) have been able to freely source 
SALW in PNG. Additionally, both the air and naval elements of the PNGDF have 
been unable to conduct continuous operations due to the lack of funding.461 
Furthermore, bilateral relations with Indonesia have traditionally focused upon 
issues relating to their respective borders and the potential for strong domestic 
support for the OPM within PNG. Several incursions into the territorial borders of 
PNG by Indonesian security agnecies have occurred, and it is likely that difficulties 
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between the two states could directly increase as a result of drugs, and especially if 
production facilities for ATS or methamphetamine become established or as a 
consequence of the use of marijuana by the OPM for acquiring SALW. Drugs have 
been securitisied by Indonesia, and any anti-drug measures undertaken by 
Indonesian authorities that involve the violation of PNG sovereignty in the future will 
undoubtedly result in raising Australian security concerns. In the future, the GOPNG 
could seek to securitise its borders due to the occurrence of both drug and SALW 
trafficking and the inability of neighbouring such as the Solomon Islands to control 
their own borders, though it is unlikely that it would possess the resources to do so.  
 
Joint sea patrols that include personnel from the PNGDF, RPNGC, PNGCS, 
Immigration and the TCU have been undertaken recently in order to reassert control 
over the borders and enhance interagency cooperation, though the sustainability of 
such operations is unpredictable. Issues such as corruption will present a further 
challenge to these agencies, as it is likely that gangs and criminal groups will 
attempt to undermine their operational capacity, while the ability of the GOPNG to 
internally monitor personnel is limited. 
 
Of critical importance to this thesis are the perceptions and responses of the 
GOPNG to drugs and other interrelated security issues. Unfortunately, as Roscoe 
observes, the government considers the appearance of violent crime and tribal 
conflict as two distinct phenomena, and as a consequence, they are dealt with by 
different legal codes and actions to suppress, ameliorate and penalise their 
occurrence.462 Roscoe asserts that: “under traditional schema, raskolism is warfare 
just as much as are the pitched battles of the highlands; just as do contemporary 
Highland warriors, raskols usually target victims beyond their clan or village, people 
who, under traditional schema, constitute legitimate enemies.” 463 Roscoe contends 
that while the state treats these as separate actions, due in part to the inheritance of 
Western legal principles and definitions, violent crime and tribal conflicts have 
converged, and are virtually indistinguishable. Nonggorr reinforces this 
observation, and asserts that legislation designed to respond to tribal conflicts, such 
as the Inter-Group Fighting Act 1997, were unworkable because tribal fighters could 
not be individually identified by the RPNGC and were required to prove their 
                                                
462
 Paul Roscoe, “Crime and “Tribal” Warfare in Contemporary Papua New Guinea”, in Globalisation and 
Cultural Change in the Pacific Islands, ed. Victoria Lockwood (Upper Saddle River NJ, Pearson Education, 
2004) p.59-64 
463
 Roscoe, 2004, p.69 
 160
innocence, and as such, it was ruled as unconstitutional.464 This inconsistency in 
policy exerts a considerable influence upon the presence of marijuana throughout 
the state and the environment of insecurity and instability. Measures that combat 
gangs, but fail to intervene in the appearance of tribal conflict will not significantly 
reduce the presence of marijuana, and paradoxically, failure to combat both 
simultaneously will allow them to sustain their political, economic and social 
autonomy as either will take advantage of the reduction in GOPNG security 
measures and decreasing internal sovereignty.   
 
The GOPNG is, as a consequence, trapped into combating gangs in urban 
areas, which is potentially beyond the capacity of the RPNGC at this point in time, 
while other policies, such as the State of Emergency in the Southern Highlands has 
ultimately only focused upon one element of the conflict equation. Removing 
access to SALW will bring significant benefits to the state, though the failure to 
combat the presence of marijuana, and the potential involvement of other drugs in 
the future, will not remove the capacity for SALW acquisition. Unfortunately, the 
state is unable to reduce the presence of both drugs and SALW, and as a 
consequence, an increasing focus upon drugs could potentially overwhelm the 
judicial system, and will place additional burdens upon already limited social 
services. In spite of the clear threat posed by marijuana, the GOPNG is clearly 
forced to intervene to manage and control issues considered more serious and 
important because of its limited resources. While drugs present a clear threat to 
PNG, the presence of SALW is more visible, and as such, it is unlikely that drugs will 
be, or could be, securitised by the government.  
 
With regard to the securitisation and politicisation of drugs according to the 
concepts developed by Buzan et al, the lack of information regarding domestic 
political discussion hinders a thorough assessment. However, the employment of 
the NFA has allowed this thesis to examine how drugs present a significant threat to 
the state by their merging with SALW acquisition activities, and by the support that 
marijuana provides for the autonomy of gangs and villages. Examining the GOPNG 
has revealed that it views the insecurity and instability created by SALW as 
fundamentally important, and this aspect has been securitised, though it reveals the 
flaws in the approach of the GOPNG by ignoring the relationship with marijuana. 
Furthermore, the potential involvement of national and community leaders ensures 
                                                
464
 John Nonggor, “The Sandline Affair: A Papua New Guinean Perspective”, in Australia and Papua New 
Guinea: Crime and the Bilateral Relationship, ed. Beno Boeha and John McFarlane (University of New South 
Wales Press, 2000) p.266 
 161
that there is unlikely to be strong support for instituting anti-drug measures. Lastly, 
given the importance of the conflict that occurred in Bougainville to the overall 
security of PNG, the relationship between marijuana and SALW acquisition will be 
extremely important for the future security of PNG.  
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Case Study Four 
 
FIJI 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 Fiji is currently under the control of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) 
commanded by Commodore Frank Bainimarama, and an Interim Administration (IA) 
has been established. The 2006 coup has been attributed to the leniency displayed 
by the Laisenia Qarase government towards those connected with the 2000 Coup, 
and as Watson observed before the coup, the RFMF already occupied an 
ambiguous position within domestic politics, and had merged its professional role 
with a domestic political agenda. This transformation has therefore encouraged the 
promotion and institutionalisation of itself as a source of domestic security and 
stability.465 As a consequence of the coup, government officials have been removed 
from their positions, while both oppositional political leaders and journalists have 
been harassed, and significant steps have been undertaken to institutionalise 
RFMF personnel throughout the government.466  
 
As this case study will demonstrate, the presence of domestic political 
competition and conflict, the imposition of economic sanctions combined with 
policies implemented by the IA itself may sustain a favourable environment for the 
further entrenchment of drugs, and additional TNC, to the detriment of the state and 
the wider region. Though, importantly, statistics and information concerning drug 
abuse and criminal convictions are better developed in comparison to other PIS, 
though they are still limited, and official concerns regarding the increasing presence 
of drugs has been expressed frequently.  
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News Coverage of Drugs in Fiji 
 
Source Date Headline 
Radio Australia March 7, 2000 “Arrest Ends Fiji Drug Trafficking Syndicate” 
BBC October 29, 2000 “Hugh Heroin Haul in Fiji” 
The Fiji Sun/PINA Nius Online January 17, 2001 “Fiji Islands: Fiji police hunt drugs connection” 
Fiji’s Daily Post/PINA Nius 
Online 
April 18, 
2001 
“YOUTH: Fiji marijuana trade’s impact on young worries 
NGO” 
PINA Nius Online April 21, 
2001 
“DRUGS AND CHILDREN: Children caught peddling drugs, 
Fiji police force say” 
Radio Australia April 27, 
2001 
“Drugs Found In Fiji Biscuit Tin” 
PINA Nius Online February 20, 2002 “Fiji drugs case prompts regional call” 
The Fiji Times/PINA Nius Online March 27, 2002 “Tongan cocaine shipment had Fiji address, says customs 
chief” 
Wansolawara September, 2003 “Marijuana menace: As more teenagers succumb to the 
substance, its use spreads newer social ills” 
Fiji Sun February 20, 2004 “Jobless Fiji Women Jailed For Growing Marijuana” 
Pacific Magazine  September 16, 2005 “Fiji: Tongan Gets 18 Months For Drugs” 
The Fiji Times Online February 6, 2007 “Military Fights Drugs” 
Sydney Morning Herald September 17, 2007 “Fijian drug haul believed bound for Australia” 
The Fiji Times Online March 17, 2008 “War on drugs” 
The Fiji Times March 26, 2008 “Costly mistake: Youths with drugs mistake police for pick-
up”  
 
 
Overview of Illicit Drugs in Fiji 
  
The cultivation of marijuana throughout Fiji is believed to be ubiquitous. 
Commercial-size plantations have been discovered on a regular basis, though as a 
consequence of successful operations conducted by the Fiji Police Force (FPF), it is 
believed that these operations have been relocated to less accessible areas.467 
While the number of people convicted for drug offences has actually declined 
according to official statistics, the FPF has asserted that marijuana-related activity 
throughout the state is “grossly under-reported”. 468 In the view of the government, 
the Navosa region appeared to be the most prominent region for cultivation, though 
other parts of the country are also thought to be substantial cultivation areas.469  
 
The size of plantations that have been discovered has resulted in 
speculation that marijuana is being trafficked to other neighbouring states, as the 
domestic market could not possibly consume the quantities available. Further 
transformations have included the increasing involvement of unemployed women 
with marijuana cultivation.470 This presents a significant burden and creates 
additional challenges for the provision of social services and for the functioning of 
the justice system. According to Evans, concerns have been expressed over the 
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increasing organisation of marijuana cultivation, and more importantly, the potential 
threat that this concentrated income will pose for the IA if criminal groups invest this 
income in other illicit commodities or in the acquisition of SALW.471 The occurrence 
of any additional transformations will significantly jeopardise the ability of the IA to 
intervene in the cultivation of marijuana, which already presents a dynamic 
challenge in itself. Further changes would require the increasing provision of 
additonal resources to law enforcement agencies that are already attempting to 
manage and institute multiple strategies to combat activities, which have included 
the local production of methamphetamine and the trafficking of both cocaine and 
heroin.  
 
In addition to marijuana, high-profile and large-quantity seizures of both 
heroin and precursor chemicals used in the production of methamphetamine have 
occurred. All forms of concealment used for trafficking have been observed in the 
country, including the use of human couriers, containerised freight, the hiding of 
drugs inside other objects, and transportation via private yachts. It is also believed 
that drugs were being stockpiled in Fiji in anticipation for supplying criminals that 
intended on capitalising upon the presence of the Olympic games in Australia.472 
However, according to Evans, the cost associated with harder drugs such as 
cocaine and heroin make them unaffordable for domestic consumption, though this 
is not true for cheaply made ATS.473 If ATS were to become widely available 
throughout the country, their presence would accelerate the social problems that 
are already being experienced, and could potentially assist in increasing the 
presence of crime and violence. Very few treatment and rehabilitation facilities are 
available for those with marijuana-related health issues; addiction to ATS would 
also place an overwhelming burden upon these limited health and social services.     
 
A number of international organisations and prominent agencies have 
commented upon the presence of drugs in Fiji. In 2004, the DEA recorded the 
increasing presence of marijuana and its sale, and cited the Western Islands of Viti 
Levu as the primary cultivation area.474 The INCB has made similar observations, 
and asserted that the ubiquitous cultivation of marijuana throughout the country had 
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resulted in its widespread abuse, and that criminal groups had utilised Fiji as a 
transit point for the trafficking of cocaine and heroin destined for both New Zealand 
and Australia.475 However, as Prem Adip, Acting Assistance Superintendent of 
Police, observed, no Fijian citizen has ever been charged with the use of any drug 
with the exception of marijuana.476 Concerns have also been expressed over the 
presence of South American individuals who have been linked to drugs.477 The 
failure to arrest Fijians associated with drugs other than marijuana could indicate 
that foreign citizens are primary involved at this point in time, meaning that the 
government can do little beyond internal measures to deter potential trafficking 
groups or organisations. It could also indicate that the FPF has so far been unable 
to devote enough resources, or has not adopted adequate strategies to investigate 
the occurrence of drug-related crimes and those involved with drugs domestically.   
 
Of critical importance is the fact that the INCB observed in 2003 that law 
enforcement agencies and regulatory controls were well functioning. However, the 
increasing need for the development of both a drug control master plan and an 
assessment of the current levels of drug abuse was noted, as these were required 
for the institution of effective counter measures and rehabilitation services.478 The 
establishment of the National Substance Abuse Advisory Council (NSAAC) and the 
Senate Ad-Hoc Select Committee on Drugs, Crime and Prostitution (SASC) 
represent a strong commitment towards fulfilling these requirements.  
 
Examples of Drug Seizures in Fiji 
 
Date Operation Name/ 
Details 
Agencies Involved Location Illicit Drug Estimated 
Value 
2000 ‘Log Runner’; inside 
shipping container 
Multinational  357Kgs of Heroin  
March, 
2001 
Inside computer disk Fijian and Australia 
Police, U.S Customs and 
DEA 
Suva 30 Grams of Cocaine  
August 
2001 
 Police and Army Keiyasa, Navosa 
Highlands 
Marijuana plantation FD$1.7 
Million 
2004 ‘Out Rigger’; 
Methamphetamine 
super laboratory 
Multinational Laucala Beach Methamphetamine and 
precursor chemicals 
NZD$870 
Million 
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Marijuana Leaves & Plants Seized 1990-2003 
 
Year Dried Leaves 
Grams 
Dried Leaves 
% Variable 
Plants 
Grams 
Plants 
%Variable 
1990 2900  821  
1991 4900 41 154 -433 
1992 6300 22 723 79 
1993 4100 -54 1035 30 
1994 3900 -5 1100 6 
1995 16900 77 2239 51 
1996 6989 -142 5388 58 
1997 17442 60 8588 37 
1998 30039.8  1091  
1999 45617.8 52 3841 252 
2000 25051.2 -45 533 -86 
2001 183811 634 515 -3 
2002 11179.5 -94 2010 290 
2003 44327.02 296.5 129626 6349.1 
The Senate, Report of the Senate Ad-Hoc Select Committee Established to look into the Escalating use of Drugs and Related 
Crimes Including Sexual Crimes and Prostitution, Vol.1, Parliamentary Paper No.22 (Suva: Fiji, Department of Legislature, 2006); 
Fiji Police Force, National Police Crime Statistics 
 
 
 
Precursor Chemicals Seized During Operation Out Rigger, 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oceania Customs Organisation, The Quarterly News, No.18, September 2004 
 
 
 
Selection of Criminal Offences in Fiji 2001-2007 
 
Type of Crime & 
Offences 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Robbery with 
Violence 
623 794 832 806 914 
Burglary 383 773 727 816 850 
Drug Offences 433 417 417 312 312 
Table constructed from statistics presented on the website of The Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics. http://www.statsfiji.gov.fj/  
 
Chemical Amount Seized 
Chloroephedrine 1300Kg 
Ephedrine 450Kg 
Chloroform 135 x 200 Litre drums 
Barium Sulphate 20Kg 
Acetic acid 10 x 20 Litre drums 
Sodium Hydroxide 15 x 25Kg sacks 
Hydrochloric acid 20 Litres 
Waste water 15 x 200 litre drums 
Hydrogen 180 Bottles 
Aqueous reaction 
mixture 
500 Litres 
Palladium 2 Chloride 180 x 100 gram 
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Political Security Concerns 
 
The Presence of Political Conflict 
 
The reoccurrence of coups and contemporary political conflict are, in many 
respects, directly linked to the legacies of colonialism and colonial policy.479 
Instability arises from among a range of complex issues that include competition 
between regionally organised political groupings, the creation of quasi-cultural 
forms of governance such as the Great Council of Chiefs (Bise Levu Vakaturaga) 
and the repeated intervention and power-brokerage position of the RFMF. The 
presence of indigenous and Indo-Fijian political and economic conflict and the 
promotion of ethno-nationalism by successive governments has also encouraged 
instability, and these grievances have provided part of the motivation behind the 
coups that have occurred. As Finin and Wesley-Smith illustrate, while the three 
coups have received the largest amount of attention from New Zealand, Australia 
and regional media organisations, the presence of indigenous competition and 
conflict is, in fact, more prevalent, and the coups are an expression of the 
contestation of a shared national identity.480 This history of political instability has 
assisted with facilitated a conducive environment for drugs and TNC through the 
weakness of the state and its distraction with internal political competition. In the 
future, further destabilisation could derive from the increasing entrenchment of 
criminal groups that take advantage of this instability. There is also a possibility that 
internally competing actors from among Fiji’s confederacies could utilise the profits 
associated with marijuana in order to achieve their domestic political objectives, 
such as funding national election campaigns or for providing social services to their 
constituents.   
 
The Interim Administration 
 
The presence of the IA and its stated goals of reducing corruption, removing 
racial discrimination from the constitution and encouraging economic development 
are, paradoxically, being undermined by its own actions. RFMF personnel have 
been appointed to the judiciary, calling into question the independence of the court 
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system, and disturbingly, they have also been granted immunity from both criminal 
and civil prosecution.481 The ability of the bureaucracy to function is under serious 
threat, as previous policies of indigenisation have excluded experienced Indo-Fijian 
civil servants, while RFMF personal have now replaced those excluded on the 
basis of their political connections and those that have professionally distanced 
themselves from the coup.482 Additionally, the local media has come under 
significant pressure for their criticism of the IA and RFMF, and the freedom of the 
media has been severely curtailed.483 These issues raise serious concerns 
regarding governmental accountability and transparency, while the institution of the 
military throughout the bureaucracy removes any sense of neutrality. As a 
consequence, the RFMF may gain an enhanced capacity for oversight of the 
bureaucracy, though any internal issues present throughout the military will be 
expressed in policy making, and other potential issues such as corruption or 
competing loyalties will be dispersed directly into the governance apparatus of the 
state.   
 
The ability of the FPF and bureaucracy to effectively combat the security and 
governance-related challenges posed by drugs will become increasingly strained 
as government revenue decreases. Additional issues, such as human rights abuses 
committed by the FPF and RFMF against people detained in their custody have 
been raised, and could potentially influence their ability to obtain drug-related 
intelligence and cooperation from the population.484 Constraints upon both financial 
and technical resources throughout the FPF have also been noted. According to 
Senior Superintendent Berenado Daveta, Chief of Staff Operations, the FPF 
requires an additional 80 vehicles and 2450 radio handsets to enhance their 
effectiveness.485 Moreover, instances of corruption and collusion with criminals have 
also been raised. There have been allegations concerning the fact that the former 
Police Commission, Isikia Savua, may have been aware of the Speight coup in 
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2000 before it happened, and failed to act accordingly.486 These issues raise 
concerns regarding the effectiveness of the FPF and its ability to combat rising 
levels of crime, and assists in account for the increasing presence of community 
watch groups throughout the country. The recent arrest of an individual involved in 
making and selling fake visas for entry into New Zealand and Australia 
demonstrates that the FPF continues to be operationally successful in spite of 
resource limitations.487 This example also illustrates the increasing sophistication of 
criminals and the need for continued investment in police training and resources. 
Moreover, it is likely that activities such as these directly assist those involved with 
drug-related activities, by allowing them to forge documents or disguise their 
identity. Lastly, a popular perception exists that the presence of the RFMF directly 
after the coup was beneficial in reducing crime, and this aspect could assist them in 
attaining a greater level of legitimacy for the coup and any future plans for their 
permanent institutionalisation.  
 
Military Security Concerns 
 
The Availability of Small Arms and Light Weapons 
 
Attempts at trafficking SALW into Fiji have previously occurred, for example, 
in 1988 used Czechoslovakian small arms that were reported to have been 
organised by a Fijian national were seized in Sydney en route from North Yemen.488 
Concerns have also been raised regarding the return of RFMF personnel from UN 
peacekeeping operations and instances where they have not been properly 
disarmed.489 The amount of SALW present within, and recycled throughout, PNG 
and the Solomon Islands provides a potential market for criminal groups and non-
state actors to obtain weapons, while the profits associated with marijuana 
cultivation and involvement with other TNC could ensure that the financial capacity 
for acquisition exists. These examples demonstrate that both geography and 
financial capacity do not present a sufficient barrier to the introduction of SALW into 
conflicts already present in Fiji or for employment in criminal activities. 
 
The potential for even a few weapons to have a disproportionate impact 
upon the security and stability of Fiji is illustrated by the Speight coup. This situation 
has been elaborated upon by Alpers and Twyford who observe that: “The numbers 
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of firearms used in Suva was small–only seven gunmen executed the coup, and 
Speight later provided arms to another 100 young rebels—yet it was sufficient to 
unseat a democratically elected government.” 490 The ability of the RFMF to prevent 
SALW from being employed in domestic disputes will require the further investment 
in security agencies such as the Fiji Islands Revenue and Customs Authority 
(FIRCA), and it is highly unlikely that the military would allow competing spheres of 
authority to become armed, though its ability to do so is grounded in its capacity to 
control national borders. However, this objective represents a challenge in its own 
right given the strong commercial and transportation links between Fiji, the Pacific 
and the rest of the world. A possibility exists that criminals will attempt to arms 
themselves in the future to protect their operations from potential rivals or attempts 
by the RFMF and the FPF to intervene into their clandestine activities. 
 
The Military as a Source of Insecurity 
 
During the Speight coup, supporting members of the Counter Revolutionary 
Warfare unit were able to return to their army barracks to obtain additional 
weaponry. This raises serious misgivings regarding both the security of local 
armouries and the presence of politicisation and internal divisions throughout the 
RFMF.491 The presence of divided loyalties throughout the RFMF and the potential 
for external actors to exercise influence upon military personnel heightens the 
possibility for the internal leakage and the supply of SALW to domestic actors in the 
future. Though importantly, the Australia Defence Force has assisted with the 
construction of a new armoury at the Queen Elizabeth Barracks.492 The discovery of 
Fijian mercenaries in Bougainville during 2005 demonstrates how dangerous the 
availability of military knowledge and former RFMF personnel could be for security 
in the region, especially if these individuals became embroiled in domestic disputes 
or associated with local criminal groups and their activities.493 Lastly, according to 
Watson, the RFMF has adopted and implemented the new security discourse as a 
guide its actions and future policy, and it has subsequently redefined its 
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governance role in the state.494 This situation is disturbing, as it could result in a 
militarised approach towards combating drugs and those associated, as well as 
against any other domestic issues that are perceived, or constructed, as sources of 
insecurity.  A militarised response to drugs by the RFMF could result in human rights 
abuses and the potential for internal conflict if specific areas or political groupings 
are identified as being involved with the cultivation of marijuana or other drugs.  
 
Societal Security Concerns 
 
 Fijian society has and continues to experience significant social 
transformation, such as increasing urbanisation, the presence of squatter 
settlements, high rates of youth unemployment and the associated breakdown of 
traditional cultural practices. These issues have been cited as contributing factors 
for the increasing consumption of drugs among young people.495 As such, 
community leaders have increasing expressed their concerns over drugs in Fiji, for 
example, Nadi Chief Ratu Meli Saukuru the Taukei Navo asserted that: “I call upon 
the interim Government and authorities involved to take these things seriously and 
be careful because we do not want to attract the kind of publicity and elements that 
are usually associated with drugs.” 496 Disturbingly, NSAAC has reported that both 
primary and high school students have become increasingly involved with 
marijuana; according to research conducted during 2004 an estimated 13 percent 
of secondary school students (9,179 of 70,607) had consumed the drug.497 
Additionally, hospitals have also noted the increasing admission of patients for 
marijuana related medical problems, for example, first time admissions to St. Giles 
Hospital increased from 186 people in 1995 to 319 during 2003.498  
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Drug Offences in Primary Schools According to NSAAC 
 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Drug Offences 
(Marijuana) 
3 7 10 25 28 36 
Table copied from Fiji Islands Ministry of Education, Education Gazette, Term 3, Vol.2 (2007) p.51 
 
Age of Persons Arrested for Marijuana-Related Offences in Fiji, 1987-1994 
 
Year Under 17 17-24 25 Years and Over Total 
1987 7 92 75 174 
1988 6 106 87 199 
1989 1 78 74 153 
1990 3 57 77 137 
1991 1 67 53 121 
1992 21 155 73 249 
1993 16 180 106 302 
1994 20 237 144 401 
Table copied from Mensah Adinkrah, Crime, Deviance & Delinquency in Fiji (Suva, Fiji: Fiji Council of Social Services in association 
with Asia Crime Prevention Foundation Department of Sociology, the University of the South Pacific Fiji Prisons Service, 1995) p.57 
 
 
In spite of the lack of statistics, the few that are available demonstrate that 
there is domestic drug consumption, and that this is present throughout the school 
system. The number of adults that consume drugs can only be estimated, though 
given the percentage of young people currently involved, combined with the access 
of adults to superior financial resources, these figures could be high. The presence 
of domestic demand for marijuana could transform towards harder drugs, this 
represents a credible scenario given the use of Fiji for trafficking activities. Any 
additional changes such as the increasing involvement of locals with these 
shipments and the potential for them to be paid in drugs could stimulate demand for 
harder drugs such as ATS, cocaine or heroin. It is also likely that increasing social 
and cultural links, such as increased Asian migration, could assist with encouraging 
the introduction and consumption of alternative drugs.  
 
Economic Security Concerns 
Fiji has experienced significant economic instability as a by-product of the 
coups. A combination of economic sanctions and the suspension of development 
aid, the suspension of preferential trade agreements for sugar with the European 
Union and fluctuations in tourism-related income have impacted heavily upon the 
economy, resulting in increasing levels of unemployment and poverty.499 As 
Fraenkel illustrates, the willingness of villagers to seize assets during the Speight 
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coup vividly demonstrates the level of poverty and economic exclusion experienced 
by some segments of the population.500 Sriskandarajah elaborates upon this 
situation, and suggests that income inequality is more prevalent intra-ethically 
rather than inter-ethnically.501 The presence of the RFMF does not engender 
investor confidence, while the presence of conflict over land ownership, land 
leases, and the division of labour and capital between indigenous and Indo-Fijians 
negatively influences economic development. These issues directly undermine the 
amount of government revenue available, and its ability to adequately fund law 
enforcement agencies and provide social services. 
 
Given this economic environment, the cultivation of marijuana represents an 
ideal source of income for urban individuals and rural villages. The traditional 
reliance of the population upon subsistence farming combined with the divergence 
in economic development present throughout the country may encourage further 
participation.502 According to Viliame Rakai, District Officer for Navosa, local villages 
have resorted to cultivating marijuana as a consequence of economic 
underdevelopment and the expenses involved in transporting produce to local 
markets.503  Disturbingly, Adinkrah has observed the trend of using marijuana to 
cross-subsidise the income generated from sugar cane farming.504 It is possible that 
cultivation has been entrenched throughout Fiji for a considerable period of time, 
and given this, eradicating it could present significant problems for the FPF and the 
IA if it is engrained within the local economy. It is likely that local communities will 
attempt to protect their livelihoods should the IA attempt to intervene in the future.  
 
The tourism industry represents Fiji’s primary source of income and biggest 
source of foreign exchange, earning over an estimated FD$500 million per year; it 
has been equally affected by the history of coups.505 It is likely that demand for drugs 
among certain sections of visiting tourists, such as backpackers, has assisted in 
maintaining the level of marijuana cultivation and demand in Fiji. While marijuana 
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may provide an important source of additional income, its economic benefits are 
paradoxical, as they could encourage the trafficking of harder, more lucrative drugs 
and the involvement of gangs or foreign criminal groups. If drug-related violence 
developed, this would negatively impact upon tourism and the economy, and could 
further encourage the cultivation of marijuana, or involvement with other drugs, to 
offset this loss of income. Furthermore, these potential developments would place a 
significant drain upon the resources of the IA, as it would need to respond by 
increasing the amount of resources devoted to anti-drug measures and the 
negative social effects, diverting important income away from economic 
development priorities. 
 
The Involvement of Regional Actors 
 
 The Response of New Zealand and Australia to the Coup and the 
Implications for the Presence of Drugs 
 
The coup has received widespread condemnation, and as a consequence of 
sanctions, the ability of the IA to sustain operations against the cultivation and 
trafficking of drugs, and the further entrenchment of additional TNC, has been 
undermined through the withdrawal and repositioning of development assistance. 
Fiji’s most important bilateral relations with New Zealand and Australia are in a 
state of fluctuation, and this poses serious difficulties regarding its need to enhance 
its internal and external sovereignty against those associated with drugs and drug-
related activities. Diplomatic relations with New Zealand are particularly difficult, as 
the High Commissioner, Michael Green, was declared persona non grata and a 
range of sanctions have been enacted in areas such as immigration, defence and 
governmental developmental assistance.506 Foreign relations with Australia are 
similarly strained, and some of the assistance provided for public sector, police and 
legal reforms has been removed, though AUSD$50 million allocated for the health 
and education sectors will continue, and this may assist, to some extent, with the 
promotion of drug awareness education.507 China has continued to support Fiji, and 
has provided a FD$170 Million loan to the IA, which, according to reports, will be 
allocated towards the upgrading of rural roads throughout the country.508 Though 
such a loan is also likely to allow the IA to maintain its governing position to the 
detriment of the state.  
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The coup has undoubtedly had an impact upon both the operating capacity 
of the FPF and other domestic agencies responsible for law enforcement activities. 
Additionally, Fiji’s membership within the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police has been 
suspended and the headquarters of the PTCCC has been shifted to Samoa as a 
consequence of fears over political interference. 509 However, given the previously 
close working relationship between Fijian authorities, the AFP, New Zealand Police 
and other regional agencies in operations such as Logrunner and Outrigger, it is 
extremely unlikely that either Australia or New Zealand would be willing to 
jeopardise their extensive investments in regional security by allowing drug 
activities to become further entrenched.510 However, the presence of political 
disputes between related to the RFMF usurpation of power create additional 
complexities within these security objectives that must be negotiated.   
 
While Fiji can be diplomatically isolated and measures such as sanctions 
can be employed to encourage the RFMF and the IA to relinquish control, the 
country cannot be isolated from the RSC of New Zealand, Australia, and other PIS 
because of the transnational characteristics of drugs. Attempts at punishing Fiji 
through the suspension of legal and law enforcement cooperation will directly 
enhance the opportunities for drug trafficking, and this would directly impact upon 
the availability of drugs throughout the Pacific. Lastly, Fijian concerns over the 
erosion of their sovereignty during cooperative anti-drug operations have not been 
auditable, though they are likely to exist, and it is quite possible that their concerns 
over the presence of drugs outweigh those that could arise from such sensitive 
bilateral and multilateral investigations.   
 
Responses of the Fijian Government to Drugs 
 
Previous Fijian government administrations have been significantly 
concerned about the presence of drugs and their negative influence upon the state; 
this is evident through official anxiety over increasing levels of crime and the 
enactment of legislation to enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies. 
Senior officials have expressed their concerns, for example, Viliame Naupoto, the 
Commander of the Fijian Navy, stated during 2002 that the Navy was unable to 
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secure the borders of the country against both drug traffickers and people 
smugglers, and could not prevent the landing of vessels upon the 300 islands that 
comprise the country.511 The IA and RFMF appear to be equally concerned about 
the presence of drugs, though the extent of their concerns could not be ascertained. 
However, recent RFMF actions indicate that an assertive stance is being directed 
against those involved with marijuana, and it is likely that this will apply to all drug 
activities. Within Fiji, we can therefore observe the beginning of the securitisation 
process through the actions and the provision of additional resources by both 
previous governments and the IA. The state is considered the referent object 
requiring security, and the location of the threat has been identified as drugs and 
associated TNC. 
 
Increasing cooperation between governmental and non-governmental 
agencies is visible, and the establishment of new agencies has resulted in 
considerable success. Attempts at overcoming institutional isolation and the 
development of stronger interagency partnerships are also evident. For example, 
the FPF and Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) have signed a memorandum of 
agreement (MOA) to promote a closer working relationship. This facilitates the 
sharing of intelligence related to crimes involving financial transactions and criminal 
assets, allowing for greater effectiveness; an FPF officer has also been seconded to 
the FIU.512 Further MOAs have been signed between the FIU, immigration officials 
and FIRCA, and more are in progress between the ministry of justice and other 
government agencies.  
 
As an example of success directly related to increasing cooperation, the 
Fijian Transnational Crime Unit conducted a probe into the criminal activities of 
local residents during 2002 that resulted in Operation Outrigger (2004). The 
operation involved FPF and FIRCA personnel within the TCU with strong support 
drawn from a multinational force that comprised the AFP, the New Zealand Police, 
the Hong Kong Police and the Royal Malaysian Police. As a consequence of this 
cooperation, a factory-sized clandestine laboratory preparing for the production of 
methamphetamine in commercial quantities that had been established by an Asian 
organised crime group was dismantled.513 Unfortunately, as Evans observes, those 
arrested in connection with the laboratory are only facing a maximum prison 
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sentence of 8 years because drug-related criminal legislation had not be amended 
at that time.514 The success of both Outrigger and Operation Logrunner (2000), in 
which 357kgs of heroin was seized, directly impacted upon the perceptions of the 
government. Both cases vividly demonstrated that Fiji was not immune to drugs, nor 
could it distance itself from the negative influences of globalisation.  
 
The intensity of this official concern culminated in the establishment of the 
Senate Ad-hoc Select Committee on Drugs, Crime and Prostitution (SASC). SASC 
was provisioned with a mandate to examine the presence of drugs and to 
investigate potential measures. Of specific concern was examining the relationship, 
if any, that marijuana had with the committing of crime or the use of violence. As a 
consequence of its investigations, SASC asserted that: “The illicit cultivation, supply 
and distribution of marijuana in the Fiji Islands continues to be a problem in rural 
areas around the country, which by its very nature i.e. its financial rewards often 
attracts criminal elements to this activity or will lure others facing extreme hardship 
to engage in it making it more accessible to the public with serious consequences 
arising from its use and abuse.” 515 This represents significant progress, as the 
government could not begin to tackle drugs and drug-related crime unless it was 
both aware of the contemporary situation and prepared to examine it in a forthright 
manner. SASC acknowledged previous shortcomings in areas such as legislation, 
FPF capacity and the history of political instability, while also noting additional 
negative influences such as the presence of TNC and organised crime. SASC was 
particularly concerned about the potential linkages between drug consumption, 
crime and violence, and while the FPF expressed the opinion that the two were 
linked, SASC concluded that although marijuana was not linked to violence, crimes 
such as robbery were linked to the need to finance the purchase of marijuana.516 
 
In order to gain this accurate understanding of the drug situation, extensive 
consultation with both public and private stakeholders was undertaken. SASC 
asserted that: “There are sufficient indicators to suggest that substance abuse and 
prostitution are major problems that have the potential to escalate into a national 
crisis given its numerous links to the many social ills that effect the Fiji islands today 
and it is imperative that substance abuse be given the national attention it 
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deserves.” 517 This statement clearly demonstrates the beginning of the 
securitisation process, as SASC argues for the deployment of additional state 
resources and highlights the potential for the development of a national crisis if 
drugs and the associated social effects, such as crime, are not brought under 
control. It must be noted that before SASC, drugs were only viewed according to the 
associated health aspects and the specific burden placed upon the national health 
system. This report has expanded the perceptions of the IA to include the potential 
threats posed to the state by the creation of instability through crime and corruption, 
as well as the weakening of modern and traditional governance structures. 
Moreover, it has demonstrated that there will be an increasing financial burden 
created through the allocation of additional, and potentially scarce, resources for 
law enforcement agencies, the judicial system and social service providers, which 
may affect future government policies and restrain its ability to concentrate upon 
economic development priorities.   
 
SASC has also acknowledged the financial motives that encouraged the 
participation of citizens with the cultivation and sale of marijuana, and that issues 
such as poverty in both rural and urban areas were primary influences. Though 
distressingly, it was also noted that attempts at introducing alternative development 
into some areas had failed because of the poor profitability of these crops in 
comparison to that generated by marijuana.518 According to Ms Viniana McGoon, 
Secretary to the Senate, continued investment in, and assistance with, alternative 
development programmes were viewed by the IA as the primary approach for 
discouraging cultivation by rural communities.519 Submissions to SASC reinforced 
this belief, and suggested that more profitable and diversified crops were required 
by communities to support themselves, and this would therefore counter the need to 
become involved in the cultivation of marijuana.520 Among the range of 
recommendations outlined by SASC, are the need for a national awareness 
campaigns and the overwhelming desire for the establishment of rehabilitation 
services. The need to investigate alternative sentencing mechanisms, such as 
diversion for young offenders was also noted. A holistic approach to combating 
drugs is therefore evident, and the recommendations of SASC recognise that a 
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strategy based upon both supply and demand reduction combined with the 
provision of appropriate health facilities is required.  
 
Importantly, SASC has asserted that it did not support requests by farmers in 
the Navosa Hills region to allow the cultivation of marijuana as a source of income, 
and in addition to this denial, it has called upon the government to introduce 
tougher penalties to deter participation.521 According to Adinkrah, increasing rates of 
drug consumption in Fiji during the 1990s resulted in the imposition of mandatory 
prison sentences for use, possession, and cultivation, though unfortunately, 
according to the FPF, the imposition of these harsher penalties failed to influence 
drug consumption and related activities. 522 SASC recognised the transformational 
characteristics of drugs, and acknowledged that local demand for harder drugs 
could become established as a by-product of trafficking activities through Fiji, and 
that supply for this domestic demand would develop through market forces.523 This 
is significant, as not only does it recognise that drugs are a business that involve 
both villages and criminal organisations, creating the potential for counter-
measures based upon market principles, but that a strategy based upon structural 
change represents the best option, as criminal financing and important individuals 
are targeted, rather than unimportant peripheral traffickers or individual street 
sellers.  
 
From the available evidence, it can be asserted that a whole of government 
approach was in the process of being implemented under the pre-coup 
government. This is evident in the actions of the FPF, FIRCA, the judicial system 
and other government agencies such as the Ministry of Education. However, in 
spite of prominent success and dedication, issues such as human, technical and 
financial capacity are still likely to restrict the ability of these agencies to achieve 
maximum results. Moreover, the potential for political interference with the 
functioning and direction of these agencies by the IA combined with issues such as 
RFMF immunity from prosecution represents a significant concern, as RFMF 
personnel could be targeted by criminals to provide assistance to their drug-related 
activities.  
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Previous governments and the IA have instituted a range of measures to 
enhance the capabilities of the state and to strengthen it against the threat posed by 
drugs. For example, new legal powers have been granted to the FPF to undertake 
electronic surveillance, though this has resulted in the creation of new challenges 
such as need for specialised electronic equipment, and a Criminal Intelligence Unit 
was established during 2005 to specifically cater to new policing demands and 
requirements.524 A Computer Based Training Centre has also been established at 
the Fijian Police Academy to provide important information technology skills that are 
essential for combating increasingly sophisticated criminal groups. Unfortunately, 
expanded policing powers and the focus upon drugs has revealed the increasing 
need for forensic facilities; this was noted in submissions to SASC. FIRCA has also 
purchased sophisticated Ion scan machines at a cost of FD$110,000, and has 
implemented risk management strategies that are utilised for profiling both 
suspicious individuals and cargo. 
 
Significant legislative measures have been enacted to combat drugs and the 
associated TNC. These include the Proceeds of Crime and Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters Act 1997, the Extradition Act 2003, the Illicit Drugs Control Act 
2004, and the Financial Transactions Reporting Act 2005.  
Furthermore, in an effort to prevent potential issues such as corruption developing 
in the Immigration Department, fees can no longer be paid in cash.525 Other 
initiatives have included the founding of NSAAC. The objectives of NSAAC are to 
facilitate a comprehensive approach towards drug prevention education, to promote 
the foundation of rehabilitation services, to conduct national research and to 
provide recommendations to the government.526 Though, the ability of the office to 
carry out this extensive mandate is limited by capacity constraints and its 
responsibility for the entire country. 
 
Civil society groups and the public have also become directly involved with 
combating marijuana; they have been incorporated, either officially or unofficially, 
into community policing strategies. For example, in Tukavesi, Cakaudrove, the 
community was directly involved in FPF operations to clear cultivated areas and 
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apprehend growers.527 The Fiji Community Education Association provides another 
example, it has undertaken research to estimate the scale of abuse, and has 
established drug awareness workshops throughout Fiji, and has also developed 
working relationships with government agencies. Given the overriding importance 
of Christianity and the social position of churches throughout the country, these 
could play a significant future role in providing rehabilitation services, alternative 
development programmes and anti-drug education.528   
 
There is evidence to suggest that the IA and RFMF view drugs as a threat to 
the state, though the degree to which the recommendations of SASC have been 
acknowledged and implemented cannot be accurately accounted for. There is 
however, increasing evidence of anti-drug operations. For example, in January 
2007, the RFMF conducted anti-drug operations, and used the army to conduct 
raids throughout Suva. These operations have continued with the most recent 
involving the cooperation of the RFMF and FPF in Nadroga throughout March 
2008.529 Unfortunately, according to AI, recent RFMF operations have reportedly 
resulted in the abuse of those detained in custody.530 Additional measures have 
included limiting the length of stay for foreign yachts as they have been identified as 
one of the primary sources of drugs entering the country, though this decision has 
been recently reversed.531  Furthermore, in order to ease the burden of drugs upon 
the judicial system, the High Court has directed that lower courts be given the ability 
to preside over cases where less than 0.5 grams of marijuana are involved.532 
NSAAC has also been expanded from originally only incorporating a director, Mr 
Driubalavu Misaele, to include two additional support staff, as well as additional 
volunteers. The IA has also continued to invest resources in the FPF and RFMF, 
with a primary focus upon expanding their capabilities and mobility.533  
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However, falling government revenue will ultimately impact upon capacity 
building projects and the financial resources available for social services and anti-
drug measures. Though this situation may be open to change. If drugs are 
prioritised as a primary threat to state security and stability in the future, then the IA 
and RFMF would continue to invest in anti-drug operations, and would provide the 
FPF and other organizations with the required funding. Of serious concern is the 
fact that the National Security Council and the Fiji Intelligence Services have been 
restored by the IA to respond to perceived domestic and international threats. 
According to Ratu Epeli Nailatikua, the Interim Minister for Foreign Affairs: “Given 
the unpredictable future national security landscape, the NCS is to be revived as 
soon as possible, to better safeguard Fiji’s national security matters in the medium 
to long term”.534 The potential threat posed by drugs could be used to justify the 
RFMF maintaining power, and this represents a credible scenario given its stated 
objectives of overcoming the history of poor governance, alleged instances of 
corruption and attempts by the pre-coup government to introduce legislation viewed 
by the RFMF as divisive.535  
 
It is also possible that the IA and RFMR could use the threat posed by drugs 
and TNC to establish greater legitimacy for the 2006 coup. Furthermore, drug-
related crime could be securitised and used an internal political tool to overcome 
individuals and organisations opposed to the objectives of the RFMF. This potential 
scenario would fit neatly within the securitisation concepts developed by Buzan et 
al. The Fijian media already have a tendency to heighten public fears over the 
levels of crime occurring in the country; drugs could be easily incorporated into this 
discourse. Additionally, The manipulation of ethnic identity by political and social 
leaders has a long history in Fiji. A popular perception already exists throughout the 
country that many Asian immigrants are involved in criminal activities and drugs. It 
is plausible that the potential involvement of Asians or Indians with drugs, and the 
associated crime, could be manipulated and incorporated into the security 
discourse of the IA and RFMF. The potential for the IA and RFMF to resort to 
criminal sources of finance also represents a potential scenario given the 
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weakening economy, though it would be extremely difficult, and politically 
explosive, to validate and raise such concerns.  
 
Recent IA policies that have included the relaxing of immigration controls for 
Chinese nationals represent a cause for concern, as those involved with drugs and 
TNC activities may seek to exploit these relaxed border controls and disguise their 
activities with legitimate business ventures.536 The FPF have previously attributed 
rising crime levels throughout the country to the presence of illegal migrants, though 
many of these immigrants may no longer be classed as illegal, and this effectively 
hinders their detection.537 
  
It remains to be seen how the RFMF will approach the potential threats 
posed by drugs, and it is difficult to accurately assess their current and future 
actions against those involved. The RFMF could: maintain the focus of previous 
governments and continue institutional strengthening and cooperation with regional 
agencies; ignore any drug developments or changes; initiate a repressive stance 
that entails the potential for human rights violations; allow itself to become coopted 
by domestic and foreign criminals in an effort to replace decreasing revenue due; 
or, the occurrence of all four scenarios is possible. Furthermore, while aspects of 
sovereignty have not previously figured as an overriding concern during 
cooperative anti-drugs operations, given the current political situation within Fiji, it is 
highly likely that the RFMF would be very cautious regarding future criminal 
investigations that involved the participation of New Zealand and Australia. Both 
states have overwhelmingly rejected the justifications for the recent coup, and the 
RFMF could view the occurrence of criminal investigations as a potential threat to 
their domestic legitimacy. The RFMF will be especially sensitive to any issues 
regarding sovereignty and legitimacy, and discussion concerning drug activities or 
increased drug-related crime in Fiji by New Zealand and Australia are likely to be 
meet with strong rebuttals.    
 
With regard to the concepts of securitisation and politicisation as defined by 
Buzan et al, the securitisation of drugs has clearly occurred though as of yet, this 
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has not entailed a state of emergency or an attempt to gain extraordinary powers, 
though the RFMF coup during 2006 and the institution of the IA could be examined 
according to the criteria established by Buzan et al. There is a strong possibility that 
the threat posed by drugs could become incorporated into the discourse of the 
RFMF, and the occurrence of this is encouraged by its adoption of the new security 
discourse as a policy guideline for its own domestic actions. While the domestic 
politicisation of the subject of drugs between the major political parties was not able 
to be ascertained, it is credible to suggest that this could occur in the future, though 
any political party or national leader that chose to highlight the failures of the IA and 
the RFMF could face significant personal consequences given the total degree of 
control exercised by them at this point in time.  
 
It is also possible that the RFMF could attempt to domestically publicise any 
perceived failures of Australia and New Zealand to provide law enforcement 
assistance to it for combating the presence of drugs. It is highly unlikely that drug 
activities will decrease of their own accord, and in spite of the potential dangers for 
criminals given the unrestricted power of the RFMF for dealing with potential 
domestic threats, the future use of the country for trafficking activities is likely to 
continue, as is any regional trade in marijuana cultivated throughout Fiji.  
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Chapter Five 
 
Conclusions 
 
Conclusions for the Caribbean 
 
 The case studies of Jamaica and Haiti clearly demonstrate that drugs are a 
primary threat to state security, and one where the division between the traditional 
and new security discourse has increasingly dissipated. These two case studies 
must serve as an example to PIS, Pacific security practitioners and policy makers of 
the dangers and the dynamic characteristics associated with drugs. They frequently 
merge with the domestic environment present throughout the state and form 
symbiotic relationships with other sources of insecurity, such as gangs, non-state 
actors and assist with the acquisition of SALW. Moreover, they profoundly influence 
the governance arrangements of the state by corrupting its leaders and 
bureaucracy, while they also weaken its internal and external sovereignty, and 
assist in allowing alternative actors to insert themselves into the vacuum created by 
the reduction of the authority and legitimacy of the state and its diminished ability to 
provide for its citizens.  
 
 
The weakness of the government and the totality of the state are further 
ensured through the rise of criminal groups and non-state actors that enjoy a strong 
level of coercive capacity and the ability to self-finance. This guarantees that cycles 
of weakness and armed conflict can develop, and that the increasing employment 
of violence by a government is required in order to restore its sovereignty and re-
establish a secure domestic environment. Once ordinary citizens become involved, 
it is virtually impossible to undermine their participation, and branches of the state 
such as the judicial system or law enforcement agencies can become easily 
corrupted and overwhelmed. The number of arrests that have occurred in Jamaica 
as a result of the possession of marijuana should serve as an example where 
alternatives to criminal conviction for minor offences are required, as are alternative 
development projects.    
 
With regard to Haiti it is possible that drugs have so thoroughly penetrated 
the state and corrupted its national leaders that even with international assistance 
they will remain as an overwhelmingly detrimental influence. This could potentially 
require further intervention in the future to ensure the security of the Caribbean and 
to re-establish a secure domestic environment. Disturbingly, the UN intervention 
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into Haiti and the reinstitution of the GOH could encourage those associated with 
drugs to shift to neighbouring states where the government is equally weak and the 
state is internally challenged, and the ability of external actors to assist with the 
provision of security is absent. The complexities associated with state sovereignty 
will continue to provide areas of opportunity where criminal groups and non-state 
actors can manipulate themselves between jurisdictional asymmetries to their 
advantage. The overwhelming level of violence and instability throughout Haiti is a 
product of the contestation of the governance arrangements of the state by internal 
actors, and it is within this environment that cocaine traffickers, and potentially those 
involved with the cultivation of marijuana, have chosen to exploit the powerlessness 
of the GOH, for their own economic advantaged. As long as gangs, criminal groups, 
and non-state actors continue to financially benefit from their involvement with drug 
activities, the GOH will be unable to effectively reinstitute itself and the 
implementation of anti-drug measures will ultimately be unsuccessful.  This 
demonstrates the importance of strong and transparent governance for PIS security. 
 
 
With regard to Jamaica, it is clear that its own political leaders have assisted 
with the development and expansion of gangs as they were ideally suited for 
achieving their domestic political objectives, and this patronage combined with the 
use of the profits associated with drugs has facilitated their autonomy. However, in 
spite of this situation, the GOJ has continually invested in the provision of financial, 
technical and human resources for its law enforcement agencies to combat the 
presence of drugs, which are directly linked to the high levels of violence, crime and 
murder that occur. Furthermore, the GOJ has also recognised the multidimensional 
characteristic of drugs, its own previous failings and has sough to institute a 
comprehensive national security policy and a national anti-drug policy with high 
expectations that this coordinated approach will assist with reinstituting both its 
internal and external sovereignty. Jamaica, like Haiti, is trapped between the drug 
demands of the US and the weaknesses present in South America that result in the 
use of their states for drug production. The situation throughout Jamaica 
demonstrates that governments can successful intervene into their drug-related 
insecurity, however, the implementation of such policies are extremely costly. 
 
However, unlike Haiti, the state has not previously failed, and its leaders 
have attempted to utilise bilateral and multilateral relationships to assist with 
enhancing its security, and bipartisan support for anti-drug strategies is evident. 
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One unequivocal similarity that the two states share is the resort to violence by law 
enforcement agencies and the implementation of highly aggressive strategies 
within poor and marginalised communities. These actions often result in human 
rights abuses, and it appears that these respective governments are able to avoid 
the processes associated with legitimising such actions, though states of 
emergency have previously been imposed, that would be required in Western 
states. This situation can be partially accounted for by their historical creation 
through the processes of colonialism, and the fact that their law enforcement 
agencies were previously structured according to a constabulary model of policing, 
with the objective of enforcing the state and not serving its citizens. This situation is 
also evident in PNG. Both the HNP and the JCF have, and are in the process of, 
undergoing extensive reform. Lastly, the fact that gangs, criminal groups and non-
state actors are well financed and have acquired a strong coercive capacity also 
assists in accounting for the highly aggressive strategies employed by the GOJ and 
the GOH in order to maintain their control and authority.  
 
 
Of significant concern, is the fact that even with the provision of extensive 
bilateral and multilateral assistance by the US and its securitisation of all drug 
activities throughout the Caribbean for the past four decades, this has not 
concomitantly resulted in the long-term reduction of the cultivation, production or 
trafficking of drugs, nor has it reduced the insecurity experienced by these small 
and weak states. In spite of repeated and sustained operational success against 
drugs, those involved have simply transformed their operations. This must serve as 
a warning to New Zealand, Australia and the Forum, that the costs of prevention are 
far more economical than for attempting to intervene into entrenched drug activities. 
For example, Mexico is now a major area for trafficking operations, where CIS 
previously served as the primary area for drug activities. Part of the responsibility for 
this derives from US policies that focus on supply over demand reduction, and the 
economic policies that the US pursues throughout the region, which encourage 
economic instability and restrict economic opportunities. The US therefore 
represents both part of the solution and part of the problem. As a regional actor its 
policies directly influence the cultivation, production and trafficking of drugs, its 
counter measures encourage transformation and innovation among those involved 
and the strength of its domestic demand ensures potentially significant profits for 
those prepared to participate.  
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Moreover, US domestic political competition and policies such as the War on 
Drugs combined with its foreign policy objectives exert an enormous influence upon 
drug activities throughout the hemisphere. The US has undoubtedly been forced by 
competing priorities, such as the wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan and the desire 
to increase mainland security, to divert resources and agencies such as their Coast 
Guard away from their previous duties of intercepting drugs within the Caribbean. 
As a direct consequence, the region will again present an ideal area for drug 
activities, and recent transformations such as the localised production of ATS could 
ensure a more insecure and unstable region in the future. The increasing 
reallocation of financial resources to the US mainland border with Mexico, due to 
domestic political concerns regarding drug trafficking and illegal migrants, 
represents another important, though distracting, priority. It is also highly likely that 
budgetary constraints that have developed as a result of its foreign policy decisions 
and miscalculations combined with the sub-prime mortgage crisis will influence the 
financial, technical and human resources available for combating drugs throughout 
the Caribbean in the immediate future. This situation could also have implications 
for the Pacific, especially if border security with Mexico is enhanced. 
 
 
Considerable responsibility must be also be reserved for those CIS where 
cultivation, production and trafficking activities occur, as their national leaders and 
the governments of these states have instituted policies that directly assist with 
enhancing the environment for drugs, such as relaxed financial controls upon the 
banking sector, or they have tolerated official corruption. Alternatively, they have 
ignored drug developments within their state or have been unable to marshal the 
resources to combat their presence. Leaders within these states have also found it 
politically expedient to allow segments of their population, or even their own 
bureaucracy, to become associated with drug activities and such accommodation 
often results in the creation of future sources of insecurity and the empowerment of 
gangs, criminal groups and non-state actors. CIS already have a strong focus upon 
regionalism in order to overcome their collective weaknesses, and in order to 
further ensure their future security additional multilateral political, economic and law 
enforcements measures are required, as is a strong commitment to those that have 
already been established. Moreover, a sustainable level of funding is required for 
these initiatives to be maintained, and external actors that have strong historical 
relationships and the presence of domestic demand for drugs such as the US, UK, 
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France and the European Union must continue to assist these states in securing 
themselves and the Caribbean region. 
 
Conclusions for the Pacific 
 
The continued cultivation, production and trafficking of drugs and the 
expansion of these activities in the future will, without doubt, result in the 
establishment of a permanent domestic drug consuming market throughout PIS, 
and will further embed the region as an area exploited by external criminal groups 
and organisations. Once such activities become entrenched it is highly unlikely that 
they will be amenable to effective management or control, and the region does not 
currently possess the high level of resources required to successfully intervene into 
such activities on a sustained basis. PIS are already challenged by issues related to 
economic development and increasing urbanisation, and the inclusion of such a 
multifaceted issue as drugs is likely to overwhelm their already limited resources. 
Unfortunately, the lack of economic opportunities are also likely to encourage the 
participation of ordinary Melanesia, Micronesian and Polynesian citizens with drugs 
in order to provide for themselves, and the paradoxes relating to the occurrence of 
this situation have previously been highlighted. Furthermore, the presence and 
entrenchment of these activities directly threatens the objectives of economic 
growth, sustainable development, good governance and enhanced regional 
security as outlined in the Pacific Plan. It can be confidently asserted that without 
the significant investment of financial, technical and human resources, including 
extensive bilateral and multilateral assistance and the further enhancement of law 
enforcement capacity building programmes, then the continued security and 
stability of the Pacific cannot be guaranteed. Drugs are a contemporary threat that 
will increasingly materialise to the detriment of PIS and regional security. 
  
 Adequate examples of conflict and instability are readily available 
throughout the Pacific, and while drugs are extremely unlikely to be the cause for 
armed conflict—unless gang warfare related to drugs develops within urban 
areas—the profits associated with drugs could sustain villages, clans and non-state 
actors locked into domestic conflict, and assist with their SALW acquisition activities. 
Furthermore, while it has been frequently asserted that SALW have been 
overwhelmingly sourced from domestic stocks, it is possible that drug profits could 
be invested in acquiring them from outside the region in the future, and initiatives 
such increased armoury security that restrict the domestic supply could encourage 
this to occur. The evolution and development of a conflict scenario were domestic 
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actors trade drugs or use the associated profits to acquire SALW has already 
occurred throughout PNG. This may have already occurred throughout the Solomon 
Islands, or equally, it could occur in Bougainville in the future. This situation will 
entail very real consequences for any future peacekeeping and peace-restoration 
operations, as the motivations of those groups involved in conflict could transform 
away from those based upon grievance and towards more financial objectives. This 
change is likely to prevent the easy amelioration of these conflicts, and it is also 
likely to sustain their duration. Lastly, if drug related violence and crime developed 
beyond a small scale then this will negatively impact upon the viability and 
expansion of the tourism industry, which represents a fundamental source of 
income for PIS, resulting in future instability. Regional security actors and agencies 
cannot afford to be complacent.  
 
Of further concern, is the development of a scenario where gangs present 
through PIS could become proxies for external criminal groups or organsiations. For 
example, this could happen if they become middlemen for Asia, South American, 
New Zealand or Australian criminal groups, and this would eventually result in the 
development of indigenous PIS criminal groups that profit from their involvement in 
drugs. Such a scenario occurred within Haiti. This proxy scenario could become 
more destabilising if gangs and criminal groups developed relationships with local 
and national political leaders or parties, and the history of Jamaica demonstrates 
the challenges posed by criminals that enjoy a modicum of political patronage and 
protection. Moreover, successful anti-drug and organised crime strategies within 
New Zealand or Australia could encourage these activities to shift to more 
vulnerable PIS. If this were to occur, then the ability of either state to pursue these 
criminals would be greatly reduced, and it would require the investment of 
significant resources to intervene. Complexities regarding PIS sovereignty could 
also arise, and this would further hinder attempts at combating drugs, while also 
creating difficulties within key bilateral and multilateral relationships. The history of 
the Caribbean vividly illustrates how the tacit or explicit acceptance of corruption 
and crime assists with the entrenchment of criminal groups associated with drugs, 
and if this were to occur, then the governance capacity and both the internal and 
external sovereignty of PIS would be undermined. This situation is credible, given 
the concerns that have already been raised about accountability, transparency and 
corruption within many PIS.  
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Other equally concerning transformations could include the reinvestment of 
the profits derived from marijuana into ATS or methamphetamine production, or for 
attaining alternative drugs such as cocaine or heroin. For example, recent 
discussion has focused upon the availability of methamphetamine in PNG, and 
given its open borders and close proximity to Indonesia and the rest of South East 
Asia, it could be possible for the demand for low cost ATS to be stimulated within 
the country, or alternatively, local production facilities could become established. 
The trafficking of precursor chemicals used in the production of ATS and 
methamphetamine has already been observed in PNG. This trade throughout the 
Pacific could have occurred for a long period of time without official recognition of 
what the chemicals were being used for, and the volume of chemicals seized during 
operation Outrigger assists in reinforcing this scenario. There is also a strong 
likelihood that drugs profits will be used to provide assistance to other TNC 
enterprises such as migrant smuggling. Further developments could include the 
increasing utilisation and exploitation of cruse ship tourism for trafficking drugs, as 
few controls are imposed upon them. It is highly unlikely that go-fast-boats that are 
used for trafficking within the Caribbean will become established in the Pacific due 
to the large distances between PIS. Lastly, given the limited sovereignty and power 
that PIS currently command, it is credible to suggest that the expansion of criminal 
activities associated with drugs could be potentially overwhelming, and the 2006 
Tongan riots vividly demonstrate this fact.  
 
Unfortunately, the anti-drug discourse promoted by Australia, New Zealand 
and the Forum is not universally accepted, and as a consequence, asymmetries 
exist among PIS in terms of their drug legislation, their attitudes to the potential 
threats and facilitating conditions for their cultivation, production and trafficking. For 
example, Donna Browny, a member of the Vanuatu Parliament, asserted that 
families should have the right to cultivate marijuana given the low prices that are 
being paid for copra.538 This situation is likely to be present throughout the region. 
There is no way to account for whether local law enforcement agencies or 
community leaders passively ignore the presence of marijuana cultivation in 
response to poor economic opportunities. There is also the strong potential for 
social and community values to differ throughout the region given the diversity of 
European and Pacific cultures. This situation results in an uneven, and potentially 
flawed, regional approach towards combating the presence of drugs. 
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The continued viability of both New Zealand and Australia as drug 
consuming markets combined with the strategic geographic location of PIS between 
the major producing and consuming markets will ensure that they are extensively 
used for drug activities in the future. Robert Taylor, Head of the Oceania Customs 
Organisation, has asserted that: “the Pacific has been used, is being used and will 
continue to be used for drug trafficking in the future.” 539 As a consequence of this 
situation, measures that are solely directed against interception and seizure are 
unlikely to result in lasting success, and this is vividly demonstrated by the 
enormous success of Caribbean bilateral and multilateral operations that have 
done little to disrupt the overall continuation of drug activities. Additionally, the 
prohibitive financial costs associated with undertaking such regular operations 
raise significant questions regard their appropriateness and sustainability, given 
their overall ineffectiveness and the fact that these resources could be deployed 
towards more effective anti-drug strategies.  
 
A multifaceted approach is therefore required, and importantly, the 
recommendations of SASC in Fiji demonstrate that PIS have begun to demonstrate 
a sound understanding of the challenges they currently face. This understanding is 
also apparent within observations made by FPF and RPNGC personnel. 
Unfortunately, as a consequence of their limited resources, PIS may face the 
additional challenge of convincing New Zealand, Australia and other regional 
actors such as the US of the need to extensively fund their domestic initiatives. This 
is likely to be meet with resistance, and could potentially raise questions regarding 
the responsibility of PIS for their own domestic security arrangements. This situation 
also raises questions regarding the power asymmetry of PIS in relation to regional 
security actors. While New Zealand and Australian have securitised drugs and TNC 
in the region, they may not be amenable to PIS solutions, and they could in fact 
seek to influence domestic drug policy in line with their own requirements. It would 
be highly unlikely that marijuana could be legalised or decriminalised by any PIS, 
even if this course of action relieved the pressure upon PIS governments and 
judicial systems, as this could potentially influence the availability of it in other 
states. Moreover, the decriminalisation and legalisation of marijuana in some PIS 
would directly assist with the development of the threats consistently outlined 
throughout this thesis. 
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The Pacific region is firmly established within the RSC of New Zealand and 
Australia. Neither the political parties nor the constituents of either state would be 
willing to tolerate the development of drug-related security threats within PIS, and 
there is a strong potential for such failures to become domestically politicised. The 
increasing involvement of the US throughout the region and the extension of its 
bilateral relationships with PIS states are also likely to result in the creation of 
additional pressures upon their domestic drug policies. Although there is significant 
power asymmetry within the bilateral and multilateral relationships between PIS, 
New Zealand and Australia, these should not be considered as unidirectional. 
However, in the future, PIS will need to enhance their lobbying strategies within 
these states to ensure that their future anti-drug resource needs are meet. It is also 
possible that PIS could attempt to insert themselves further into the regional security 
discourse in order to maximise the potential level of assistance that they receive. 
Though, as the reports by the ANCD demonstrate, PIS drug issues are still largely 
unpublicised and inadequately addressed.     
 
 
Increasing cooperation between police, customs and immigration agencies 
has occurred, and the establishment of new organisations such as Financial 
Investigation Units and Transnational Crime Units have resulted in significant 
regional success in seizing drug shipments, dismantling production facilities and in 
disrupting criminal enterprises. However, PIS require the continued expansion of 
the capacity of their law enforcement agencies in order to undertake sustained 
operations. This raises concerns regarding future sustainability, and the direct need 
for New Zealand and Australia to continue with expanding their presence and anti-
drug measures throughout the region. Unfortunately, New Zealand appears 
reluctant to commit to an expanded presence throughout the region as advocated 
and initiated by Australia.540 In the opinion of Ranmuthugala, PIS are already 
unable to deal with routine law enforcement activities such as violent crime or fraud, 
and further responsibility for drug activities, TNC and organised crime are 
potentially beyond their current level of expertise.541 Similarly, Naidu has described 
the security forces of many PIS as oxymoronic due to their reoccurring involvement 
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in coups and their instigation of violence.542 Significant attention will need to be 
focused upon not only measures to increase the professionalism and capabilities of 
Pacific law enforcement agencies, but also the environment that they will be 
policing within. This situation is clearly demonstrated by the behaviour of police 
personnel within Jamaica and Haiti. Attention to this last aspect is especially 
relevant if police are working within an environment that becomes characterised by 
the availability of drugs, corruption or is defined by the dominance of custom and 
traditional authorities.  
 
The region has witnessed the fundamental expansion of security measures 
during the past few years. The AFP has become indispensable for conducting 
regional anti-drug operations. Moreover, they have been instrumental in 
establishing agencies such as the PTCCC and the provision of extensive training 
opportunities for law enforcement personnel via the Law Enforcement Cooperation 
Program. The OCO has also established the Asia-Pacific Enforcement Report 
System that ensures secure communications for disseminating information relating 
to drugs and the modus operandi of criminal groups. Joint naval operations have 
occurred with the objective of enhancing civil maritime surveillance techniques, 
such as operation Kurukuru, have involved the participation of Australia, New 
Zealand, France, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Fiji. Additionally, the implementation 
of security measures such as the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) 
Code (2004), as a consequence of US desires to extend the burden for its territorial 
security, could have potentially positive benefits for PIS by enhancing their port 
security and this would assist in deterring their use by criminals.  
 
However, the volume of maritime cargo and pleasure craft that transit the 
region will ensure that any states that fail to adopt new measures are likely to 
become primary targets, while the financial costs associated with these new 
security measures will place an additional burden upon the small, weak and 
microstates that characterise the region.543 Taylor also expressed strong concerns 
that pleasure craft involved with trafficking activities were utilising the Panama 
Canal to avoid US anti-drug measures in the Caribbean, and to supply other 
markets such as Australia.544  Given this situation and the observation by the 
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Colombian government that the Pacific coast was now overwhelmingly important for 
the trafficking of cocaine, it is credible to suggest that these activities will 
increasingly involve the use of PIS. 
 
Previous attempts at introducing regional legislation have faced a situation 
where issues of applicability, legal capacity and a lack of monitoring have 
undermined their overall functioning and the original objectives associated with 
shared legal codes. This also does not take into account whether the laws were 
adopted or implemented at all. Moreover, policies and legislation that aimed at 
enhancing regional security through legislation, such as those identified by the 
Honiara Declaration, occurred at a time when the widespread visibility of drugs and 
TNC was low, and the threat from such criminal activities were only considered as a 
potential scenario. This is likely to have reduced the allocation of resources and 
political commitment. The lack of shared legislation throughout the Pacific directly 
impacts upon the ability of law enforcement agencies to cooperate, intercept and 
dismantle criminal activities. The absence of even minor laws that permit activities 
such as the monitoring of phone calls can hinder investigations and prevent the 
gathering of intelligence. Additionally, the failure to update criminal penalties has 
allowed individuals that were arrested during operation Outrigger to escape with 
short prison sentences. This clearly needs to be addressed.  
 
Adherence to UN anti-drug conventions by PIS is low, and as Boister 
observes, these conventions are not comprehensive; they require close 
cooperation among member states to implement additional bilateral and multilateral 
legislation to make them effective.545 These legislative concerns have been 
commented upon frequently. For example, the 2002 Forum Communiqué asserted 
that: “Leaders expressed concern about the inability of current illicit drugs 
legislation within the region to provide a common base for law enforcement 
agencies to operate from both the national and regional basis.” 546 The absence of a 
shared anti-drug strategy for the region has been recognised, as has the lack of a 
regional legal response towards shared legal codes and the legislation necessary 
to facilitate complex anti-drug operations. The FRSC has recognised this, and the 
draft Illicit Drugs Control Bill (2002) has resulted from extensive consultation 
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between the Forum, OCO and the South Pacific Chiefs of Police Conference.547 The 
bill has been use as the basis for legislation introduced by Tonga, Fiji, and the 
Northern Mariana Islands.548  
 
The examination of Forum documents clearly demonstrates that the 
presence of drugs throughout the Pacific has been securitised, however, with 
regard to Buzan this regional securitisation is different to the securitisation of drugs 
by a state. The Forum commands little authority and few coercive measures, and it 
continues to face financial difficulties. Furthermore, established norms such as the 
pacific way and the preference of regional actors like New Zealand to defer to 
international authorities such as the UN before undertaking interventionist actions 
ensures that securitisation at the regional level is directed largely by a mixture of 
benevolence and compassionate self-interest, even if Forum policy is 
overwhelmingly influenced by both Australia and New Zealand. This is in contrast to 
state securitisation, where unstated objectives are often behind attempts to gain 
extraordinary powers. Moreover, as Boxall notes, the political nature of the Forum 
reduces the overall ability of its leaders to respond to crises and conflicts.549  
 
If PIS view the potential threats posed by drugs as an externally imposed 
security agenda that is unrelated to their own concerns, then this situation could 
prevent their future acceptance of additional measures such as legislation for the 
extradition of criminals. More importantly, significant concern over the possible 
need to surrender elements of their sovereignty for the collective objective of 
enhancing regional security could conceivable occur, and the potential for such 
sensitivities has already been demonstrated during US-Caribbean negotiations 
over the Ship-rider Agreements. Indeed, concerns over protecting sovereignty are 
likely to become issues that result in significant delays. For example, the current 
political situation in Fiji could potentially prevent regional assistance with future 
anti-drug operations. The issue of sovereignty throughout the Pacific is a 
particularly difficult issue, and shares many similarities with the Caribbean, as the 
shear number of jurisdictions and the complexity of sovereignty arrangements 
hinder quick cooperation. France and the US also have considerable interests 
throughout the Pacific, and it is likely that these powerful actors will need to provide 
both their consent and to allocate additional resources to these territories in order 
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for them to comply with anti-drug measures. Lastly, PIS are not homogenous, and 
as such, any current political or economic conflicts between them could become 
subsumed within bilateral and multilateral negotiations, and could prevent their 
adoption of new measures. 
 
 New Zealand, Australia, the Forum and PIS must be willing to examine the 
previous success and failures of the Caribbean in order to avoid becoming trapped 
within the same cycles of crime, violence, and instability. For this to happen a 
regional strategy that is multifaceted, which combines a credible focus and balance 
between seizure objectives, demand reduction, alternative development and 
sentencing, must be developed. Importantly, an increased desire for political and 
economic regionalism over and above what has already occurred is evident 
throughout the Pacific. Moreover, the politicisation, political bargaining and 
antagonism that are traditionally associated with the discussion of drug issues must 
be overcome by political accommodation and bi-partisan support. Furthermore, 
while it can be easily asserted that PIS are frequently subjected to the imposition of 
foreign political agendas, which raise questions regarding relevance and 
appropriateness, such as post-September 11 security measures and anti-Terror 
legislation, the same cannot be said for regional anti-drug measures. Drug-related 
threats and insecurity have already begun to materialise, and will directly influence 
both bilateral and multilateral relations throughout the region in the foreseeable 
future. Additionally, future regional strategies must explicitly include the US, and 
must aim to incorporate their efforts as much as possible within the strategies 
developed by the Forum.  
 
However, though this approach is likely to bring significant benefits to PIS in 
the form of increased financial, technical and human resource assistance, the 
power of the US and its own objectives could equally dominate the objectives of the 
Forum. The assertiveness of the US within the development of anti-drug policy 
could lead to measures that are either out of touch with Pacific cultures or 
antithetical to the interests of New Zealand and Australia. For example, the 
preference for law enforcement measures and supply over demand reduction by 
the US could place additional burdens upon PIS and their judicial systems. Lastly, 
the US has already begun the process of negotiating Shiprider Agreements with 
PIS, both Palau and the Cook Islands have already agreed to these legislative 
measures, and while the Forum should not intervene to stop these bilateral 
agreements, it should seek to pressure the US to organise them on a more holistic 
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regional level with the Forum at the centre of negotiations so that the whole region 
may benefit.550 The cultivation, production, trafficking and consumption of drugs will 
not stop of their own accord, and as such a robust regional response is required for 
the future security of the Pacific. 
 
 
 
 
Potential Future Policy Initiatives for the Pacific 
 
  
1. The establishment of a Regional Drug Master Plan 
 
2. The undertaking of a regional survey of high school students to estimate the extent of drug 
consumption and availability as a barometer for the wider community 
 
3. The establishment of a regional fund for anti-drug operations 
 
4. The establishment of a regional training school for drug councillors 
 
5. The institution of a regional training programme for drug detection dogs  
 
6. Increased cooperation between the Pacific Maritime Patrol Boat Programme, customs, police, 
immigration agencies, and both the Australian and New Zealand Navy in regional monitoring. 
 
7. Increased monitoring of private vessels transiting the region 
 
8. Increased cooperation with Caribbean intelligence, customs and police agencies, and other regional 
organisations involved with combating drugs. 
 
9. Increased cooperation with US Pacific agencies such as the DEA or Federal Bureau of 
Investigations (FBI). 
 
10. Increased cooperation with Asia and South American police and customs agencies.  
 
11. Alternative economic development projects 
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Barriers to Regional Success in Combating Illicit Drugs 
 
 
1. Domestic armed conflict and SALW acquisition activities 
 
2. State and government weakness 
 
3. The presence of corruption 
 
4. A lack of domestic political support and institutional apathy 
 
5. A lack of financial, technical and human resources 
 
6. Poor support from New Zealand and Australia 
 
7. The presence of political accommodation between national leaders and criminals 
 
8. The entrenchment of drugs through the involvement of ordinary citizens 
 
9. A lack of economic incentives to discourage participation by ordinary citizens 
 
12. A lack of coercive measures to discourage criminal participation 
 
13. The geographic dispersal of PIS and an inability to assist all states 
 
14. The development of criminal relationships between Pacific gangs and criminal groups, and Asian, 
South American, New Zealand and Australian counterparts. 
 
15. The potential for significant profits above what the formal economy can provide 
 
16. Poor regional cooperation 
 
17. Bilateral and multilateral tension or difficulties 
 
 
 
Conclusions for the Employment of the Concepts Developed by 
Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 
 
The Securitisation of New Threats and the Potential for Human Right 
Abuses 
 
Significant criticism has been directed against the opening up of both the 
referent object and the location of the threat. According to this disapproval, such an 
action would make the field of conflict and security studies incoherent, and the 
concept of security devoid of any substantive meaning. More dangerously, a 
situation could result where security could be invoked for any event defined as a 
threat, and as long as those holding power were in a strong position, with weak 
domestic political opposition, then the citizens of such a state would, undeniably, be 
at the caprice of those in power. While Buzan et al have asserted that there are 
socially defined limits to what can be securitised, these limits are to an extent 
meaningless as long as those in power address their legitimating audience in terms 
that are appropriate and in concert with prevailing social beliefs. This is clearly 
demonstrated by the actions of the Jamaican and Haitian governments and their 
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law enforcement agencies, and this also exists to an extent within PNG. It is 
questionable whether such aggressive methods bring about a higher level of safety 
and lower rates of crime, though without a doubt human rights abuses occur on a 
large scale because of these tactics. While it is important to recognise the 
significance of new security threats, the adoption of the discourse can itself lead to 
the commission of acts or the development of policies that were once indefensible 
or unthinkable.  
 
The strong possibility of such scenarios occurring requires a further example 
to reinforce the seriousness of the implications. According to Emmers, drugs were 
securitised as a threat to the national security of Thailand during Thakin Shinawatra 
term as Prime Minister, and all categories of the NSF with the exception of the 
environment were included within his discourse that legitimated the aggressive 
actions of the state.551 As a consequence of police actions, an estimated 2,000 
people were killed, 52,000 were arrested and 40 million ATS pills were seized 
between February and April 2003 when the first official anti-drug campaign 
ended.552 A census of Thai citizens revealed strong support for these anti-drug 
measures and oppositional parties accused Shinawatra of using the securitisation 
of drugs for political gain.553 Muna reinforces the negative consequences of 
securitisation, and cites the established practice of securitisating non-traditional 
issues and virtually everything within Indonesia as a mechanism for domestic 
control during the Presidency of Suharto (1966-1998).554 Similarly, the GOJ has 
instituted states of emergency for such purposes, and in the future the RFMF could 
equally use the securitisation of drugs and crime to maintain its control and to 
enhance its legitimacy. The immediate effectiveness of such anti-drug campaigns 
should not be downplayed. However, the focus upon supply reduction and the 
avoidance of demand reduction that is characteristic with the securitisation of drugs 
are highly unlikely to result in any tangible benefits as the environment that 
facilitates drug activities remains intact.   
 
The application of the NSD frequently results in a militarised response by 
governments for purposes and priorities that are clearly more political than defence 
related, even though drugs are intimately involved with tangible threats. These 
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observations assist in reinforcing the conclusion that unless securitisation is 
undertaken with a state where political transparency is valued and a system of 
checks and balances upon the actions of both the state and its agencies are in 
place, then it is likely that securitisation will result in human rights abuses. The 
employment of securitisation in weak and failing states, non-Western states and 
those that are internally challenged with low levels of legitimacy such as former 
colonial states, often results in the abuse of their citizens. The political character of 
the state must therefore be taken into account with the adoption of the NSD, though 
given the domestic objectives of political, security and defence actors, it is highly 
unlikely that they would be self-reflective and question their own employment of 
such a discourse if it was successful for achieving their goals. As a consequence, 
the securitisation of new issues is likely to be directly associated with the 
maintenance of state power and its measures to combat threats to its authority, and 
it represents an ideal mechanism for non-democratic states to legitimise their 
actions to the international community.  
 
Securitisation Versus Criminalisation 
 
The relationship between repression and the use of securitisation is linked to 
other important discussions, such as whether issues should be handled by 
measures that are already available versus the mobilisation of additional state 
resources. For example, with regard to Indonesia, SALW have remained 
criminalized while the trafficking of drugs has been securitised, and a war on drugs 
has been instituted.555 In Fiji, the beginnings of the securitisation process are visible, 
though as of yet this has not resulted in a war on drugs, and the motivation for the 
provision of additional state resources has come from a combination of the research 
undertaken by the SASC and the magnitude of the drug seizures that have 
occurred. In Jamaica a combination of securitisation and criminalisation is visible, 
with the continued allocation of resources to law enforcement agencies and 
aggressive anti-drug strategies, while alternative sentencing mechanisms are also 
being implemented. Clearly, there is a need to raise the priority of an important 
security issue so that it can obtain the necessary resources before it becomes a 
potentially destabilising crisis, though it is questionable whether securitisation 
represents the best course of action for all states and all issues. Often the 
politicisation of an issue within the media is enough to ensure the allocation of 
additional resources.  
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Applicability of the PS&F, NFA, and R&P 
 
The NFA has been criticised as too euro-centric in character, and therefore 
only applicable within certain states. Buzan and Weaver have attempted to address 
these euro-centric criticisms by asserting that the original concepts were devised 
with developing states in mind.556 However, in spite of considerable efforts devoted 
by them to understand and highlight the security issues that are intimately 
associated with former colonial and developing states, in reality the application of 
the NFA raises significant problems. Firstly, when examining developing, weak or 
failed states the ability to obtain accurate and up-to-date information represents a 
significant challenge, as information concerning the actions and policies of the 
government are frequently unobtainable from the bureaucracy, or it may not even 
exist, and this was demonstrated by the investigation into Haiti and PNG. 
Furthermore, in more authoritarian states transparency is not valued as a priority, 
and information detailing their decisions are therefore not available. Decisions 
could be made on a more ad-hoc basis if a state does not base the legitimacy of its 
actions upon support derived from its citizens.  
 
The sheer volume and specific nature of the information required to conduct 
informed analysis of a particular state raises an additional concern, as when 
examining a potential threat or example of securitisation multiple categories of the 
NFA must be employed to gain a holistic understanding. For example, information 
concerning the presence of drugs and their influence upon Haiti, PNG and Fiji are 
not well developed, and this requires considerable background research. 
Importantly, the NFA has allowed this thesis to avoid some of the issues associated 
with the lack of detailed information and statistics concerning the presence of drugs, 
and examining the actions of the state assists with assessing whether their 
respective governments view drugs as a security threat. The NFA has also allowed 
this thesis to employ an organised approach for examining the threat posed by 
drugs throughout the four case studies. Furthermore, consulting PS&F has allowed 
this thesis to examine the importance of non-state actors and gangs, and to 
highlight their interdependent relationship with their host state, while also providing 
an overview of the contemporary and historical challenges facing the state.  
 
The consultation of R&P has demonstrated the importance of powerful states, 
such as the US or Australia, and regional or global actors, such as the INCB or the 
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Forum, for defining the domestic drug policies of the case studies. R&P has also 
illustrated the importance of their historical and contemporary bilateral and 
multilateral relationships, and how these can influence the domestic decisions 
made by governments. However, because of the volume of information that is 
required to make important decisions, it is quite possible that arbitrary conclusions 
or poor insights into future their actions could result, and as a consequence 
analysis of important current events could be limited to post-factum situations. This 
is unhelpful for informing current or immediate policy decisions.  
 
The definitions employed by Buzan et al, and especially the difference 
between securitisation and politicisation are somewhat arbitrary and it is clear that a 
mixture of both are in operation when a government is attempting to gain legitimacy 
for its actions or future policies. These definitions must also be placed under the 
caveat of public versus private securitisation, as clearly publicising a security issue 
is beneficial for a government attempting to either shape its presentation within the 
media, to confuse other actors attempting to gain an insight into their future 
intentions or can merely assist with presenting the façade of public consultation.  
 
Buzan et al have been overwhelming motivated by the desire to examine the 
process of securitisation and the claiming extraordinary powers by governments 
during a state of emergency, the securitisation of some issues, and this is especially 
relevant for drugs, often occur over a long period of time. Moreover, within this long 
time period, individual events can involve the attempt to gain extraordinary powers 
during the invocation of a state of emergency, as the discussion of Jamaica 
demonstrates. This highlights a problem with the employment of securitisation as 
described by Buzan et al: the timing and occurrence of events. Securitisation should 
be conceived of as existing along a spectrum, and does not necessarily involve an 
attempt to gain extraordinary powers during an emergency situation. The example 
of the US government and its invocation of emergency powers immediately after the 
attacks upon the World Trade Towers represents one end of the spectrum and fits 
the definitions developed by Buzan et al. The other end of this spectrum is provided 
by Jamaica and its long history of attaching a high priority to drug-related insecurity, 
which has at times involved emergency measures, though it has traditionally 
involved the overwhelming allocation of resources for anti-drug measures. 
Furthermore, since drugs represent a multidimensional threat that is at times difficult 
to define, aspects of security that are associated with drugs, such as organised 
crime, urban gangs or specific drug-related activities or types of drugs, can be, and 
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are often securitised individually. Lastly, more attention must be focused by Buzan 
et al, if it this has not already occurred, to the complexity of sovereignty 
arrangements, where states may be unable to act upon an issue because of their 
weakness, or could be influenced towards making specific policy decisions 
because of external actors. 
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Appendix 
 
1.1 Small Arms and Light Weapons Availability in Haiti 
 
 
 
 
 
 206
1.2 Small Arms and Light Weapons Transfers to Haiti 
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1.3 Armed Groups Present Throughout Haiti 
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2.1 Black Market Small Arms and Light Weapons Prices in 
 Papua New Guinea 
 
 
 
2.2 Black Market Ammunition Prices in Papua New Guinea 
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2.3 Unaccounted for Small Arms and Light Weapons  
in Papua New Guinea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 210
2.4 Unaccounted for Small Arms and Light Weapons  
in Papua New Guinea 
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2.5 Tribal Conflict and Casualties in Papua New Guinea 
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